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Setting a Baseline for Innovations in Multi-Layer Plastic Packaging Recycling

SCP-Centre - 21. Juni 2022 - 9:48

With a yearly volume of over 3 million tonnes, which is about 17% of all plastic packaging in the European Union, multi-layer plastic packaging waste is a significant part of the current waste stream. A circular plastics economy reduces the environmental issue of multi-layer plastic waste. This baseline study sets the foundation for future innovations and solutions within the scope of our MERLIN project.

By 2030, the EU will ban single-use plastics that are not reusable or recyclable. Multi-layer plastic packaging is known for its excellent packaging characteristics that both protect as well as brand goods of daily use. This packaging segment is especially affected by the ban since its advantages come with trade-offs on the recyclability and separation of compounded plastic fractions. It will be an uphill challenge to develop the technology that can meet the 80% recycling target for plastic packaging. The EU Plastics Strategy and the Circular Economy Action Plan lay it out clearly: the incineration and littering of plastic packaging have to come to a stop. For this to happen, relevant actors need to come together and find solutions to reuse and recycle multi-layer plastic packaging.

This is at the core of our Horizon 2020 project, MERLIN. As part of the project, the CSCP conducted a baseline study that assesses the status quo of today’s multi-layer plastic packaging sector. The study maps out the pathways to collection, sorting, delamination and recycling. The CSCP engaged relevant stakeholders and analysed the motivations, barriers and opportunities of the entire value chain with the input of the MERLIN consortium. Please go to our library to download the full baseline study.

In autumn 2022, the CSCP will launch the MERLIN packaging club, a platform for stakeholders and industry experts to foster collaboration and create solutions for successful recycling in a circular plastics economy.

For further questions, please contact Fiona Woo.

Photo by The Organic Crave Company on Unsplash.

 

The post Setting a Baseline for Innovations in Multi-Layer Plastic Packaging Recycling appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

The Consumer Insight Action Panel on Electronics Reveals Social Impacts of the Circular Economy

SCP-Centre - 21. Juni 2022 - 9:15

The Circular Economy is seen in the EU as the great hope on the road to a more sustainable economic system and climate neutrality. The potential is enormous, not only in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but also when it comes to conserving resources and protecting biodiversity. While the Circular Economy can score in environmental terms if done right, as part of the CSCP programme, Consumer Insight Action Panel (CIAP), we raised the question: What about the social dimension? Major societal transformation processes also entail major social upheavals: who is affected by this and in what way?

According to the European Commission, the circular economy creates more net jobs than it loses. In principle, that doesn’t sound bad. Within CIAP, we wanted to know more, because this statement conceals many socio-economic effects. One thing is certain: the upheavals in the labour market will hit some sectors and regions harder than others. Sectors that have made entire regions economically strong and ensured that people have jobs will change in ways that some job profiles will simply no longer meet the new requirements and as a consequence disappear. One example is mining in the Ruhr region, a German conurbation that has long benefited from the linear economic model through coal mining.

The experts we interviewed in our project agree: EU-wide upskilling and reskilling programmes are crucial against this backdrop in order to absorb possible job losses and offer people from traditional industries a perspective. A good example of this is the organisation RREUSE, which offers people who can no longer find employment in the traditional labour market a professional perspective in the field of reuse and repair through further education and training. The experts we interviewed also pointed out the global responsibility that the EU has in the upcoming restructuring of the economic system: so-called “waste pickers” in developing countries. They are responsible for sorting waste for recycling and should be able to work under appropriate safety and labour standards. Often though, they are exposed to toxic substances and precarious conditions.

While it is undisputed that jobs, secure incomes, and safe working conditions are of great importance, they do not represent the totality of social impacts. The way we consume and live also has an immense impact on the Circular Economy. The urge to buy the latest smartphone model, for example, supports the trend towards ever shorter lifetimes of electronic devices and runs counter to the circular principle, as does the fact that we usually want to own products ourselves instead of borrowing or sharing them with others. The social norms, i.e., what we have perceived as normal and customary up to now, should therefore change. This would also be a good basis for using the social potentials of the Circular Economy, e.g., through a new sense of belonging when sharing and repairing together.

