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Supporting peace after civil war: what kind of international engagement can make a difference?

13. Dezember 2018 - 14:53
peacekeeping can be an effective instrument in maintaining peace, but little systematic knowledge exists on the roles that other types of peace support can play. International peacebuilding encompasses a broad range of activities beyond peacekeeping. It includes non-military support to increase security through disarmament, demobilisation, the reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, as well as security sector reform (SSR) and demining; support for governance to strengthen political institutions and state capacity; support for socioeconomic development to create a peace dividend through reconstruction, basic services, jobs and macroeconomic stability; and support for societal conflict transformation, including reconciliation, dialogue and transitional justice programmes.
This briefing paper presents the results of a comprehensive analysis of disaggregated external support in post-conflict situations, undertaken recently within the DIE research project “Supporting Sustainable Peace”. Analysing combinations of peace support provided during the first five years of 36 post-civil war episodes since 1990, we find that international peacebuilding can clearly make a difference. More specifically, our findings show that
  • international peacekeeping is one, but not the only, means of support associated with sustained peace;
  • contrary to concerns regarding the destabilising effects of democratisation, the majority of successful cases are in fact characterised by substantial international support in the field of politics and governance in democratising contexts;
  • only combined international efforts across all types of support can help prevent renewed conflict in contexts of a high risk of recurrence; and
  • countries that did not receive any substantial peace support experienced conflict recurrence within five years.
In light of these findings, we recommend the following to the international community when faced with post-civil war situations:
  • Engage substantially in post-conflict countries. Our results show that international peacebuilding can be effective, even where there is a high structural risk of conflict recurrence. While success will never be guaranteed, countries that receive substantial international support often remain peaceful, whereas all countries that were neglected by the international community experienced conflict recurrence.
  • Pay particular attention, and provide substantial support, to the field of politics and governance in post-conflict countries that begin to democratise. While it is well known that democratisation processes are conflict prone, our analyses demonstrate that donor engagement geared towards supporting such processes can help mitigate conflict and contribute to peace. When a post-conflict country has decided to embark on political reforms donors should offer governance support to help overcome potential destabilising effects of democratisation processes.
  • Invest in an international approach that encompasses all areas of peacebuilding early on after the end of a civil war. Especially in contexts with a high structural risk of renewed violent conflict, the chances of sustained peace are increased by simultaneous support for security, institutions, livelihoods and societal conflict transformation.


Kategorien: english

How addressing divisions on African migration inside the EU can strengthen transnational development

13. November 2018 - 11:50
Intense negotiations about migration management policies are taking place inside the European Union (EU), and between the EU and African states. Although these two negotiation processes are often analysed separately, they are actually interlinked. Drawing on interviews with representatives of European and African states and regional organisations as well as on policy analysis, this Briefing Paper argues that negotia¬tions inside the EU restrict EU-Africa cooperation on migration in two ways: first, by transmitting a strengthened focus on border control from the internal to the external dimension of EU migration management policies; second, by framing migration in a narrow way, which has hindered progress with regard to transnational development.
Intra-EU policy negotiations on migration are essential for the evolvement of EU-Africa cooperation on migration. Their increasing focus on border controls in Europe and Africa hinders the adoption of policies that support the potential of migration to contribute towards transnational resilience and development. Therefore, addressing the divisions on the internal dimension of EU migration management policy is a prerequisite for identifying sustainable EU-Africa cooperation pathways and supporting African migrants as actors of transnational development.
There are two important lessons that the Commission and the member states can learn from their difficulties in reaching an internal agreement on how to manage migration inside and outside the EU. The first lesson is that they need to address the challenge of balancing European national and transnational competencies and approaches. This challenge is inherent to the EU being a transnational union of nation states. The second lesson is that they need to take into greater consideration the needs of vulnerable citizens of both European and African countries.
In particular, the EU and its member states should:
  • Focus on the internal dimension of migration management and rebalance the current distribution of national and EU transnational competencies on migration. This is needed to address the conflicts of competencies that are currently hindering the nego¬tiations on common policies. In particular, they should explore the feasibility of transferring some national competencies to the EU, including through the creation of a pilot EU Agency on Labour Migration.
  • Introduce effective mechanisms of transnational responsibility-sharing in the EU in order to safeguard free movement within the Schengen Area. In particular, they should foresee an EU relocation system based on incentives and sanctions as part of a reform of the Dublin Regulation.
  • Take the needs of young and low-skilled workers as well as migrant European workers into greater consideration by promoting employment, job security and labour rights, with funding through the European Social Fund.
Reintroduce policy and development cooperation measures supporting the potential of African migration to contribute towards transnational resilience and development and provide adequate funding through the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. In particular, such measures should support self-determined strategies of African migrants, for example by facilitating circular mobility and the transfer of remittances.


