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LDCs and their “development”

16. März 2022 - 22:26
Litmus test of international co-operation

By Barbara Adams and Julie Kim

Download this briefing (pdf version).

A German translation of this article is going to appear in Rundbrief Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung, Issue 1, 2022 (forthcoming). See https://www.forumue.de/hintergrundanalyse/rundbriefe/.

One of the global processes falling prey to the Omicron variant of the Covid virus was the fifth UN Conference on the Least Developed countries, originally scheduled for the end of January in Doha, Qatar. It has been replaced with a meeting in New York on 17 March 2022 for the adoption of the Doha Programme of Action (DPoA); a full meeting will be held in March 2023, where governments will gather with stakeholders “to build new plans and partnerships for the delivery of the DPoA over the following decade”. The LDC conferences and programmes of action have a long history of marking the state of global solidarity with countries most in need of co-operation and of the underlying root-causes for global inequalities.

2021 was the year to mark the 50th anniversary of establishing the Least Developed Countries (LDC) category. The Doha Programme of Action (DPoA) is the latest decade-long Programme of Action, all of which foster the ambition of graduating from the LDC category.1 Unlike the Low-Income Countries designation of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the category relies not only on gross national income (GNI) per capita, but also on the human assets index and the economic and environmental vulnerability index. Also, unlike the approach of the International Finance Institutions (IFI), the category includes commitments of the LDCs, and crucially, of their “development partners” in the form of International Support Measures (ISM).

The pivotal role of ISMs has been re-emphasized and put under the microscope in the face of the climate crisis, the COVID pandemic and the looming debt crisis – all threats to LDCs that they neither wholly caused nor can address by domestic measures alone. While the DPoA underscores that LDCs have the primary responsibility for their development, it reiterates that development partners commit to providing “concrete and substantial support” in solidarity.

Solidarity is not charity; in an interconnected world, it is common sense. It is the principle of working together, recognizing that we are bound to each other, and that no community or country can solve its challenges alone. It is about our shared responsibilities to and for each other, taking account of our common humanity and each person’s dignity, our diversity and our varying levels of capacity and need.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, “Our Common Agenda” (2021)

Before the pandemic, LDC progress on development was unstable at best and lagging at worst.2 Graduating from the LDC category is meant to indicate sustained efforts and results toward development, economic and otherwise. While some LDCs expressed concern about losing the bulk of the ISMs upon graduation, inching closer to graduation at all seems farfetched with the pandemic setting back progress. The UN Committee for Development Policy (CDP) that oversees the graduation process found that on top of LDCs not being on track pre-pandemic, the crisis is “reversing years of progress towards achieving the SDGs” globally and returning to pre-COVID is unfeasible.3 Without the international community’s coordinated assistance on finance, LDCs could be left behind in pandemic recovery and, as documented by UNCTAD, face “a risk of a lost decade of development and of remaining on the margins of the global economy.”4

Remember, whenever a country gets in debt too much, it’s as much the result of bad lending as it is bad borrowing.
Joseph Stiglitz, LDC Future Forum 2021

Distressed by debt and Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs)

Crippling debt is an immediate and looming crisis for LDCs. Two new measures designed to help debtor countries during the current crisis were heralded: the IMF allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and the G20 Debt Suspension Services Initiative (DSSI). SDR allocations were to provide extra liquidity to IMF member countries in need, but were allocated according to each countries’ IMF quotas, which total only 3.2% for LICs, compared with 17.4% for USA. Efforts to “re-channel” these funds were called for and the G20 pledged such action in 2020, but it remains unimplemented.

