english

Tourism is high on the list of sectors severely affected by the Coronavirus pandemic. Leveraging sustainable investments can help rethink tourism and enhance its positive impact on people and the planet in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In Mauritius, the financial sector can play a central role in the transition to a low-carbon, inclusive and sustainable development model, for example by providing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with access to green finance.

As part of our Sustainable Island Mauritius (SIM) project, many Mauritian SMEs reported that access to finance remains a big challenge in their efforts to implement sustainable practices. High-interest rates, complex application processes, and extensive collateral requirements were mentioned as serious barriers. To address this issue, the SIM project introduced the topic of Green Finance in various workshops and webinars with SMEs, supporting them to use green finance as a means to developing sustainable business.

In strategic meetings with the leadership of the Mauritius Bankers Association (MBA), the SIM project team discussed how to improve access to green finance for tourism SMEs and support them to become more competitive.

Using the information received from the banks, the SIM project developed an e-pamphlet, which the Mauritius Tourism Authority (MTA) distributed among tourism operators, including SMEs. It shows SMEs in the tourism sector the various green measures and technologies they could implement and the corresponding green funding available.

The e-pamphlet, Applying Green Strategies for Building Back Better, was launched during the project’s series of final events and is divided into three sections:

• What is green financing & opportunities and challenges for tourism SMEs
• Available financing schemes that support the green transition and subsequent investments
• An e-directory featuring organisations that work with green and innovative technologies

The SIM project also organised an Open Talk on Investing in Sustainable Mauritius as one of the project’s final events. Over 40 bank representatives took part in the event that focused on questions such as, how does the future of tourism in Mauritius look like, what investments are needed for a sustainable island, and how can businesses have an improved access to green finance.

The Sustainable Island Mauritius was funded by the European Commission Switch Africa Green Programme. A key goal of the project was to support Mauritius acquire the Green Destination status by 2030.

For further questions, please contact Kartika Anggraeni.

The post Enabling Sustainable Tourism Through Green Finance appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Still reeling from the COVID pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global economy is facing an increasingly murky and uncertain outlook, according to the latest report released on Tuesday by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

By Steven M. Radil, U.S. Air Force Academy, Olivier Walther, University of Florida, Nicholas Dorward, University of Bristol, Matthew Pflaum, University of Florida and Marie Trémolières, Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), OECD

The ruralisation of conflict has been particularly spectacular in the West African Sahel, although Jihadist organisations have maintained a complex relationship with cities. On the one hand, cities provide ideal conditions for Jihadist organisations to flourish due to their large population of unemployed youth (...)

On the other hand, controlling cities has become less important for Jihadist groups than in the early years of the insurgencies. Since the violence affecting West Africa has largely shifted from the Sahara to the Sahel and its southern margins, these groups do not have to physically control cities to influence civilians and have access to natural, mineral and agricultural resources.

The post Conflicts are becoming increasingly rural in North and West Africa appeared first on Development Matters.

By Jeannine Ajello

On Wednesday, July 13, the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution convened a panel of experts to answer pressing questions on the state of the global economy. David Malpass, president of the World Bank Group, delivered introductory remarks on the deteriorating global growth outlook, touching on energy and food insecurity, capital misallocation, stagflation, and more.

Below is the full text of President Malpass’s remarks.

DAVID MALPASS: Thank you very much, Coul [Moderator – Brahima S. Coulibaly] and thank you to the Brookings Institution. And thank you ladies and gentlemen for joining us today to discuss the state of the global economy. I wish I had a brighter image of where the world is going.

The world is facing multiple crises, including the sharpest slowdown in GDP growth in 80 years, the risk of a frozen crisis in Ukraine due to Russia’s invasion, and a massive worsening in global inequality as advanced economies absorb the limited supplies of global capital and energy.

Global growth is not expected to rebound in 2023, given energy supply constraints; the long overdue normalization of interest rates and bond yields in the advanced economies; and the misallocation of investments that has pushed much of the world’s savings into bonds, mostly bonds issued by governments and overcapitalized borrowers.

The global economy is also facing significant downside risks. These include intensifying geopolitical tensions, the fragility in many countries, the potential for an extended period of stagflation, the widespread financial stress that’s caused by the higher borrowing costs, and food insecurity.

In a recent Churchill Symposium speech I gave at the University of Zurich, I described two major factors in the crisis and some of the World Bank Group’s response. I’d like to summarize those briefly, and then I know there’s going to be a great discussion with Ayhan [Kose] and the panel about the global economy.

Energy realignment

One of the things that is very important in the current crisis is the overreliance on Russian energy and then the redirection of global energy. I described in that speech the tradeoff that Europe is making, and the advanced economies in general, as they store fuel and food for next winter. China is the world’s biggest storer of grain and has continued to increase those stockpiles. Europe is storing huge amounts of energy now for the winter.  The tradeoff that creates is global fertilizer markets don’t have the energy, the natural gas, needed to make the fertilizer to make the crops and to build the storage for their own use into next year.

Global food insecurity is worsening. As we’ve seen, the electricity supplies are diminishing because of the shortage of natural gas, which is the swing provider of electricity around the world and in country after country. Those shortages then leave the grids in brownout and in blackout conditions, which undercuts the production efforts of those countries. We’re looking at a crisis that, on the production side, will extend into 2023 as the world searches for ways to bring enough capital to bear to increase the production of energy and fertilizer and enable the agricultural system.

All of this can be done in ways that are cleaner, greener, and that reduce carbon intensity in the global supply chains. But at present conditions, that’s not being done. We have to look into 2023 with this trade-off continuing where Europe, and advanced economies in general, use up much of the cleaner fuel. That leaves many parts of the world reopening their coal-fired plants or extending the life of some of the most carbon intensive coal-fired power plants. This comes at a time when electricity grids in many of the world’s countries haven’t been strengthened to absorb the renewables that are needed. You end up with a global electricity crisis on top of the food, fuel, and fertilizer crisis that I’ve been describing.