This requires talking more about the social side of the Circular Economy. Our publication “Discussing the social impacts of circularity” summarises the results of our expert survey and aims to provide an impetus for this. The report was produced as part of the Electronics Club, funded by the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra as part of the Consumer Insight Action Panel (CIAP). CIAP is a CSCP multi-stakeholder programme that aims to support the transition to a Circular Economy by generating, applying and testing consumer behaviour insights into circular strategies in areas such as textiles, plastics, and electronics. The overarching vision was to enable circular behaviour by exploring how innovations can enable consumers to reuse, repair, share, recycle, or lease in support of a Circular Economy and more sustainability. Read our CIAP final report here.

For further questions, please contact Imke Schmidt.

The post The Consumer Insight Action Panel on Electronics Reveals Social Impacts of the Circular Economy appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

Addressing human mobility in national climate policy: insights from updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in South America

GDI Briefing - 21. Juni 2022 - 9:08

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.

Kategorien: english

Addressing human mobility in national climate policy: insights from updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in South America

GDI Briefing - 21. Juni 2022 - 9:08

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.

Kategorien: english

Germany and the UK: perspectives for deepening the bilateral dialogue on development policy

GDI Briefing - 21. Juni 2022 - 8:48

Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms.
The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions.
The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives.
Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects.
First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods.
Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.

Kategorien: english

Germany and the UK: perspectives for deepening the bilateral dialogue on development policy

GDI Briefing - 21. Juni 2022 - 8:48

Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms.
The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions.
The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives.
Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects.
First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods.
Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.

Kategorien: english

Ocean literacy and unlocking a revolution in ocean science solutions

UN #SDG News - 21. Juni 2022 - 4:11
The ocean holds the keys to an equitable and sustainable development path for all. This is the premise behind the UN Ocean Decade and it will be in the spotlight during several major international summits this year to promote ocean health, including the UN Ocean Conference, which is set to open soon in Lisbon, Portugal.
Kategorien: english

Expanding Malawi’s Aquaculture Sector

SNRD Africa - 20. Juni 2022 - 18:44

Aquaculture fish has great prospects to contribute substantially to better food security

The post Expanding Malawi’s Aquaculture Sector appeared first on SNRD Africa.

Kategorien: english

Iran Nuclear Diplomacy Enters a Perilous New Phase

UN Dispatch - 20. Juni 2022 - 17:07

In early June, Iran took the dramatic step of turning off some monitoring cameras in key nuclear facilities that had been installed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The move came in reaction to a vote by the IAEA board of governors to censor Iran over its lack of cooperation with IAEA inspectors.

This latest turn in the ongoing saga of nuclear diplomacy with Iran is further indication of just how precarious the 2015 Nuclear deal seems to be.

Laura Rozen is a veteran reporter who has closely followed the contours of Iran nuclear diplomacy over many years. She is a member of the Just Security editorial board and writes the “Diplomatic” newsletter on Substack

We kick off discussing the state of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as Biden inherited it in 2021 before discussing how nuclear diplomacy with Iran in the past two years has unfolded, leading to this latest crisis over the removal of IAEA monitoring cameras.

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Transcript lightly edited for clarity

How Have Trump and Biden Interacted with the Iran Nuclear Deal and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action?

Laura Rozen [00:03:20] Yes, so the Biden administration came in January 20th and the Trump administration had left the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and Iran since 2019 so for the past, about a year and a half had been steadily exceeding the deal’s limits to protest the lack of sanctions relief they were getting. Trump left the deal. So, when Biden came in, unlike with the New START treaty with the Russians, that was a first week thing that they announced that they were going to go back into, which Trump hadn’t done. But with Iran, with the JCPOA, the administration, as they were getting in place, decided they wanted to consult with the other parties who were part of the deal before they figured out what they were going to announce. Even though Biden had campaigned on saying that if the Iranians would go back to the deal, he would go back to the deal.

Mark L. Goldberg [00:04:18] The other parties are, to remind listeners, permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.