As for the DSSI, it is only a suspension of debt repayment, nothing more than “kicking the can down the road” (Bodo Ellmers). The DPoA notes with concern that “4 LDCs were classified as in debt distress, while the number of LDCs at high risk of debt distress increased to 16” as of February 2021. The CDP study on the impact of COVID-19 emphasizes that DSSI is only temporary and “clearly insufficient,” especially as it excludes multilateral lenders that make up more than a third of total debt, and this failure contributes to LDCs spending more on debt service than the health sector. In its 2022 Global Economic Prospects Report, focusing on low-income countries, the World Bank reports that many countries face a crisis of solvency, and that a reduction of debt stock is required.5

The so-called Mbeki Report of 2015 records over $1 trillion over the last 50 years in losses due to IFFs from Africa, home to 33 LDCs.6 It is estimated that governments worldwide lose $600 billion in taxes annually.7 In Zambia, copper mining makes up 80% export earnings, but 30% of the tax revenue and 12% of the GDP,8 enabled by lucrative tax incentives to multinational mining companies. Combined with other tax avoidance techniques, such as overestimating production costs, such measures allowed the companies to report no profits made. The widely recognized lacuna of international tax cooperation and prolonged debate over the definition of IFF continues tax avoidance and evasion, undermining not only development for LDCs but also their domestic resource mobilization to invest in important public programs like healthcare during the pandemic.

International Support Measures

ISMs are fundamental to LDC development, encompassing financial resources, capacity building, and technical assistance. In concert with development and trade partners, LDCs are given special and differential treatments to support their development path. However, upon graduation LDCs are confronted with the loss of ISMs and compete globally for trade, finance and investment, on top of pressures of the pandemic and achieving the SDGs. Attempts to expand ISMs has been fragmented and designed without guaranteeing compliance from development partners. For example, donors have consistently failed to meet the Official Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.15% to 0.20% of GNI for LDCs.9 The DPoA emphasizes the importance of extending ISMs for graduated LDCs with the extension or gradual phasing out of trade preferences to “avoid their abrupt reduction.” Such measures would ensure sustainable and irreversible graduation and contribute to holding LDCs and development partners mutually accountable.

You have to realize that some of the gap between the rich countries and upper middle-income countries is actually smaller than the gap between upper middle-income countries and the LDCs. And they are given three, five years to jump from LDC to upper middle-income in terms of what they are allowed to do.
Ha-joon Chang, LDC Future Forum 2021

This short article addresses only a couple of the issues that LDCs confront, but they are indicative of the intertwined reality of domestic and external policy and support measures. It is imperative for development and trade partners, be they higher-income countries or IFIs, to acknowledge the increased vulnerabilities to exogenous shocks. This requires the reevaluation and redesign of ISMs with rigorous attention to the quality of and adherence to the ISMs during the pre- and post- graduation process. As a first step, should this not include benchmarks and indicators for the “partners” as well as the LDCs?

Barbara Adams is Senior Policy Analyst with Global Policy Forum and faculty member at The New School, where Julie Kim is a master’s student at the Graduate Program in International Affairs with concentrations in Development and Governance & Rights.

Notes:

1 Fifth UN Conference on the LDCs (2022): Doha Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries. UN Doc. A/CONF.219/2022/3. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959499?ln=en

2 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/CDP_Comprehensive_Study_2021.pdf

3 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/CDP-2021-Plenary-Briefing.pdf

4 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ldc2021_en.pdf

5 https://www.twn.my/title2/finance/2022/fi220204.htm

6 UN Economic Commission for Africa (2015): Illicit financial flows: report of the High Level Panel on illicit financial flows from Africa. Addis Ababa. https://hdl.handle.net/10855/22695

7 See, for example, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/09/tackling-global-tax-havens-shaxon.htm.

8 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session19/A_HRC_WG.2_19_CRP.3.pdf

9 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/CDP_Comprehensive_Study_2021.pdf, p. 8.

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Private Sector Financing of UN Funds and Programmes

1. Februar 2022 - 18:52

By Elena Marmo

Download this briefing (pdf version).

Following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) embarked on an effort to harmonize UN Development System (UNDS) activities with the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs as well as system-wide pressure for greater country ownership of in-country activities. Part of this process includes the 2017 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (A/RES/71/243) and ongoing reform proposals for the UNDS, all aimed at improving the quality of development and meeting the needs and priorities of host countries and donor governments.