Kategorien: english

How addressing divisions on migration inside the EU can strengthen African transnational development

13. November 2018 - 11:50
Intense negotiations about migration management policies are taking place inside the European Union (EU), and between the EU and African states. Although these two negotiation processes are often analysed separately, they are actually interlinked. Drawing on interviews with representatives of European and African states and regional organisations as well as on policy analysis, this Briefing Paper argues that negotia¬tions inside the EU restrict EU-Africa cooperation on migration in two ways: first, by transmitting a strengthened focus on border control from the internal to the external dimension of EU migration management policies; second, by framing migration in a narrow way, which has hindered progress with regard to transnational development.
Intra-EU policy negotiations on migration are essential for the evolvement of EU-Africa cooperation on migration. Their increasing focus on border controls in Europe and Africa hinders the adoption of policies that support the potential of migration to contribute towards transnational resilience and development. Therefore, addressing the divisions on the internal dimension of EU migration management policy is a prerequisite for identifying sustainable EU-Africa cooperation pathways and supporting African migrants as actors of transnational development.
There are two important lessons that the Commission and the member states can learn from their difficulties in reaching an internal agreement on how to manage migration inside and outside the EU. The first lesson is that they need to address the challenge of balancing European national and transnational competencies and approaches. This challenge is inherent to the EU being a transnational union of nation states. The second lesson is that they need to take into greater consideration the needs of vulnerable citizens of both European and African countries.
In particular, the EU and its member states should:
  • Focus on the internal dimension of migration management and rebalance the current distribution of national and EU transnational competencies on migration. This is needed to address the conflicts of competencies that are currently hindering the nego¬tiations on common policies. In particular, they should explore the feasibility of transferring some national competencies to the EU, including through the creation of a pilot EU Agency on Labour Migration.
  • Introduce effective mechanisms of transnational responsibility-sharing in the EU in order to safeguard free movement within the Schengen Area. In particular, they should foresee an EU relocation system based on incentives and sanctions as part of a reform of the Dublin Regulation.
  • Take the needs of young and low-skilled workers as well as migrant European workers into greater consideration by promoting employment, job security and labour rights, with funding through the European Social Fund.
Reintroduce policy and development cooperation measures supporting the potential of African migration to contribute towards transnational resilience and development and provide adequate funding through the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. In particular, such measures should support self-determined strategies of African migrants, for example by facilitating circular mobility and the transfer of remittances.


Kategorien: english

Boosting non-state climate action in the European Union

9. Oktober 2018 - 11:46
The 2015 Paris Agreement and the accompanying Paris Decision recognise the importance of climate actions by non-state actors, such as businesses, civil society organisa¬tions, cities, regions and cooperative initiatives, to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) and to adapt to climate change as necessary complements to governmental commitments. Prominent international platforms, such as the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) by the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Climate Initiatives Platform ad¬min-istered by the United Nations Environmental Pro¬gramme/Technical University of Denmark (UNEP/DTU) Part¬ner¬ship, have greatly improved the visibility of such actions.
Within this dynamic field of non-state climate action, non-state actors based in the European Union (EU) can be considered global leaders. Actions led by EU-based actors represent most initiatives registered with UNFCCC’s NAZCA platform. Moreover, individual member states have played leading roles in the Global Climate Action Agenda (also known as the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action). A recent study by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the German Develop¬ment Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwick¬lungs¬politk (DIE) moreover finds that actions led by EU-based non-state actors are performing well compared with the global average (EESC, 2018).
However, the implementation of non-state actions is not evenly distributed. In absolute terms, existing initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are underrepresented. Moreover, few actions led by EU-based non-state actors are recorded in international platforms in areas such as forestry, transport and construction (EESC, 2018).
The need for more, and more effective, non-state actions is evident given the fact that current EU climate policies are inconsistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. According to the Climate Action Tracker, the EU’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is insufficient; if all govern¬ments had targets similar to the EU, global warming could exceed 2°C and possibly even 3°C.
Non-state actors could make important additional mitiga¬tion and adaptation contributions, both directly, for example, through new installations, as well as indirectly, for example, by encouraging behavioural change. Moreover, they could inspire governments and the EU to be more ambi¬tious. However, currently non-state actions are not easy to track. Despite a strong focus on climate mitigation, most actions led by EU-based actors do not set clear GHG reduction targets. In addition, many relevant actions remain unrecorded.
This paper explores what is necessary to accelerate non-state actions and enhance their effectiveness in the EU and as a solution suggests that a light-touch framework be implemented to stimulate bottom-up climate actions. This framework should respond to the needs and challenges experienced by a range of stakeholders while building on existing efforts. Moreover, a well-designed framework could help address the imbalances identified in this study.