Laura Rozen [00:04:25] Exactly and in particular Biden, as you’ve seen for the past two years, they’re always talking about allies and partners and working with allies. So, in particular, he really wanted to hug Europe and consult with Europeans and then in addition, Russia, and China. And also, there was the implication that Israel and the Gulf allies who were very nervous about if Biden — the pendulum swings so much with U.S. administrations between Democrats and Republicans — so you want him to consult with the Israelis and Arabs as well.

What is the timeline of current negotiations surrounding the Iran Nuclear Deal?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:04:57] So the upshot being that Biden did not want to rush back into the JCPOA, even though he was very supportive of it.

Laura Rozen [00:05:06] Correct. And the meantime, is the Iranian government that had negotiated the deal they were lame ducks. There were Iranian presidential elections scheduled for last June, so they only had a few months on the clock so while Biden was trying to consult with everybody and get everyone comfortable with where he was going, the Iranians were sitting there saying, we’re going to be out of here in a couple of months. And they basically, the former Iranian foreign minister Zarif and the former Iranian President Rouhani, were pretty constrained by the Iranian system at that point from diplomatic initiatives because they had been burned so badly. So, there was this terrible mismatch and I think by late February, anyhow, the Biden administration went to consult with the Europeans, and they had come out with a joint statement with the Europeans saying, we want to go back to the deal with the Iranians well, by then, the Iranians took a whole month to agree to resume talks with the United States. They all didn’t get to Vienna till last April, and the Iranians would not talk with the US directly until the US is back in the deal. So that added more time to all the negotiations that it had to go through the other parties.

What occurred in the informal talks between the United States and Iran in April 2021?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:06:30] So you’re saying in April 2021 there were talks, though not necessarily direct talks between the United States and the Iranians.

Laura Rozen [00:06:39] Correct. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany plus Iran, convened by the European Union, met in Vienna. They started having those multiparty talks in Vienna, but the US was not in the room, so the Europeans or whoever would go back and forth. So, this is April 2021, Iran has presidential elections in June, and the Rouhani administration is in its second term, and it can’t run again. So, by the time they start talking, the Rouhani people are really lame ducks. I mean, that’s basically the beginning of their transition out. So, the parties worked on a draft of the deal, and by June, just before the Iranian elections, they had part of the draft on a deal to return to the deal, but it wasn’t done, and they broke for the Iranian elections with many parties expecting they would get back there soon. You know, I think the US Special Envoy to Iran, Rob Malley, has been quoted saying that he left suits in Vienna expecting that they would be back after a few weeks and the hardline Raisi administration gets elected and during the transition before Raisi comes in, well, many people were thinking, oh, that’s when the Iranians will be able to rejoin the deal, right, and blame any concession on the outgoing guys. That did not happen. There were no meetings. They didn’t come back. I think you and I were both in New York in September for the U.N. events. The new Iranian foreign minister comes, and he gives a lot of speeches about, you know, why they’re not rushing back to talks. Anyhow, by the time they all get back to Vienna, it is not till the last week of November and then the hardline guys come in and they spend the first couple of weeks of December basically walking back everything they already conceded in the draft that they had till June. So, there was really a crisis. Some members left the U.S. negotiating team. I think you’ve heard of the deputy envoy, Richard Matthew, left feeling like the Iranians were giving the U.S. the runaround. At that point, Russia really had been playing an important role because the Iranians felt like Russia — so the Europeans and the U.S. are on one side, kind of the hard liners, right?

Why did the Iran-United States negotiations in 2021 come to a crisis point?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:09:09] From the Iranian perspective, the U.S. and Western Europe are the hard liners and Russia and to a certain extent, China are the more reasonable interlocutors.