Exploring these reforms as debated at meetings of ECOSOC and the Executive Boards of UN Funds and Programmes highlights issues of accountability and transparency, as well as quality of funding available to the UNDS. This was especially true in their perception of how donor priorities dramatically impacted UN agencies’ interest in the private sector as a partner in development.

ECOSOC holds an annual stock-taking on the performance of the UNDS and shapes priorities. At its last such session in May 2021, Ib Petersen, Deputy Executive Director of UNFPA chaired the session on the UN Funding Compact. Noticing the system-wide concerns regarding a lack of flexible, core resources, he remarked that “we get the UN that we fund”.

This briefing examines how the UNDS is addressing its current funding challenges with a focus on the UN Fund for Children (UNICEF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, and their various programmatic initiatives and engagements.

Background on UNDS Reform

Each year, the Executive Boards of the different UNDS Funds and Programmes meet to discuss a variety of agenda items, including those related to the UNDS Reform, in line with the 2017 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (A/RES/71/243). This takes the form of “Structured Funding Dialogues” with Member States to assess progress on funding the activities approved in each entity’s Strategic Plan.

Over the past several years, the Funds and Programmes have raised concerns regarding the unequal distribution of core and non-core resources. Core resources, also known as regular resources, are unrestricted and unearmarked, critical for funding and staffing general operations and much of the norms and standards work for which the UN is well-known.

The Funding Compact

The Funding Compact, established in 2019, is an agreement between the development system and Member States, including financing commitments for both donors and UN entities with a view to enhance delivery on the SDGs. However, the compact is a voluntary and non-binding document, making enforceability challenging. The commitments, targets and indicators within the Funding Compact utilize 2017 figures as a baseline, with targets set to be achieved by 2023.

Among the commitments applicable to Member States as donors: increasing the share of core funding to 30% of overall UNDS funding, doubling the total amount of non-core resources for the UNDS by 2023 through the use of interagency pooled funds and thematic funds, predictable funding to the specific requirements of UNSDG entities and country-level including the Resident Coordinator System, and to harmonize and make transparent reporting guidelines for the UNDS entities.

For UN Funds and Programmes, commitments include: greater cooperation with other UN entities in-country settings, support and adherence to new frameworks like the Resident Coordinator System and the UN Development Cooperation Frameworks, harmonized enhanced coordination through shared offices and greater communication between various entities, and increased and improved joint programming and reporting to Member States.

Overall, the Funding Compact exists with a view to promote collaboration amongst the Funds and Programmes within the UNDS and seeks to hold Member States accountable to the financing necessary to do so. However, as this briefing will explore, as Member States fail to meet their commitments, UN Funds and Programmes are left to meet not only their programme-related commitments, but also find ways to secure the funding critically needed to support the reform process.

At the most recent Second Regular Sessions of the Executive Boards, UN Staff all painted a bleak funding picture, indicating that the percentage of core resources is falling far below the 30 percent target set forth in the Funding Compact. For this reason, Funds and Programmes have turned to private fundraising initiatives to supplement their annual budgets.  As these efforts grow, Member States warmly welcome them, obfuscating Member State responsibilities as laid out in the Funding Compact while enhancing the role of the private sector.

UN Fund for Children (UNICEF)

UNICEF’s 2020 Annual Report highlights USD 717 million in contributions from the private sector, amounting to 21 percent of their overall income. Corporate partnerships include Unilever, LIXIL, Louis Vuitton, and Microsoft while foundation partners include Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Mastercard Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, Stavros Niarchos Foundation, Qatar Charity. It also cites relationships with the World Economic Forum and the International Chamber of Commerce. Further UNICEF engagement with the private sector is through its national committees, which fundraise from individual donors and corporations at the national level, with a view to supporting UNICEF globally.