Capital misallocation

The second area that I wanted to raise is on the monetary policy side. The major central banks moved further away from monetarism in many recent years. Some of them entirely removed the reserve requirement on banks and adopted a post monetarist framework in which central banks both regulate and allocate capital, rather than controlling the money supply through bank reserves. That’s been a major shift in the global economy over the last decade. The regulatory framework has the explicit bias that debt of advanced country governments is considered zero risk, while other debt especially of small businesses  and developing countries, and of new entrants to the market, is treated as risky and requires costly bank equity capitalization.

Separately, that process has caused a huge misallocation of capital in the world to the safest issuers of bonds and away from the places in the world that need new capital.

Separately, the purchase and ownership of bonds by central banks, which continues to this day in giant size, allocates capital from small bank accounts—that’s the providers of the bank reserves that the central banks are drawing on, .since the liability of the central banks is bank reserves which come from banks. They draw on that and shift it to bond issuers. The result of that is to increase asset prices in overcapitalized sectors of the advanced economies.

From an inequality standpoint, this framework misallocates capital, it favors those with higher net worth at the expense of broad-based growth. That was already evident before the COVID crisis and it was evident before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These are challenges in the global system that need to be addressed. If the anti-inflationary policies that are now getting underway are primarily achieved through interest rate increases, it risks deepening the inequality that is so problematic in the world.

Stagflation could worsen. It’s exacerbated by shortages of the working capital needed for small businesses and supply chains. We have a system patently set up that diverts capital to the big players and not to the small players that provide this solution to the current inflation problem.

There are important additional tools that policymakers could be doing on the monetary front. They could and should encourage a very strong supply response to counteract the price increases that are underway. The most available increases in supply are in the largest economies. That’s a fact of the mathematics and also of the availability of capital.

The United States has the biggest ability in the world to expand production to counteract the global inflation underway. Not enough steps are being taken to dramatically increase U.S. production of supplies that are in shortage. But that’s also true of China, the second largest economy, and of Europe also—in combination, a very large portion of the world’s economy.

I wanted to go through those challenges in detail. And then I wanted to give you a little sense of what the World Bank has been doing in order to respond to these clear crises going on around the world. We’ve tried to be in the forefront of efforts. I speak to the world leaders about these problems, about the need for massive new production in the advanced economies in order to counteract inflation; also about the misallocation of capital coming from the macro frameworks in the world.

What the World Bank is able to do and has done is very large, early support for the people of Ukraine. We continued that even yesterday with a $1.7 billion disbursement that came from money supplied by the U.S. That’s on top of the $1.3 billion disbursement late in June also provided by the U.S. We were supplying our own funding early in the war effort, and that’s helped sustain people in Ukraine, the pensioners, the hospital workers, and government workers in Ukraine. We’re in the process of mobilizing more for Ukraine as the war persists.

On the food front, we’ve entered an alliance with the G-7 presidency—which is Germany this year—and are providing $30 billion of resources available over the next 15 months to support interventions in agriculture, to make more climate smart, stronger systems, more resilient systems; also to provide funding for social protection. It’s very important that as the world faces this giant crisis, that subsidies be targeted and that import and export restrictions be removed, be reduced by the advanced economies—many of them have strong import restrictions that impede global agricultural markets—and also by exporting countries so that they don’t limit it.

We’re putting in emergency assistance. We’ve recently approved more than a dozen programs, including in Lebanon, Egypt and 11 countries across eastern and southern Africa to help increase the resilience of food systems and tackle food insecurity. We’re a strong advocate for good global policies in terms of subsidies, export and import restrictions, and reduction of excess supply storage.

As I mentioned earlier, China is the world’s second biggest economy. It’s the world’s biggest producer of wheat, but it’s also the world’s biggest storer of wheat, and other agricultural products. This provides one possible source as the world faces this impending and deepening crisis.

I want to say a final word on the global debt situation and then turn back to Coul. The global debt is connected, tightly connected. to this food crisis, because of the shortage of fiscal space in the poorest countries. As you know, the DSSI [Debt Service Suspension Initiative] that was done by the G-20—and by the way, the G-20 is meeting even today and trying to work on a communique, but it’s been very difficult for the G-20 members to find consensus on any of these major topics—as we look back, the G-20 did the DSSI debt suspension initiative. All it did was defer the payments but then the interest kept compounding on those payments. And so, the countries are left with an even larger set of debt burdens.

The G-20 initiated the Common Framework for debt relief, but it has been stalled. Even this morning, Chad’s creditor committee met but was unable to make progress. We are hopeful of progress in Zambia, but that’s been one country and it’s been ongoing for over a year and a half, I suppose. We are left with giant amounts of unsustainable debt in developing countries without a methodology to reduce that debt. This means that the countries are still paying to rich creditors, and there’s not a process that’s going to allow them or help them to move into more sustainable debt territory.

That problem is one of the many overlapping crises facing the world. I wanted to end on that point, Coul. One thing that would be good for Brookings, or the U.S., or for the think tank community to be engaged in is: how do we have a major change? You know, I, the World Bank, have proposed many very specific changes that would make this situation work better. But it would be good to have a consensus on the steps that are needed in order to reduce the unsustainable debt situations and to increase the transparency of debt, new debt, as it’s taken on by countries.  And that, I think, needs to be kept in this list of major policy initiatives and endeavors that are needed as we go through these overlapping crises.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to hearing the panel and the results. Over to you, Coul.

      

Download pdf version

This GPW Round Up #1, entitled “The Debt Crisis and Illicit Financial Flows” looks at the UN Secretary-General’s proposals in his report Our Common Agenda to address this crisis, starting with a Biennial Summit between the G20, ECOSOC and IFIs, and asks “Does Our Common Agenda provide solutions?”

At a time when Africa has lost US$ 1 trillion over 50 years to IFFs, more than it has received in development assistance, the Round Up features Member State statements on the nature and scale of the crisis, and their demands for the UN to take charge of resolving it. Mali speaking on behalf of the Africa Group is particularly critical of the proposed Summit, pointing to its lack of inclusiveness and apparent limited mandate, saying transparency is not enough. Ethiopia echoes this, commenting that IFFs are being used to “wage wars and destabilize Africa”. Morocco on behalf of the Arab Group also raises doubts about the Summit and emphasizes that deliberations on the proposed international tax structure must be undertaken in consultation with Member States.