Laura Rozen [00:09:18] Exactly, so back in December, in this crisis point when the U.S. team was having divisions and people didn’t know if they were going to walk out on the talks because the Iranian position was seen as so unreasonable with this new government after they waited months and months to come back to the talks and after they had expanded their nuclear program during those months in ways that were alarming, you know, they had increased their 20% enrichment. I don’t remember exactly when they started 60% enrichment, they were doing more underground enrichment. So, I think the Western parties felt like the Iranians were trying to boost up their nuclear program, to put pressure on the West to give more concessions and I think the West felt that the Iranians weren’t negotiating in good faith at this point. The Russians really went into overdrive and behind the scenes they worked with the Iranians and got the Iranians to walk back to the old draft, more or less. On the nuclear front, they got them to go back to the old draft and so a crisis was averted by late December. If Iran hadn’t done that, the U.S. said there was going to be at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in late December, they were going to have a censure resolution against Iran but Iran made all these concessions at the last minute. And so, they didn’t have to do the censure and then they had two months of incredibly productive talks in Vienna, even with this hardline Iranian government, where they basically got a draft done against a lot of people’s expectations by the end of February. And I went to Vienna at the end of February with a lot of other people because negotiators were telling us they expected to get the deal and then the Russian war in Ukraine started.

How has Russia’s war on Ukraine affected the Iranian Nuclear Deal talks?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:11:18] So I remember reading lots of commentary from you and from others saying, wow, we are really close to a diplomatic breakthrough on the Iran nuclear front. This was like the end of February, middle of February, and then February 24th, Russia invades Ukraine and given the crucial role that you describe Russia played in bringing the Iranians back to the negotiating table, presumably that Russian invasion of the Ukraine had a profoundly negative impact on Iran nuclear diplomacy. Can you explain what that impact was?

Laura Rozen [00:12:00] Yes and actually, it wasn’t immediate. I mean, I met with the Russian ambassador the day I arrived in Vienna, which was the day after the war started. You have to know that during the 2015 talks that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 2014 and 2015, those negotiations, Russia had invaded Crimea and there have been other instances in the past where everyone kind of holds their breath, thinking it’s all going to fall apart, and it had survived. The Russians see the nuclear deal as in their interests, right? So, it’s not because they’re doing any favors for the United States. It’s because it’s understood that Russia wants the nuclear deal. So, this time, for like a week or two, everything was still the same. The dynamic was similar that they actually got the draft. The Europe E3, the three European parties came to the deal and said, our work is done. There were just a few little things between the U.S. and Russia to iron out. This was like early March, as you said, this year and then Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, makes some comments. This is right after the European and US sanctions are announced against Russia for the current invasion of Ukraine and he starts making some demands that, oh well, we don’t know if the new sanctions on Russia are going to impede the Russian ability to fulfill its role in the nuclear deal, the Iran nuclear deal. So, they raised some concerns to get taken to this joint commission, which oversees implementation of the Iran nuclear deal. This maybe takes us a week or two into March. The negotiations in Vienna have basically broken off for now because the draft is done. These are some new Russian demands. By mid-March or so my understanding is the Russian concerns have been resolved that the Western sanctions on Russia are not going to impede the Iran nuclear deal, but at this point, my understanding is the Iranians have this demand that the US delist the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps from a State Department terror blacklist called the FTO List: Foreign Terror Organization List. The U.S. envoy takes it back to the NSC and it goes up to meetings and at some point, the White House, or the Biden administration, they go back to Iran and say, okay, well, if we do this non-nuclear concession, you have to give us some non-nuclear concession, right? Like agree not to target our officials; they gave them some list of options for some reciprocal gesture and the Iranians mulled this and they come back and say, no, they’re not going to do that. There were different compromises like, for instance, you could take off the IRGC and put on the Quds Force, the part of the IRGC that is considered to be the arm that sponsors foreign terrorism and proxy groups, right? It’s not that the whole IRGC is not considered to be acting abroad as much as this Quds Force. Remember, the Trump administration had assassinated the Quds Force commander, Kassam Soleimani, in Iraq in a very controversial move so the Iranians were still looking to avenge that and part of their vengeance around it was that we’ve heard that there are that the US has credible intelligence that Iran is threatening to target former U.S. officials who they consider involved with that decision and reportedly the former secretary of State Mike Pompeo has had to have $2 million worth of security from the State Department every month because of this threat. I think the former national security adviser for Trump, Bolton, is understood to have extra security out of this threat and some other officials as well. So, this is serious stuff. The U.S. is saying, right, if we take off the IRGC, you can’t target our former officials and the Iranians wouldn’t agree to that. So, it’s basically been stalemated. So, then the E.U. coordinator of the talks, Enrique Mora, the deputy secretary general, went to Iran a couple of times to try to pass messages to try to see if they could get — are there other things Iran would want on the sanctions delisting front that might be acceptable, right? And that hasn’t been successful yet.