A Closer Look: UNICEF’s United States National Committee

This committee structure is quite unique, where national committees effectively function as non-governmental organizations in their own right, soliciting donations to UNICEF from individuals through fundraising appeals and programmes.

Notably, the US National Committee’s Trick or Treat for UNICEF has gained substantial ground as a fundraising effort for young children around Halloween in the United States. These individual donations are considered private sector income and contribute a meaningful supply of core resources to UNCIEF overall. Additionally, however, these national committees also initiate partnerships with corporate entities.

The US National Committee’s 2020 Annual Report notes a long list of corporate donors that have contributed over US 1 million including: American Airlines, Clarios foundation, Disney, Facebook, Johnson & Johnson, Kimberly-Clark, Marriott, Merck, Microsoft, Prudential, SAP, UPS, and Xylem.

Collectively, corporate donors made up 29.8 percent of the US National Committee’s income in 2020.

In a special 2020 report titled “Core Resources for Results”, UNICEF reports that of its top 10 regular contributors, 6 are national committees. The report details total income in 2020 as USD 7.22 billion, USD 1.47 billion or 20 percent of which as “regular” or “core” resources (RR). It states: “Of this, USD 592 million was contributed by public sector partners, and USD 717 million by private sector partners. The remaining USD 162 million included income from interest, procurement services, and other sources.” In all, 49 percent of UNICEF’s “regular” or “core” resources in 2020 came from the private sector.

Figure 1.1 UNICEF Top Regular Resource partners

At the Second Regular Session in September 2021, under the agenda item “Private Fundraising and Partnerships”, Carla Haddad Mardini, Deputy Executive Director of Partnerships gave a presentation on 2020 achievements including: “Partnerships with business maximize results for children delivering income of USD 211.6 million, 2,859 businesses engaged for core assets; child rights and business; and advocacy, 133 million children reached through engagement with business”.

During the Structured Funding Dialogue and Private Funding and Partnerships session, Haddad Mardini also called for enhanced engagement with corporations stating, “[W]e need to completely shift from simple transactional funding relationships to a spectrum of engagement with business to better influence their own practices.” She also highlighted a UNICEF initiative titled, “Business for Results (B4R)”, under which UNICEF hosted a special event in September 2019, outlining the various ways in which they partner with business and philanthropy, highlighting “shared value partnerships”.

UNICEF is also currently partnering with the World Bank on the World Bank Instrument for Sustained Private Sector Investment, designed to boost private sector fundraising in UN country programme locations. It “consists of an issuance of notes by the World Bank under its Capital at Risk Notes programme and a forward flow arrangement between UNICEF and the World Bank, under which UNICEF will make payments to the World Bank in respect of such issuance, for an amount expected to be approximately USD 50 million”. Given a lack of predictable and flexible core/regular resources, UNICEF proposes to utilize unearmarked private sector contributions to finance this investment.

UN Development Programme and UN Population Fund (UNDP/UNFPA)

The UNDP 2020 Annual Report details various initiatives to engage the private sector including: The Lion’s Share, the Connecting Business Initiative, and Youth Co: Lab while also naming “new ones including the COVID-19 Private Sector Global Facility, partnering with the United Nations Global Compact and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to develop innovative public partnerships for COVID-19 recovery”.

Figure 1.2 UNDP private sector initiatives featured in the 2020 UNDP Annual Report

The Report also highlights UNDP’s COVID-19 Private Sector Global Facility, the aim of which is “to foster and enhance public–private partnerships and solutions at both the global and national levels.”

The UNDP webpage dedicated to private sector engagement features a quote from Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator: “While the private sector can bring both agility in delivery and new approaches to financing the SDGs, the UN has an important role to play in creating an enabling environment for business to contribute.”