Kategorien: english

A mountain worth climbing: reforming the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs

4. Oktober 2018 - 13:26
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) is a key multilateral organisation for development. Since 2015, DESA has had the unique mandate of facilitating the efforts of all UN member states towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by supporting the High-level Political Forum. It is tasked to provide intellectual leadership through research and analysis, support norm-setting by the main UN bodies on development – the General Assembly (GA), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – and coord¬inate with the broader UN development system.
However, DESA has yet to unlock its full potential in playing a politically relevant and analytically authoritative role in sustainable development beyond the conference rooms of New York. DESA’s organisational structures have become increasingly outdated and inefficient. Since the founding of DESA in 1997, the department has been curiously exempt from the ongoing reforms of the world organisation. In addition, there is little transparency and analysis of actual reform needs and options.
Our reform vision is that DESA should become a more prominent voice of the UN in sustainable development and help to credibly raise ambitions for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda globally. Tasked with economic and social affairs, DESA could serve as the multilateral hub for advancing universality, assisting all countries (including high-income countries) in striving for sustainable devel¬op¬ment and coordinating global policies towards advancing the global common good. This vision calls for a department that is intellectually brilliant, politically capable and impartial in bringing together the whole UN system.
As a basic condition, DESA reform requires vigorous and consistent support from member states. The power of the Secretary-General (SG) and his heads of department to reorganise the structures are limited by member states’ oversight, which is mainly executed in the UN’s budgetary bodies. Moreover, DESA’s substructures have expanded organically around mandated tasks, creating a highly decentralised entity with various overlapping activities, thereby raising the stakes of reform.
The most recent reform attempts of DESA have stag¬nated in a geopolitical climate of mistrust and opposing priorities along the divisions between countries from the political North and South. DESA has been the home base of developing countries – organised as the Group of 77 and China (G77) – at the UN Secretariat, making it an advocate of developing-country interests. Since 2015, several countries from the political North (e.g. United States and EU countries) have called for DESA reform in terms of increasing effectiveness and efficiency, while the G77 has pushed back, suspecting attempts to diminish their power by cutting funding and staff. The situation has become increasingly complex, with growing speculation on the intentions of China, whose diplomats have been leading the department for the last decade.
In order to prepare the ground for a comprehensive DESA reform that is beneficial to all stakeholders, we suggest three steps to the SG and his reform team that build upon each other:
  1. create greater transparency, substantive knowledge and participation on DESA reform
  2. interlink DESA reform with ongoing UN reform processes
  3. generate political support from member states and long-term payoffs from DESA reform.


Kategorien: english

Pro-poor climate risk insurance: the role of community-based organisations (CBOs)