The CSO FfD group goes further, calling for shifting the centre of economic governance so that UN is at the centre, a position South Africa also embraced. This Round Up, like future ones, includes links to relevant chapters of Our Common Agenda as well as video links to the debate on Cluster 2, called “Accelerating the SDGs through sustainable financing and building trust”.

The GPW team welcomes comments at insights@gpolicywatch.org

The post Debt Crisis & Illicit Financial Flows appeared first on Global Policy Watch.

Urbanisation offers great potential for Africa’s economic and social development: citizens earn twice as much in large cities compared to rural areas, and young urbanites receive on average between 2.5 and 4 years more education than their rural  counterparts. At the same time, the rapid rise of the urban population is putting a strain on Africa’s cities. While on average, city dwellers have better access to services than their rural counterparts, more than half of all citizens in sub-Saharan  African metropolises live in informal settlements without adequate access to basic infrastructure. Citizens have long demanded participation in urban governance that goes beyond elections in order to voice their concerns. Although participatory  processes have become increasingly evident in many African countries in some cities and neighbourhoods, they are still far from being institutionalised at scale. This policy brief asks why participatory approaches have not been successful thus far and analyses the challenges regarding a political mobilisation of civil society organisations (CSOs), which often face weak and fragmented state institutions. It argues that participatory processes need to be thoroughly embedded in politics in order to move beyond  particularistic gains towards a structural improvement of relations between citizens, CSOs, and local governments.

In order to strengthen policy recommendations and deliver the peoples’ voices inclusively to the G20, C20 Indonesia will hold its second biggest event called Policy Dialogue Forum on July 27-28, 2022 at Le Meridien Hotel, Jakarta and Zoom Meeting. Both C20 Working Groups and the G20 Working Groups will present the agenda and policy recommendations to be brought to the G20 Summit.

            The first day will be a talk show ‘Questioning the G20 Recovery Strategy when the Brink of Global Recession is Inevitable’ inviting Wempi Saputra, Expert Staff of Minister of Finance for Macro Economy and International Finance (G20 Finance Deputy) and

Amalia Adininggar Widyasanti, Deputy of Economics, Ministry of National Development Planning. It will be followed by the main agenda–C20 Public Dialogue. The dialogue recap and press conference will be conducted on the second day.

“Policy Dialogue becomes the process that finalizes the ideas and analysis of all C20 Working Groups so that they are well-prepared to be presented at the C20 Summit later in October,” said Sugeng Bahagijo, Chair of C20 Indonesia, on July 25, 2022.

Sugeng also highlighted why it should be G20 and the importance of democracy on Friday, July 22, 2022.

“In addition to the UN, we only have the G20, which truly represents broader leadership, compared to the G7, which consists of developed countries. So, in our opinion, the G20 is worthy to carry out its leadership role. The leadership role must solve pandemic, climate change, the increasing inequality, technology companies that go too far,”

On the other hand, there is a trend of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries becoming increasingly influential and excessive, such as the influence of China and Russia in the political economy.

“G20 consists of democratic and non-democratic countries. In other words, our voice (CSOs) aims to make the G20 democracies assert that only with democracy can we improve the situation, and with democracy, we can correct what has been a deficit so far. There are mechanisms for improvement with democracy, both through elections and civil society organizations,”

He shared that if there is no democracy, there is no prospect for improvement. Leadership should move from ‘doing good for ourselves’ to ‘doing good for others’ so that countries do not think about themselves but also about other countries that are in trouble. For example, during this pandemic, many countries have not been able to buy vaccines. No one is safe until everyone is safe.

            Finally, Sugeng hopes that G20 stakeholders will give input to the C20 Working Groups policy recommendation, and the public, through the media, will also understand the recommendations’ background.

Writer : Sita Mellia

Bulgaria’s UN Ambassador banged the gavel as President of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for the first time on Monday with a vow to build on the “solid foundation” left by the outgoing head and his bureau to transform the world into “a better place for the people of today and tomorrow”. 

I caught up with Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Pryzdacz at the Aspen Security Conference in mid-July.

Poland is a front line state to the crisis in Ukraine and has been directly impacted by Russia’s invasion, including hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees. Poland was also and early target of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to use gas exports as a kind of blackmail; and when Poland refused to pay for Russian gas in Rubles, Russian gas was abruptly cut off.

I kick off my conversation with the Deputy Foreign Minister with a discussion about the refugee situation in Poland. We have an extended conversation about how Poland responded to Russia’s abrupt suspension of gas exports and what lessons from that episode Poland might impart on other countries in Europe. We then have a broad conversation about how Poland’s proximity to the fighting in Ukraine is shaping its approach to that conflict.

 

Apple Podcasts  | Google Podcasts |  Spotify  | Podcast Addict  |  Stitcher  | Radio Public 

The post Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Przydacz | Live From the Aspen Security Forum appeared first on UN Dispatch.

By Gabriela Keseberg Dávalos, Head of Communications, Southern Voice, and Rita da Costa, Senior Counsellor, OECD Development Centre

It is important that the international community treats civic space not only as critical for democracy but also for all aspects of life, including responding to crises. Strengthening regional and international human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, boosts citizens' capacity to work together creatively to respond to challenges that arise.

The post Why we need to build trust and guarantee civic space to deal with global challenges     appeared first on Development Matters.

Medienveranstaltung in Hamburg beschäftigt sich mit Falschinformation und Hetze und der Frage, welche Rolle Medien dabei spielen

In den 1980er Jahren ließ das Regime des autokratischen Präsidenten Robert Mugabe mehr als 20 000 Angehörige des Ndebele-Volkes ermorden. Sie waren Anhänger der Afrikanischen Volksunion von Simbabwe (ZAPU) und somit Mugabes politische Gegner. Die Gräueltaten wurden unter dem Namen Gukurahundi bekannt und als Völkermord eingestuft. Bis heute ist es in Simbabwe gefährlich, darüber zu be­richten und den Angehörigen der Opfer und Zeitzeugen eine Stimme zu geben.