In contrast to UNICEF, UNDP’s 2020 Funding Compendium indicates that private sector funding comprises only 1 percent of total income (approx. USD 81 million) though the report does not disclose whether this funding was for core resources or earmarked for specific projects. UNDP’s top 10 private donors in 2020 include: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Coca Cola Company, Education Above All-AlFakhoora, BRA-Instituto Bras. Do Algodao, BRA-Fund Sup Recovery Eco Acti, Stiftung Auxilium, Aliko Dangote Foundation, Paltel Group Foundation, Citi Foundation and AIESEC.

Figure 1.3 UNDP Annual Report 2020 – Resources by donor type

UNDP’s Executive Board (jointly held with UNFPA and UNOPS) held the Annual Session 7-11 June and its Second regular session 30 August-3 September. At the last session, UNDP Staff presented a report on the Structured Funding Dialogue. Ulrika Modeer, Director of Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy at UNDP highlighted uneven progress on the Funding Compact, as despite UNDP progress, Member States are not meeting their commitments. She noted that core “resources continue to account for only 13 percent of total resources, far below the funding compact target of 30 percent by 2023”.

The UNDP 2022-2025 Strategic Plan approved by the Board also cites that UNDP will be “partnering with governments and the private sector to align capital flows with the SDGs and mobilize finance at scale”. UNDP’s 2018-2022 “Private Sector Strategy” states:

“Given the current emphasis on UN reform and harmonization, the time is also ripe to develop deeper cooperation and sharper synergy related to private sector development efforts of UN agencies… The intent will be to move towards a coherent UN approach in supporting private sector and market development at the country level, delivering support to countries as one synergistic system. By better pooling resources and expertise in this way, the UN could be a more influential actor in the area of private sector development.”

One private sector initiative is its Lion’s Share Fund, launched in 2019, through which “the corporate world can now make a contribution each time an animal appears in their ads, raising money for wildlife conservation, habitats, and animal welfare”. UNDP presents this as a “win-win-win” partnership, which like UNICEF’s “shared value” partnerships, “sells” the Fund through its values “while elevating brands to resonate with audiences in a more meaningful way – thereby positively impacting the brand’s growth, trust, and profitability”. In this way, UNDP legitimizes the role of the private sector in development and allows businesses to view engaging with the UN as a profit-generating opportunity.

UNFPA Segment of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Executive Board

Concerns about regular/core resources were echoed in the UNFPA presentation as well. Klaus Simoni, Director, Division of Communications/Strategic Partnerships stated: “UNFPA has met 95 percent of commitments while Member States have only met 62 percent”. He said, given the impact of COVID-19, “flexible and core resources remain critical to sustain operations and achievement of our objectives”.

The UNFPA report on Structured Funding Dialogue includes a section titled, “Private sector and other strategic partnerships” which cites that “In 2020, UNFPA continued strengthening its partnerships with non-traditional partners, securing about USD 41.6 million in private-sector contributions and collaborating with 100 partners”. The report also includes reference to the “UNFPA corporate resource mobilization strategy” but this strategy is not currently available to the public. While not included in the 2020 Annual Report, UNFPA’s “Private Sector Spotlight” webpage features an interactive map listing corporations in partnership with UNFPA. These include: Philips, Johnson & Johnson Foundation, Bayer, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the UN Foundation.

UN Women

UN Women has also struggled to obtain adequate core/regular resources to sustain its mandate. At the Second Regular Session 14-15 September 2021, Deputy Executive Director Anita Bhatia remarked that UN Women “will continue to pursue a diverse range of channels to address gender financing globally”.

Unlike other organizations, UN Women did meet its 30 percent regular resources target as outlined in the UN Funding Compact. However, UN Women Director of Strategic Partnerships Daniel Seymour noted that while UN Women is “happy with exceeding the 30 percent core target… It’s not UN Women’s belief that 30 percent is the right target. We believe 50/50 is the correct target for our mandate.”