12. September 2018 - 15:54
In the face of increasingly frequent extreme weather events, the need to manage climate risk becomes more urgent, especially for the most vulnerable countries and communities. With the aim of reducing vulnerability, climate risk transfer in the form of climate risk insurance (CRI) has been gaining attention in climate policy discussions. When properly designed, CRI acts as a safety net against climate change impacts by providing financial support after an extreme weather event. Two main types of insurance enable payouts: indemnity (traditional) insurance or predefined parameters (index-based) insurance. Individuals, groups, or even governments may take out policies with either type of insurance and receive payouts directly (insurer to beneficiary payout) or indirectly (insurer to aggregator to beneficiary payout). Direct insurance is usually implemented at the micro-level with individual policyholders. Indirect insurance is usually implemented through group contracts at the meso-level through risk aggregators and at the macro-level through the state.
While promising, risk transfer in the form of CRI also has its share of challenges. Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the lack of accessibility and afford¬ability of CRI for poor and vulnerable groups have been identified as barriers to uptake. In light of climate justice, asking the poor and climate-vulnerable groups - most of whom do not contribute substantially to anthropogenic climate change - to solely carry the financial burden of risk transfer is anything but just. Employing a human rights-based approach to CRI may ensure that the resilience of poor and climate-vulnerable groups is enhanced in a climate-just manner.
Indigenous peoples are some of the poorest and most climate vulnerable groups. Often marginalised, they rarely have access to social protection. The strong communal relationship of indigenous peoples facilitates their participation in community-based organisations (CBOs). CBOs are a suitable vehicle for meso-insurance, in which risk is aggregated and an insurance policy belongs to a group. In this way, CBOs can facilitate service provision that would otherwise be beyond the reach of individuals.
Conclusions of this briefing paper draw on a conceptual analysis of meso-insurance and the results of field research conducted in March 2018 with indigenous Palaw’ans in the Philippines. We find that CRI needs to be attuned to the differential vulnerabilities and capacities of its beneficiaries. This is particularly true for poor and vulnerable people, for whom issues of accessibility and affordability need to be managed, and human rights and pro-poor approaches need to be ensured. In this context, meso-insurance is a promising approach when it provides accessibility and affordability and promotes a pro-poor and human rights-based approach of risk transfer by:
  • Properly identifying and involving target beneficiaries and duty-bearers by employing pro-poor and human rights principles.
  • Employing measures to improve the financial literacy of target beneficiaries.
  • Designing insurance models from the bottom up.
Kategorien: english

Pro-poor climate risk insurance: the role of community-based organisations

12. September 2018 - 15:54
In the face of increasingly frequent extreme weather events, the need to manage climate risk becomes more urgent, especially for the most vulnerable countries and communities. With the aim of reducing vulnerability, climate risk transfer in the form of climate risk insurance (CRI) has been gaining attention in climate policy discussions. When properly designed, CRI acts as a safety net against climate change impacts by providing financial support after an extreme weather event. Two main types of insurance enable payouts: indemnity (traditional) insurance or predefined parameters (index-based) insurance. Individuals, groups, or even governments may take out policies with either type of insurance and receive payouts directly (insurer to beneficiary payout) or indirectly (insurer to aggregator to beneficiary payout). Direct insurance is usually implemented at the micro-level with individual policyholders. Indirect insurance is usually implemented through group contracts at the meso-level through risk aggregators and at the macro-level through the state.
While promising, risk transfer in the form of CRI also has its share of challenges. Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the lack of accessibility and afford¬ability of CRI for poor and vulnerable groups have been identified as barriers to uptake. In light of climate justice, asking the poor and climate-vulnerable groups - most of whom do not contribute substantially to anthropogenic climate change - to solely carry the financial burden of risk transfer is anything but just. Employing a human rights-based approach to CRI may ensure that the resilience of poor and climate-vulnerable groups is enhanced in a climate-just manner.
Indigenous peoples are some of the poorest and most climate vulnerable groups. Often marginalised, they rarely have access to social protection. The strong communal relationship of indigenous peoples facilitates their participation in community-based organisations (CBOs). CBOs are a suitable vehicle for meso-insurance, in which risk is aggregated and an insurance policy belongs to a group. In this way, CBOs can facilitate service provision that would otherwise be beyond the reach of individuals.
Conclusions of this briefing paper draw on a conceptual analysis of meso-insurance and the results of field research conducted in March 2018 with indigenous Palaw’ans in the Philippines. We find that CRI needs to be attuned to the differential vulnerabilities and capacities of its beneficiaries. This is particularly true for poor and vulnerable people, for whom issues of accessibility and affordability need to be managed, and human rights and pro-poor approaches need to be ensured. In this context, meso-insurance is a promising approach when it provides accessibility and affordability and promotes a pro-poor and human rights-based approach of risk transfer by:
  • Properly identifying and involving target beneficiaries and duty-bearers by employing pro-poor and human rights principles.
  • Employing measures to improve the financial literacy of target beneficiaries.
  • Designing insurance models from the bottom up.
Kategorien: english