Aktivist Zenzele Ndebele von der Medienorganisation Centre for Innovation and Technology (CITE) in Bulawayo sagt: „Wir versuchen seit einigen Jahren, mit Dokumentationen und Diskussionsveranstaltungen die Schrecken von damals ans Licht zu holen und festzuhalten; die Angehörigen der Opfer haben ein Recht zu erfahren, was passiert ist.“ Ndebele und seine Mitstrei­terinnen und Mitstreiter von CITE kündigen Termine und Orte ihrer Aktivitäten nur kurz­fristig an, um staatlichen Störmanövern zu entgehen. Die simbabwischen Sicherheitskräfte beobachten die Organisation genau, da die Regierungspartei keinerlei Interesse an einer Aufarbeitung hat.

Bei den Recherchen zum Gukurahundi hat Ndebele erfahren, wie sehr das Mugabe-Regime vor vier Jahrzehnten Falsch­informationen gestreut hat, um das Ausmaß des Völkermords zu verschleiern und die Taten bei den eigenen Anhängern zu rechtfertigen. „Es ist wie heute in den sozialen Medien: Falschinformationen schüren Hass, und Hass führt zu Gewalt“, erklärt Ndebele. Deswegen hat CITE ein großes Projekt zur Medien- und Informationskompetenz gestartet. Seit 2021 bildet die Organisation Freiwillige aus, die in ihren Communitys die Medienkompetenz der Menschen steigern.

Wie genau das aussieht und welchen Beitrag CITE zur Aufarbeitung des Gukurahundi leistet, werden Ndebele und einige Teammitglieder in Hamburg auf dem diesjährigen Symposium des Forums für Medien und Entwicklung (fome22) im Detail vorstellen. Auch andere Redner aus aller Welt werden ihre Erfahrungen teilen. Chefredakteur Soe Myint aus Myanmar wird berichten, wie sich das Medienhaus Mizzima vorsorgend für Krisen präpariert hat und so im vergangenen Jahr schnell auf den Militärputsch reagieren konnte.

Eine Vertreterin von Rappler, dem regierungskritischen philippinischen Nachrichtenportal der Friedensnobelpreis­trägerin Maria Ressa, wird erklären, wie sich ihre Redaktion gegen Übergriffe des Staates wappnet. Bosnien-Expertinnen und -Experten werden berichten, welche Lehren die Medien dort aus der Vergangenheit gezogen haben. Andere Themen werden die Kommunikation von Wahrheitskommissionen sein, und die Bemühungen, Straftaten gegen Journalistinnen und Journalisten besser zu verfolgen. Es wird auch darum gehen, wie Medienentwicklungsorganisationen ihre Aktivitäten besser messen können, und um die Situation der Medien in der Ukraine.

Der Titel des Symposiums, das am 13. und 14. September in Hamburg stattfindet, lautet „Media Development: Dealing with the Past – Preparing for the Future“. Workshops, Vorträge und Diskussionen widmen sich der Frage: Welche Rolle können Medien bei der Aufarbeitung von vergangenen bewaffneten Konflikten und der Vermeidung von künftigen gewalttätigen Konflikten spielen und welche Rolle spielt Medienentwicklungszusammenarbeit dabei?

Links
Programm, Tickets und Tipps zum Symposium:
www.fome.info
www.interlink.academy

Werner Eggert ist Geschäftsführer der Interlink Academy for International Dialog and Journalism, die das Symposium dieses Jahr organisiert.
werner.eggert@interlink.academy

Every month we share with our readers a curated reading list on inclusive development. This month, we are zooming in on the just transition and the future of work – a topic INCLUDE is currently working on through our joint research programme with Palladium, Green jobs and the Future of Work.

Agriculture is expected to remain the largest job-supplier in Africa in the coming decades. But many jobs within the sector will be transformed to respond to climate change. Africa is highly vulnerable to climate change. Recent research by the AERC into the role of Africa in the green transition advises new agricultural practices and policies that support and create a sustainable green revolution. This ‘green transition’ is anticipated to create new ‘green jobs’, and is therefore widely heralded as a solution to the missing jobs crisis in Africa. Indeed, ACET’s research into Development Finance Institutions for more decent jobs in Africa indicates that Africa’s future jobs will be green and digital, thereby supporting the modernisation of the agriculture sector. However, a green transformation of the economy will also displace existing jobs. The green transformation must therefore also be a ‘just transition’.

The German Development Institute published a discussion paper on the challenges and opportunities of green jobs in African and Asian cities, including good practice cases. From the many recommendations included in this paper, one is cross-cutting: the need for green transformation policies that reflect local problems, potentials, and stakeholders. The green transformation can create more green jobs and respectively shift current jobs into green jobs. But misalignment with the local context, such as disregarding the informal sector or a mismatch between skill sets and jobs created, could ruin chances to benefit from the green transformation. There is a risk that newly created green jobs might not compensate for job losses. The African Development Bank’s African Economic Outlook 2022 emphasises that a just transition should mitigate the risks of locking Africa out of the green technology manufacturing value chain and should aim to increase Africa’s share of green jobs.

Curious to know more about digitalisation and the future of work in Africa? Take a look at our work and stay tuned for more in our newsletters.

Het bericht Our Monthly Reading List: July 2022 verscheen eerst op INCLUDE Platform.

Through a virtual side event during the UN High-Level Political Forum (UN HLPF) in New York titled A look into Integrated National Financing Frameworks (INFFs): Ensuring ownership and alignment with national development priorities, CPDE and its partners facilitated a conversation around how the framework can truly help bring sustainable development.

Held last July 5, the activity was organised together with the Reality of Aid Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Italy, UNDESA, UNDP, and the Civil Society Financing for Development (FfD) Group.

According to the organisers, the international community has been steadily investing in the development of INFFs since the Addis Ababa Action Agenda stated their relevance. Notably, the G20 endorsed a voluntary framework in this regard.

Today, INFFs are being promoted by development partners and multilaterals; partner countries are implementing these frameworks on some level; and civil society organisations are trying to better understand potentials and risks, in order to assess the impact on the Financing for Development (FfD) global agenda, the actual space for country ownership and the participation of civil society.

Facilitated by Stefano Prato, Executive Director of the Society for International Development (SID), the event featured presentations and discussions on the overview of INFFs and its approach, survey, and facility by the UN DESA and UNDP, civil society views on the Review of Guidance Material by the CSO FfD Group/CPDE, the INFF G20 framework, implementing country government national experience, and national CSO perspectives on INFF implementation.