UN Women’s latest 2020-2021 “Highlights” report states that “22 New private sector partnerships” and “1,630 Businesses signed the Women’s Empowerment Principles. Additionally, the 2020 Financial Statements indicate that UN Women’s top private sector contributors were the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the BHP Billiton Foundation. In 2020 both contributed non-core (also known as earmarked) resources—BHP giving USD 4.7 million and Gates giving USD 4 million. At the Second Regular Session of the Executive Board in 2021, Daniel Seymour reported that the contributions from the private sector totaled 2 percent of UN Women’s income overall throughout 2020.

Figure 1.4 UN Women Executive Board’s Structured Funding Dialogue – Resources by donor type

However, interest in engaging the private sector is building within UN Women against the backdrop of the UNDS Reform push for Funds and Programmes to pursue thematic and pooled funding mechanisms. Of note is UN Women’s championing of the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women which engages the private sector through direct donations and cause-marketing partnerships in programmes related to ending violence against women and girls with partners including: Mary Kay, AVON, Benetton, Johnson & Johnson, Tag Heuer, Omega, Verizon and Viacom.

UN Women’s presentation on Structured Funding Dialogue at the Second Regular session also outlined plans to increase private sector engagement for the upcoming decade, including: “Building partnerships with IFIs to influence their financing and programming to expand resources for SDG5, Supporting Gender Bonds as an innovative financing instrument to support gender equality, in line with coordination mandate, a global 5-year action on gender equality, underwritten by billions in new funding commitments through GEF.”

Conclusion

As the 2017 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) and ongoing reform proposals have brought about Structured Funding Dialogues and enhanced transparency regarding the financial situations of the various UN Funds and Programmes, they also shed light on the increasing dependency on the private sector. Across the UN Funds and Programmes examined here (UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, and UN Women), all actors are positioning private sector fundraising as an area of enormous potential.

While the different entities hold varied levels of engagement and reliance upon the private sector as a contributor to their annual budget, leadership at the highest levels of these organizations are welcoming an expansion of private sector fundraising.

“We are innovating and exploring new ways to support children and young people. From digital fundraising tools, to frugal innovations. We are seeking out the private sector and opening doors to a true cross-pollination of ideas and solutions, from children and young people themselves, technology companies, vaccine manufacturers, foundations and governments.” – Henrietta Fore, Executive Director of UNICEF at the Second Regular Session of the UNICEF Executive Board in September 2021

“Our partnerships are not static. We are constantly looking not just for new partners but for new ways of collaborating. Our partnerships with IFIs and the private sector are evolving through pioneering models and new financing for development…. We do not take our partnerships for granted. Governments have a huge array of potential partners, public and private. We want UNDP to be a partner with purpose, offering the greatest value to those we work with.” – Achim Steiner, Administrator of UNDP at the Second Regular Session of the UNDP Executive Board in September 2021.

“We also seek to expand financing for gender equality, which has been chronically under resourced to date, including by expanding partnerships with International Financial Institutions and the private sector.” – Anita Bhatia, Assistant Secretary-General of UN Women at the Second Regular Session of the UN Women Executive Board in September 2021.

While entity leadership turns to the private sector as a vital source of funding to sustain the UNDS, many questions raised by CSOs remain unanswered. At what cost—in terms of UN norms and standards? in terms of validating their activities in developing countries–are these partnerships being embraced? Whose interests are these partnerships truly serving?

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Global Health & Private Sector Partnerships at the UN: The COVID-19 Private Sector Global Facility

28. Januar 2022 - 20:39

By Elena Marmo

The COVID-19 crisis continues to have profound consequences across all sectors of society. Following the initial worldwide shutdown and resulting economic crisis, governments were forced to respond quickly to the virus, while also addressing the profound socioeconomic impacts—widespread job loss, inadequate social protection systems, and industries on the brink of collapse.