Meeting Africa’s employment challenge in a changing world

12. September 2018 - 8:47
Around 2031, Africa’s working-age population will pass the 1-billion threshold. This growing workforce will require decent productive employment. So far, Africa’s economies have largely failed to create stable and well-paid jobs. For any one person working in the formal private sector, 10 work in the informal economy. Failure to generate sufficient formal-sector jobs for young people will increase migration and global security challenges.
Creating decent jobs at the scale required is inconceivable without a structural transformation that enables workers to move from low-productivity agriculture and informal trades to modern manufacturing or service sectors. Such a transformation took place in some East Asian countries, but no comparable dynamic has so far been observed anywhere in Africa. What’s more, the region has already started to deindustrialise at a stage when industry has not yet really taken off.
What, then, are the prospects for Africa’s economic future? Where should the millions of decent jobs the region urgently needs come from? We suggest exploring this not by extrapolating past trends, but by analysing how certain – potentially disruptive – global trends impact on African economies:
  • Natural resources are being depleted globally while the world population increases, becomes more affluent and demands higher-value food. Also, the global bioeconomy is likely to boost demand for fuel substitutes. This creates opportunities for countries with underutilised land resources.
  • Urbanisation and the expansion of African middle classes will boost and diversify demand, creating opportunities for local consumer industries. Trends towards sustainable smart cities also hold promises for African entrepreneurs in transport, electronics, the construction industry and other sectors.
  • New digital technologies improve connectivity. Some digital innovations enable African producers to tap into hitherto inaccessible markets, whereas others may lead to automation and global market concentration at the expense of African producers.
  • China’s rapidly increasing wages may lead to the relocation of labour-intensive industries to African countries with low unit labour costs – unless China uses auto¬mation to keep them at home.
  • The imperative of reducing the world economy’s material footprint may create new opportunities, such as in low-input agriculture or electrification based on low-cost renewable energy. At the same time, it creates the risk of enormous capital losses in high-carbon and other unsustainable technologies.
We do not know exactly how these trends will play out for individual African countries. Yet some trends will be game-changing. Hence, we recommend systematic efforts to explore them, with the aim of identifying competitive opportunities and taking strategic action early on. We identify some opportunities in manu¬facturing and services that we expect to become important (while recognising big differences across the region). We also suggest complementary investments in productivity and employment for the large proportion of the workforce not easily and immediately employable in competitive industries.


Kategorien: english

The devil is in the detail: administrative and fiscal challenges in implementing River Basin Management in Mongolia

29. August 2018 - 8:16
The concept of river basin management calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote the sustainable use of water resources. Often this goes along with the introduction of river basin organisations (RBOs) as special purpose organisations. However, particularly in developing countries, RBOs often suffer from insufficient funds. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. Decentralisation could thus provide a source of funding for RBOs, depending on how tasks and funds are allocated among RBOs and general-purpose jurisdictions. This briefing paper examines administrative and fiscal aspects of river basin management and analyses whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts the funding of river basin management. We present the example of Mongolia, where in recent years the processes of RBO institutionalisation and fiscal decentralisation have occurred in parallel. More specifically, we analyse i) how competencies for various water governance functions between RBOs and other bodies at the sub-national level are formally allocated, ii) which de jure and de facto funding arrangements are in place, and iii) what this implies for the coordination and sustainability of water resource use.
We find that despite a broad division of labour among administrative units, a high level of overlap exists, for instance in the areas of data management, water law enforcement and implementation of water protection measures.
In terms of financing water governance, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) are primarily financed through the national budget and aimag (province-level) environmental authorities (AEAs) through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees. In practice, funds available to RBAs only cover fixed costs. AEAs have somewhat higher budgets, but do not necessarily use these funds for water-related projects nor do they earmark water-use fees. Inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, but also to initial collaborative arrangements. We conclude that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive and we recommend a number of legal and financial adjustments. In particular, we recommend that
  • responsibilities be distributed more clearly to reduce overlap and uncertainty;
  • legal inconsistencies regarding water-use fees be clarified;
  • funding be arranged according to tasks; and
  • funding for RBAs be increased and minimum state-funding be provided to river basin councils (RBCs), so they can fulfil their mandates.
Kategorien: english