Why did the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors vote to censure Iran?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:16:45] And so it’s in this context of stalemate that earlier in June, the IAEA board of Governors, which is made up of a number of U.N. member states, that kind of tilts towards the west, they voted to formally censure Iran. But what was that censure resolution all about?

Laura Rozen [00:17:07] So a couple of years before, there had been some particles found, I think at three Iranian sites, and there had been an IAEA resolution asking Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to explain what those past particles were about. This is work that I understand is before 2003 and before the Iran nuclear deal and so Iran back in March, when it seemed we might get the nuclear deal, had agreed with the IAEA that it would work on a road map to explain to them what these particles were about. The IAEA director general, Rafael Grossi, reported back to the IAEA board in June that he didn’t find Iran’s cooperation that successful or that convincing. And in the meantime, you know, there’s not that much progress on the nuclear deal and the Russians aren’t lifting a finger to help on this behind-the-scenes like the Russians had for several IAEA board meetings in the past: gone behind closed doors with the Iranians and said, you have to do X, Y, Z. That didn’t happen this time. So, the Iranian sends some messages through the EU trying to coax everybody not to do this resolution and saying that maybe they’ll come back to meetings or blah, blah, blah, and the parties went ahead and did this resolution. It was extremely mild, but urging them, not referring them to the UN Security Council. It was much more in the language of coaxing, but Iran reacted very harshly, as they tend to do, and said they were going to respond proportionally and they said they were going to turn off a bunch of cameras, IAEA cameras. They informed the IAEA that they were moving forward with installing cascades of advanced IR6 centrifuges in underground locations to do enrichment. So, they’re reacting very harshly.

What are the implications of Iran turning off IAEA monitoring cameras?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:19:27] You know, these cameras that they are taking offline are a significant part of the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear activity. They’re sort of how the IAEA monitors the nuclear activities. They don’t have boots on the ground. They have these kinds of sophisticated cameras that they’ve set up at key locations and judging from what I’ve heard from Grossi, the head of the IAEA, this is a very significant move that could seriously undermine the ability of the IAEA to monitor Iran’s nuclear program.

Laura Rozen [00:20:08] So I have to say, I do not understand all the technical specifications of how the IAEA monitoring regime works. Speaking with a European diplomat last week when Iran was announcing their measures, I said, is this what you expected? And he said it was still within what they were expecting. I’m not sure all the parties were as alarmed by Iran’s reaction as, you know, Grossi’s. Grossi has a different job than the diplomats, right? I mean. Grossi’s all about IAEA continuity and what I understood from what Grossi was saying is they could go about three or four weeks in this state, after which he would not be able to guarantee that they had continuity of knowledge. Does that make sense? So, they could go for some amount of time with still feeling like they could reconstitute what Iran had been doing and proving that it was peaceful, so they have a certain amount of time.

How did Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Mariano Grossi, react to Iran turning off monitoring cameras?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:21:14] Yeah. I mean, it’s Grossi and the IAEA’s job to report to the board of Governors about what they’re seeing on these cameras and Grossi was saying, after two or three weeks, with these cameras off, we can’t reliably inform you, was my understanding and my interpretation of Grossi’s statement.