In her introduction to the INFFs, Shari Spiegel, Chief, Policy Analysis and Development Branch at FSDO/DESA argued that countries are responsible for their own development, and the international community is responsible for their enabling environment. At the same time, she explains that “while the INFF is potentially a powerful tool, one should not expect too much from it.”

The INFFs, she explained, are a framework to raise financing needs at the national level and to strengthen coherence among policies and actors, and a knowledge and experience sharing platform for implementing countries. These are tools aiming at strengthening the SDGs and existing systems, not to add to, nor to replace them. She also stressed that the purpose of the process is to bring everyone to talk, but that this will not solve existing country governance problems.

Thomas Beloe, Chief of Programme, UNDP Sustainable Finance Hub, described the INFFs as a country-led “work in progress” and insisted that at its core  is an emphasis on broadening the constituencies that engage on finance policy. This is why, he says, the UN strongly encourages the participation and significant contribution of civil society.

Among 86 countries implementing INFFs worldwide, only 28% of national oversight committees count civil society as members. He stressed that “we could do more and should do more to engage different constituencies at every stage of the INFF process.”

For her part, Polly Meeks, an independent researcher for the Civil Society Financing for Development (CS FfD) Group, presented the findings of a review on the INFF guidance material. She started by saying financing issues faced by the Global South countries are systemic, and outside their unique control. The review thus recommends expediting action on systemic global economic governance issues and not to present INFFs as the sole solution.

The review also insists on the full participation of rights holders in all INFF decision-making, as well as giving countries free choice on implementing the INFFs. The paper also recommends that policy reforms being pushed forward within the INFF processes should acknowledge risks, uphold obligations, and value alternatives. For example, economic growth is assumed as a common objective for all countries, but must be reconsidered given the current global threats and climate crisis. The IPCC report for instance recommended a pattern of degrowth for Global North countries.

Meeks also urged taking into account existing researches on the risks associated with some of the INFF tools, and featuring them more prominently on the guidance materials, along with a more diverse range of possible tools and approaches as alternatives. Finally, she pointed out the importance of emphasising the countries’ binding obligations under UN treaties, especially regarding human rights.

Min. Marco Ricci, Chair of the G20 Development Working Group under the Italian Presidency, meanwhile provided an overview of the process and development of the INFF G20 Framework developed over the past two years, explaining its aim to try to cope with the crises of 2020.

He talked about the adoption of the extension of the debt suspension initiative given to 50 lower income countries, and of a common framework – an ambitious instrument aiming to gather all donors, including private donors, around 80 high-debt countries for more structured intervention to make debt sustainable. “We believe that the only way forward is for all creditors to be involved,” he said. They also promoted the adoption of a global minimum tax, seen as the first step towards a global tax.

Italy organised a development ministers’ meeting at the end of June 2021 to discuss INFFs, which led to the later adoption by the G20 DWG of the G20 Framework for voluntary support to a greater uptake and operationalisation of the INFFs for SDG financing and Covid-19 recovery in developing countries. This framework was then adopted by G20 leaders at the Rome summit last October 2021.

Next presenters were CSO speakers Vitalice Meja, Director of Reality of Aid – Africa and Non-Executive Co-Chair of the GPEDC to reflect on Kenya perspective, and Rodolfo Lahoy Jr, Policy, Communications and Training Team Head at IBON International, for the Philippine experience.

Meja said that in Kenya, where INFF is still in development, the process led by government is becoming more inclusive, with the technical steering group including civil society, local authority, and foundations. But he acknowledges that more work needs to be done towards comprehensive ownership, and insisted on the importance to train people locally to develop and implement such processes, instead of relying on external consultants for reports that will only be reviewed later by local actors. He also reiterated the importance of bringing all stakeholders to the table from design to inception to implementation and review. He argued that everyone should engage on the terms of reference, agree on the key questions and areas that need to be looked at, and that the INFF should not only be a government tool that nobody really uses.

He does note that, as of now, this process is solely undertaken by the national Ministry of Finance. And because sustainable development is not only about finance, there is a need for more coherence and various perspectives, hence the involvement of other ministries and civil society actors. He also asked, “What is the added value for this process, especially at the national level? Is there really a demand for this or is this supply-driven?”

He stressed that development partners still play a very big role in setting the direction of development funding in developing countries. He then invites everyone to ask the kind of behavior change we need, want, and expect out of this exercise, especially from development partners: “It is not enough to say that you have a tool to be able to track, to be able to see, but how does that tool lead into a behavior chance that is necessary to generate sufficient resources to finance SDGs?”

Finally, Rodolfo Lahoy Policy, Communications, and Training Team lead of IBON International, then provided CSO perspectives on the INFF in the Philippines. After an overview of the Philippine INFF launched September 2021, its human capital approach (investing in health, education, and gender equity for long term economic growth), systems and stakeholders, Lahoy raised some questions on both democratic ownership and Philippines systemic issues in the context of implementing the INFF.

Regarding the democratic ownership, he laments that the process has not been sufficiently democratic as organisations of the marginalised, such as domestic trade unions, organisations, and urban and rural poor movement, were not influential or even present, across the process. He also warned that INFF process works from uneven terrain of big private sectors vis a vis civil society.

Lahoy asked how the INFF, in aligning with existing country policy priorities, would account for existing structural issues regarding development financing. Among them are the current tax regime being heavy on consumers while investment on special economic zones (SEZ) rely on corporate incentives, the country being highly indebted, and one of the top borrowers from the World Bank, its trade economy being export-oriented, and broadly relying on remittances and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) without strong industrial capacity.

He warned that the INFF process might reinforce risky approaches about private finance, and whether the INFF – amid pandemic, multiple crises, unequal recovery – will actually offer a window for more ambitious, systemic policy shifts. All these elements of national context and policies, he said, must lead us to ask how they will contribute towards sustainable development.

The event ended with an open plenary where civil society actors were given the chance to ask questions to the panelists.

The full event recording is available here.#

The post CPDE UN HLPF side event urges INFF ownership, alignment with national development priorities appeared first on CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness.