Now, with the Omicron variant on the rise globally, urgent action is needed to bring businesses and industries on board, holding them accountable as employers, taxpayers, and economic actors. The joint proposal from India and South Africa to the World Trade Organization is a necessary step towards COVID-19 recovery. The proposal, which will waive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, namely patents and intellectual property rights related to treatment for and containing the spread of COVID-19, is critical to ensuring vaccine equity.

WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus stated, it’s “…not just that the world is at risk of vaccine apartheid; the world is in vaccine apartheid…the basic problem is a lack of sharing, so the solution is more sharing”. COVAX, the multistakeholder initiative aimed to promote vaccine sharing, has proved insufficient to achieve the vaccine equity needed. Due to its voluntary nature, COVAX has established the role of the private sector in COVID-19 recovery as voluntary, calling on companies to align with vague principles and make “donations,” while continuing to promote a market-based approach rather than the systems change needed to reduce inequities.

Drawing much less attention, but equally concerning is another voluntary multistakeholder initiative employing a market-based approach – under UN auspices. This is the COVID-19 Private Sector Global Facility, announced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at the 2020 SDG Business Forum. The aim of the facility is “to foster and enhance public–private partnerships and solutions at both the global and national levels.” The initiative is co-created by UNDP, the United Nations Global Compact (UN Global Compact) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) with private sector partners including Deutsche Post DHL Group, Microsoft Corp, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).

The initiative is “tailored to countries’ specific needs and supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to advance green and digital technologies. Its work directly supports the progress of SDG 8, SDG 13, SDG 17 and the COVID-19 response.” It presents Five Solution Areas to Increase MSME Resilience which include: “digital capabilities, building e-commerce opportunities, integrating SMEs into procurement/supply chains, boosting access to capital, collective action / coordination to benefit SMEs”.

The UNDP webpage dedicated to private sector engagement hosts a quote from Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator: “While the private sector can bring both agility in delivery and new approaches to financing the SDGs, the UN has an important role to play in creating an enabling environment for business to contribute.” The COVID-19 Private Sector Facility does just that. Steiner, in announcing the facility noted:

“Solidarity to ‘Recover Better Together’ can boost our collective efforts not only to cope with the crisis but overcome it. UNDP’s footprint across some 170 countries and territories, combined with the UN Global Compact’s network of more than 10,000 companies and 68 Local Networks around the world, and the International Chamber of Commerce’s network of over 45 million companies, multiplies our collective capacity and potential”.

At the launch of this initiative, Sanda Ojiambo, CEO & Executive Director of the UN Global Compact stated:

“It is a moment of human tragedy and intense economic and social upheaval. But it is also a moment of possibility. Through partnerships like the COVID-19 Private Sector Global Facility we will support companies to Recover Better Together from the pandemic and finally confront global inequality by taking action, as well as mitigate the worst impacts of a climate emergency that threatens all of humanity. Together we can construct a new paradigm of resilience.”

To date, very little information on the facility’s activities has become available. While it has been disclosed that Colombia, Ghana, The Philippines, and Turkey will host pilot programs, the facility’s impact has not yet been communicated aside from the creation of a digital training platform, called Digital Path. The platform, launched during UN General Assembly 2021, will feature “cutting-edge content provided by all partners of the Global Facility, to support MSMEs in their effort to go green and digitally transform; business development and strategy guidance; impact measurement and management; and how to go towards sustainable business practices and trade”.

The facility’s efforts are emblematic of the trend towards voluntary multistakeholder initiatives, rather than coordinated international mandates and regulation, and initiatives such as that of India and South Africa. The Global Facility and COVAX are two examples of the ways in which the private sector works with the United Nations system to promote market-based solutions under the auspices of supporting the SDGs. The Global Facility itself claims to support the SDGs, including, “Goals 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), 13 (Climate Action) and 17 (Partnerships for the Goals)”. However, this does not account for potential adverse effects of privatization and the market-driven nature of the initiative overall.

While the Global Facility is opening doors for the private sector in their programme countries, it has yet to take concrete action to achieve SDG 3 and its commitment to: “Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all”.

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