Laura Rozen [00:21:33] And let me just say, Grossi did something provocative before this IAEA board meeting, which was, you don’t have the Russians at this point playing a hopeful role behind the scenes, you don’t have talks in Vienna where there’s any kind of momentum to get the Iranians on your page, right? You’re in a kind of stalemate. And Grossi goes to Israel right before the IAEA board meeting, and he hasn’t really explained what he’s doing there and Israel’s not a party to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Israel has been pushing loudly all the parties to end the negotiations and don’t have a deal. And so, I think the Iranians found that provocative. I have to say, the diplomats I was talking to in Vienna from Western parties also found it provocative and not conducive to trying to make Iran more conciliatory. I thought that was an unusual action by Grossi because Israel has been trying to spoil the talks. In the meantime, you’ve seen reports of Israel not really denying the role and assassination of a IRGC figure in Iran and more recent reports, I think, in the past week of other IRGC affiliated figures who’ve died of suspected poisoning. I know nothing about that, but it seems like Israel’s trying to create a little bit of paranoia again and Iran and Grossi kind of lent himself to and, you know, there have been past acts of sabotage at key moments in the past couple of years of Iranian nuclear facilities that Iranians suspect were done by Israel. And there’s never I think from the Iranian perspective, the IAEA or Grossi never really condemned those and very, very seriously.

Will the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) be able to survive this moment of crisis?

Mark L. Goldberg [00:23:42] So, it seems that the JCPOA has been dying like a slow death since Trump ripped it up in 2018 but in recent days and weeks, it seems that that pace of death is accelerating. Is that accurate to you? Do you see this as the end?

Laura Rozen [00:23:58] I don’t know because my understanding is that the Europeans have sent something to the Iranians last week, various ideas for trying to get the talks back on track, there’s some expectation that the Iranians are supposed to respond, and they haven’t yet. But, you know, look, I mean, oil is however many dollars a barrel. Iran could be selling an enormous amount of oil all over the world if they got a deal. You’ve seen there have been protests in Iran. They implemented some economic reforms at in the spring, in May that raised prices: food prices and other prices and so Iran could really benefit from the deal. In the meantime, their nuclear program basically the breakout is less than a week or the amount of time it would take Iran if it chose to enrich enough 90% uranium for one nuclear weapon is now considered to be less than two weeks. So, all sides have an interest, I think, in still getting a deal. I think that you just have these global dynamics we were talking about are not conducive to helping the Iranians get there. There’s not meetings going on in Vienna; those definitely help when you have like a certain momentum. There’s kind of nothing really going on and you have Biden choosing to go to Israel and Saudi Arabia in July, even though I think from the Biden administration perspective, they think you can have the Iran deal and talk to Israel and talk to Saudi Arabia. The Iranians again, see it as Biden picking their rivals, their regional rivals over a deal with them. So, it’s a really tough situation. I’ve also seen some Iranian commentary that they feel like Biden won’t take risks on Iran before the midterms and I mean, the Iranians think they’re much more important, I think in the US midterms maybe than they are. When you and I look at the polling of what people are concerned about in the midterms, it’s much more domestic issues like inflation, right? But the Iranians somehow feel like Biden won’t give them this concession now because it’s too politically complicated, but maybe he will after the midterms. When I look at the things, you know, Biden’s probably not going to be in a better situation with Congress after the midterms so I feel like we could be in the midst of a tragic mistake where the Iranians see benefit in waiting and think that they can get more by waiting and I think Biden will be unable to give them more by waiting.

Mark L. Goldberg [00:26:50] Well, Laura, we’ll have to leave it there. Thank you so much for your time and for your excellent reporting, as always. I will plug your substack, of which I am proudly a paying member. It’s great.

Laura Rozen [00:27:02] Thank you, Mark. Thank you for having me again, take care.

Mark L. Goldberg [00:27:05] All right. Thank you all for listening. Thank you to Laura and everyone should follow her substack. It’s a great resource for understanding the latest in Iran, nuclear diplomacy and more. All right. We’ll see you next time. Thanks, bye!

The post Iran Nuclear Diplomacy Enters a Perilous New Phase appeared first on UN Dispatch.

Kategorien: english

Challenging the imperial mode of living by challenging ELSEWHERE: Spatial narratives and justice

GDI Briefing - 20. Juni 2022 - 15:25

This article frames imperial lifestyles as a problem of global justice and discusses the spatial logic that engenders the actual discrepancy between this moral standard of equal rights and reality. It claims that the notion of ELSEWHERE, as Brand and Wissen (2022) put it, plays a central role in understanding the conditions that allow this grossly unjust global separation between responsibility and effect to be stable. In doing this, it establishes the concept of communities of justice that determine the boundaries of moral responsibility and analyses the global spatial logic that underlies the course of these boundaries, as they are experienced in everyday life. The Westphalian system of sovereign nation states is its main component but certainly not the only one. Finally, it sheds light on current attempts to challenge this spatial logic as well as their potentials and limitations.