What the NDB and AIIB have in common – and how they differ

The Shanghai-based New Development Bank (NDB), also known as the BRICS Bank, was founded in 2014. It is a significant institution, but so far not a major player among the multilateral development banks. To date, the NDB has disbursed about $ 15 billion in infrastructure financing. The World Bank Group, by contrast, disbursed more than $ 60 billion in 2021.

The major shareholders of the NDB are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The governance system is well designed. The BRICS members are in control. The bank is a worthy start, but not making a difference in global affairs yet.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is another new international financial institution. It is headquartered in Beijing.

With total disbursements worth about $ 20 billion so far, it is not a big player either. China is the dominant power, though the AIIB now has 103 member states, including major EU countries such as Germany, France and Italy, which joined in spite of the USA’s request not to do so.

Beijing took the initiative to start the AIIB before the NDB was even discussed in the BRICS context. There is no resident board of directors, so the president has a lot of leeway. Rules concerning social or environmental protection are quite loose, and efficiency and flexibility have been declared to be the top priorities.

It is quite obvious that the AIIB is more important in the eyes of China’s leaders. To a large extent, it supports the regime’s foreign policy, including its massive international infrastructure programme called the Belt and Road Initiative.

Moreover, China is running many other international funding programmes which are geared to forging partnerships with countries in several world regions, including Africa, Central Eastern Europe or Latin America. Region-specific summits are held in Beijing regularly as well. PJ

Praveen Jha is a professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.
praveenjha2005@gmail.com

Why Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as a group are no real counterweight to the US-led G7

Two decades ago, Jim O’Neill, a manager at Goldman Sachs, the New-York based investment bank, coined the acronym BRICs. It stood for Brazil, Russia, India and China. In his eyes, these four emerging economies stood out due to high growth rates and large populations. The political systems, however, were very different, ranging from representative democracy to full-blown dictatorship. The economic models were very different too, and so were history, culture and geography. Russia spans half of the Arctic Circle, while India and Brazil are mostly tropical countries.

Nonetheless, the new term became popular, including in the countries concerned. In 2006, the four foreign ministers of the BRICs met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. In 2009, the inaugural BRICs’ summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia, and annual summits have taken place ever since. The latest one was a digitised event, hosted by China’s president Xi Jinping in June.

Capitalising the “s”

When South Africa joined in 2010, the “s” in BRICS was capitalised. By that time, the global context had changed considerably. In 2008, Lehman Brothers, another New York investment bank, had collapsed, triggering a financial crisis which spread around the globe. The G7 (Group of seven major high-income economies) had been hit especially hard. That emerging economies were faring better bolstered their international standing. From late 2008 on, the top leaders of the 20 largest economies (Group of 20 – G20) had begun staging annual summits. They involved the G7, what was yet to become the five-member BRICS as well as several other nations.

The BRICS account for roughly one quarter of global GDP in dollar terms and one third in purchasing power parities. About 40 % of the world population lives in a BRICS country.

Group’s appeal is not based on common agenda

Several other developing countries and emerging markets have stated their interest in joining the group. They include Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Argentina. Given that the BRICS do not have a clear agenda, its appeal seems awkward. What it shows, however, is that many governments are uncomfortable with the US-led G7 dominating the global arena. Quite obviously, they see the BRICS as a potential counterweight.

So far, however, the BRICS have not been able to play such a role. They lack a coherent agenda. There has been a lot of talk regarding various economic issues, of course, but apart from one exception, big announcements did not result in tangible projects or meaningful multilateral initiatives. So far, the BRICS have only one new joint institution: the Shanghai-based New Development Bank (NDB) (see box). Other announcements concerned things like an innovation partnership, a contingent foreign-exchange arrangement or a BRICS credit rating agency. None of them materialised.

Awkward allies

Part of the problem is that the BRICS do not agree on much apart from not accepting a unipolar world and rejecting US hegemony. As the macroeconomic situations of the five countries and their strategic interest diverge considerably, they struggle to find common ground. In particular, India and China are not natural allies, but rather fierce competitors. The security situation along the Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas is tense, and soldiers are indeed killed occasionally.

India, moreover, is largely bypassed by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a massive international infrastructure-investment programme which has financed projects in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In view of mounting sovereign-debt problems, however, it is not clear that they are really beneficiaries. In any case, the Belt and Road Initiative shows that Beijing sees New Delhi as a rival and that it is dealing with international debt issues on its own and not in concert with BRICS partners.

Trade between the five countries has actually been in decline, and the Covid-19 pandemic is not the only reason. Trade frictions between India and China are becoming increasingly evident.

The G7 are eager to exploit tensions within the BRICS. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa were both invited to the recent G7 summit in Bavaria. They attended a side-event, and that must have made alarms ring in Beijing. China has indicated an interest in expanding the BRICS, but other members seem to prefer keeping it small. All five are doing what suits their national interests.

Disappointment in the G7

International disappoint in the G7 has many reasons (see interviews with Anna-Katharina Hornidge and Vladimir Antwi-Danso on www.dandc.eu). For the purpose of this essay, I will restrict myself to pointing out that the global South has heard many long lectures on prudent macroeconomic management and fighting corruption. We notice, however, that no one is held accountable when reckless Wall Street speculation plunges the world economy into recession.Nor is anyone held accountable when German automobile manufacturers cheat customers around the world by systematically manipulating the documentation of car emissions. G7 hypocrisy did not start with US President Donald Trump. It was evident long before him – and it has not left the global state with him either.

In the current multilateral system, the G7 are aligned with financial capital and wield disproportionate power. It would be good to have a counterweight. The BRICS are too disparate to serve that function. So far, their big announcements have even largely neglected important issues like the climate crisis. They are unlikely to adopt the kind of coherent agenda that would be needed, not least, because they all want to benefit as best they can from the currently prevailing order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, moreover, has made things even more difficult than they already were.

Increasingly unstable global order

On the one hand, the other four BRICS members have all condemned Moscow’s aggression. On the other hand, they are eager not to make things difficult for Russia. To some extent, they are trying to benefit from Russia’s isolation, for example by importing its commodities at discount prices. At the same time, the NDB has frozen its Russia programme. The reason is that it wants to keep its western AA+ rating, which shows how limited the BRICS’ range of action really is. How the BRICS as a group will cope with an increasingly unstable global order remains to be seen.
 

Praveen Jha is a professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.
praveenjha2005@gmail.com

After dominating politics in Colombo for a long time, the Rajapaksa brothers have lost their grip on power

Sri Lanka’s economy is in freefall. It has been severely mismanaged. In May, the country defaulted on most of its international debt of close to $ 51 billion. The government sought and received support from India, Bangladesh and China. It has also been in talks with the International Monetary Fund. Prices are rising fast and an increasing number of families are forced to skip meals. According to the UN, 4.9 million people urgently need food aid.

After months of angry protests, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled to Singapore in July and declared his resignation there. His family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for a long time. His brother Mahinda Rajapaksa was president from 2005 to 2015, and Gotabaya served as defence secretary under him. Both have strong authoritarian leanings (see my article on www.dandc.eu). When Gotabaya became president after winning the general election in 2012 with 52 %, he made Mahinda prime minister. Other siblings have held government offices too.

The clan’s grip on power loosened in May, when wide-spread protests forced Mahinda to resign. Wickremesinghe became prime minister – not for the first time. He has had several stints in this office since 1993 under different heads of state. He is well-known, but not popular. He lost his Colombo constituency in the parliamentary elections of 2020. The United National Party (UNP), which he led, suffered a crushing defeat. Its share of votes was so small that it did not win a constituency, but only gained one single seat thanks to rules meant to ensure some proportional representation. Defying convention, Wickremesinghe decided to occupy that seat himself.

Wickremesinghe is seen as an ally of the Rajapaksas. He became president thanks to legislators close to them. Their party had won a two-thirds majority in 2020. Many believe that the new head of state will protect the clan. Its members face potential prosecution not only for fraud and corruption, but even for alleged assassinations and war crimes. Mahinda and Gotabaya played decisive roles when Sri Lanka’s decades-lasting civil war ended in a pool of blood.

Under Gotabaya, the constitution was amended, giving the president untrammelled power. His leadership was poor however. After promising farmers free chemical fertiliser, he decreed in view of dwindling foreign-exchange reserves that they had to switch to organic farming almost overnight. His tax cuts benefited the rich, but drained government finances. Already burdened with considerable foreign debt, his administration found it increasingly difficult to get new loans. Bonds were downgraded to junk status. Eventually, even public servants could no longer be paid, so the central bank started printing money.

Costly vanity projects

To a large extent, the debt results from vanity projects launched during Mahinda’s presidency. Chinese institutions provided generous loans for building a major harbour, an additional airport, a huge cricket stadium and other prestigious facilities. None of them is generating revenues anywhere close to the credit-servicing need.

Opposition parties have refused to join any government headed by either Gotabaya or Wickremasinghe. Large demonstrations demanded that both step down and that the presidency be stripped of executive powers again. The official residencies of both the president and the prime minister were stormed.

As people’s standard of life collapsed, members of the middle classes joined the protesting urban youth. Civil-society groups backed the agitation, and so did clergy of all religious denominations. Opposition political parties have shown tacit support at the least.

Wickremesinghe now holds the office he always aspired to, but he is a president without popular mandate. He is considered to have good international connections and even a vision for the country, which, however, voters so far did not appreciate. Can he succeed? The odds are against him.

Arjuna Ranawana is a Sri Lankan journalist.
arjuna.ranawana@outlook.com

Lebanon’s women-led cooperatives are helping communities to cope with the country’ recent wave of crises: the COVID-19 pandemic, the financial crisis, and the notorious August 2021 Beirut Port Explosion.

In this year’s High-Level Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF), feminists of Women’s Major Group came together to draft interventions, which we were able to deliver in official thematic and VNR sessions that can also be found on UN Web TV. Below you may find a compilation of our recorded interventions, including some we were unable to deliver.

Intervention by Daksha Vaja cancelled for ‘lack of time’ on 5 July

On the first day of HLPF 2022, it was disappointing to see civil society voices being dropped off from the discussion at HLPF 2022. It was also disappointing that civil society has been scheduled to be heard at the very end of the sessions thereby leaving them with barely any time to raise their concerns and demands. WMG member, Daksha Vaja, Community Science Center India, was to take the floor to bring attention to the importance of education in Science, Technology & Innovation toward #SRHR & gender equality before her intervention was cancelled for ‘lack of time’.

Intervention delivered by Saba Gebremedhin on 6 July

Intervention delivered by Saba Gebremedhin, Network of Ethiopian Women Associations (NEWA) and a Malala Fund partner organization, on the linkages of SDG 4 to girls’ education and gender equality.

Pille Tsopp-Pagan as Lead Discussant on 7 July

Pille Tsopp-Pagan, from WSIC, as Lead Discussant at Session on SDG 5 – Gender equality, and interlinkages with other SDGs. Her intervention focussed on the dire situation of SDG 5 since its last review in 2017, and for the needs of women and girls, in all their diversities, to be addressed more comprehensively.

Intervention delivered by Pamela Martin Garcia on 11 July

Pamela Martin Garcia, delivering an intervention from the floor for the session on Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

Mabel Bianco as Panelist on 12 July

Mabel Bianco, FEIM, as Panelist reminding the Member States and the UN about the vision of civil society: leaving no one behind in recovering better, and warning about the risk of leaving HLPF2022 without a firm political commitment to the Agenda 2030.

Emilia Reyes as Panelist on 12 July – Part 1 | Part 2

Emilia Reyes, Equidad de Género, as Panelist reiterating the urgency of the Global South that needs to be felt in the Global North and at the UN, and pushing for strong decisions that put people first, and not profits.

Svetlana Slesarenok as Panelist on 12 July

Svetlana Slesarenok, Founder and Director of Black Sea Women’s Club, speaking as a refugee from the war in Ukraine on the incompatibility between war and sustainable development, and the role of fossil fuels in conflict.

Intervention delivered by Cecile Karla on 12 July

Cecile Karla, REFACOF, makes an intervention with regards to elimination of gender-based violence, prejudice and discrimination, and prioritizing education, including SRHR.

April Porteria as Lead Discussant on 14 July

April Porteria, as lead discussant speaks on behalf of MGoS CM & APRCEM proposing the alternative approach of Development Justice with an intersectional focus on systemic barriers.

Intervention delivered by Vanessa M. Cortés on 14 July

Vanessa M. Cortés, from Asociació Stop Violéncias Andorra, makes an intervention against Andorra government for imprisoning feminist activists who are fighting for the right to safe and legal abortion, and bodily autonomy.

Intervention delivered by Sascha Gabizon on 14 July

Sascha Gabizon, WECF, makes an intervention urging the state of Guinea-Bissau to increase state budgets for education and health, and to reaffirm their commitment to SDG 5.

You can also find all our HLPF 2022 interventions compiled in this YouTube playlist.

The post HLPF 2022 Interventions appeared first on Women's Major Group.

WMG Highlights from HLPf 2022!

HLPF 2022 has been an amazing two weeks with our members and allies in New York and online. The challenges of participation and process were still very much there, further heightened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Many of our members and allies could not be physically present with us due to several political and logistical reasons. We also faced challenges with regards to virtual modalities. However, we were still ready to demand and advocate for system change. We have been present in all spaces possible and created impact. We turned 30 this year and were able to celebrate together!

We thank all our members and allies deeply for their fierce feminist advocacy. There is still much work needed to ensure that we move towards a more accountable and effective Agenda 2030, for a peaceful, sustainable and equitable future for all, and to recover from the pandemic to a system centered on human rights and care. It uplifts us, however, to know that we’ll work together to bring this transformative change, and to bring to reality this system that we, feminists, have envisioned collectively.

Here are a few highlights from all the hard work that were undertaken by the fierce feminists of WMG during HLPF 2022:

WMG turns 30!

This year the Women’s Major Group celebrated 30 years of activism within the UN. The WMG was founded at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where governments recognized “Women” as one of 9 key constituencies under the “Major Groups and other Stakeholders” (MGoS). The MGoS has been crucial for civil society to have a voice in UN processes and monitor the 2030 Agenda & its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Just as critical to its presence in official UN spaces is the WMG presence outside of them. One of the WMG’s biggest successes has been strengthening regional knowledge sharing & coordination efforts—adopting the MGoS system to the regions, but making it even stronger. As we move forward, we will continue to raise the demand that #FeministsWantSystemsChange! We were joined by WMG members, feminist civil society, Major Groups and other Stakeholders, member states, and UN representatives for a rooftop reception!

Theme

HLPF 2022 discussed in depth Building back better from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) while advancing the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. You can read WMG’s position on the SDGs in our HLPF 2022 Position Paper here.  

Statements & Interventions 

• 8 interventions (including VNRs questions/statements) in official sessions
• 2 panelist in the official sessions
• 2 lead discussants
• 1 intervention was dropped citing ‘lack of time’

We uploaded the videos of all our interventions and VNR statements to our website and Youtube channel. The VNR alternative reports submitted to us are already online here, on our website. They carry the critical feminist systemic analysis of our members and give important clues into what needs to be done, and done urgently!

Events 

We had one WMG official side event this year : Centrality of Human Rights to SDG 5 and Agenda 2030. We also hosted a special event : WMG Strategy Session: Synergies between CSW66 & HLPF 2022, and co-sponsored 7 other side events. The full list are available soon on our website!

WMG supported the organization of the MGoS CM Side Event and Official Session, WMG political discussion, an SGDs Learning, Training & Practice Session focused on various data, tech and advocacy for SDG5, with our segment on “Nourishing Feminist Advocacy for Transformative Change”, a civil society demonstration to say: “The People Want System Change!” and co-hosted a feminist coffee meet up!

Our members were active as organizers, moderators, and speakers well over 10 other events.  

Delegation Meetings

We had five official meetings with delegations. We hope to stay in touch with all the delegations we’ve met, to share information and advocacy priorities with them throughout the year. We can be reached at contact@womensmajorgroup.org for meeting & collaboration possibilities.

Colour Campaign

It was heartwarming to see the level of solidarity, physically and virtually, for our color campaign, and to see everyone looking so amazing in that day’s color in our morning caucuses and the virtual meetings! It was also awesome to see allies wearing our colors, tying the scarves to their name plates, mentioning the color campaign in their speeches & amplifying the color campaign online too! In many of the Official Sessions, the panelists wore our scarves, and we even got shoutouts from Member States who supported our color campaign and demand of the day!

You can find all our photos from the color campaign inputs at the photos section of our Facebook & Instagram accounts. Our colors were very visible on social media! Please find the graphics prepared here! You can find photos for all days here.

We also prepared a social media toolkit in English and Spanish! Many thanks to our members who’ve supported us with the translation to Spanish & French, and provided us with the Alt text for accessibility of the English graphics, that are in the toolkit for you to use.

This year’s incredible messages, graphics and Zoom backgrounds will always remain available. So please please support us by bookmarking the link to the social media toolkit, and using the materials whenever you can throughout the year, to show WMG’s advocacy on gender equality and sustainable development is year-round work!

Digital Engagement

Twitter: Overall through the HLPF 2022, we’ve sent 180 tweets from the @Women_Rio20, and our tweets got over 90.4K total impressions. We were able to bring in 23.2K new profile visits, 336 mentions, and 158 new followers.

The #FeministsWantSystemChange hashtag had been used in more than 1500 tweets during HLPF2022, and had 9.2 million possible reach!

Instagram: We reached 1129 accounts, engaged with 292 new accounts and gained 90 followers.

WMG also supported the preparation and dissemination of the MGoS CM statement on the Ministerial Declaration adopted on the 15th of July.

Please see all our incredible digital outputs at our social media channels, and please do not forget to follow us :

Twitter: @Women_Rio20
Facebook: Women’s Major Group
Instagram: @womensmajorgroup
Youtube: Women’s Major Group

You can subscribe to WMG listservs here.

We thank all our members and allies for all their support, expertise, work, time and solidarity. We are already very much excited for our collective, fierce feminist advocacy in the upcoming days and months. Next year, HLPF 2023 will be under the auspices of UNGA. With the SDG Summit in September, our fierce feminist advocacy ahead is much urgent and important.

In solidarity.

The post WMG Highlights from HLPF 2022! appeared first on Women's Major Group.