Kategorien: english

Challenging the imperial mode of living by challenging ELSEWHERE: Spatial narratives and justice

GDI Briefing - 20. Juni 2022 - 15:25

This article frames imperial lifestyles as a problem of global justice and discusses the spatial logic that engenders the actual discrepancy between this moral standard of equal rights and reality. It claims that the notion of ELSEWHERE, as Brand and Wissen (2022) put it, plays a central role in understanding the conditions that allow this grossly unjust global separation between responsibility and effect to be stable. In doing this, it establishes the concept of communities of justice that determine the boundaries of moral responsibility and analyses the global spatial logic that underlies the course of these boundaries, as they are experienced in everyday life. The Westphalian system of sovereign nation states is its main component but certainly not the only one. Finally, it sheds light on current attempts to challenge this spatial logic as well as their potentials and limitations.

Kategorien: english

20 CSO Representatives Join the Second Round of Our weiter_wirken Programme

SCP-Centre - 20. Juni 2022 - 12:00

To accelerate the sustainable transformation but also ensure that it is equitable and inclusive, behavioural knowledge is a valuable asset. Yet civil society organisations (CSOs) often lack access to knowledge and tools for behavioural change. For the second time in a row, our programme weiter_wirken offers representatives of civil society organisations the opportunity to learn about and use behavioural science knowledge to support their work.

In April 2022, 20 CSO representatives from sustainability and One World projects in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) met for a first face-to-face workshop to discuss how to facilitate and enable behaviour change for more sustainability. In this first module, Rosa Strube, head of the CSCP Sustainable Lifestyles Team, presented the current state-of-the-art in behaviour change and communication research in the field of sustainability and emphasised the importance of knowing the target group. The group brought their own project ideas – from biodiversity to fair trade, development policy or food system change – and had the opportunity to specify the behaviours they are targeting.

Participants will tackle these topics from different perspectives in 4 workshops during the 3-month duration of this round of weiter_wirken.

The workshops, a mix of online and face-to-face meetings, will cover the following topics:

  • Insights and theories from behaviour change and communication sciences in the context of sustainable behaviour change.
  • The importance of understanding your target group when planning projects and how to achieve this
  • Models, tools and interventions that can be used to promote sustainable behaviour
  • Guidance and advice on how to successfully implement a pilot intervention and evaluate it.

The programme goes beyond these topics by facilitating networking and offering two additional voluntary thematic online meetings on sustainability communication and outreach. In addition to the workshops, participants meet in thematic groups of 4-6 people to incorporate the new knowledge gained into their project activities.

weiter_wirken is a cooperation project between the Collaborating Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production (CSCP), ecosign / Akademie für Gestaltung and the Stiftung Umwelt und Entwicklung Nordrhein-Westfalen.

For further questions, please contact Jennifer Wiegard.

The post 20 CSO Representatives Join the Second Round of Our weiter_wirken Programme appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

The CATALYST Project Is Launched: Accelerating Vocational Education and Training for a Circular Economy

SCP-Centre - 20. Juni 2022 - 11:34

Vocational Education and Training (VET) is key when it comes to a long-term and systemic shift of European economies toward more sustainability and resilience. New skills are also needed in order to leverage opportunities stemming from the sustainable-digital transition.

The transition to a climate-neutral Europe and the digital transformation are changing the way we work, learn, participate in society and live. It is clear that Europe can only seize these opportunities if its citizens develop the right skills. The Covid-19 pandemic also had a profound impact on millions of people, many of whom lost their jobs or suffered significant income losses. Part of the labour force will have to acquire new skills to change sectors; another part will have to continue their education to stay in the market.

The entry point in the labour market could be very challenging for newcomers if their educational and training background does not match what is needed for a resource-efficient, circular, digital and climate neutral European economy.

The recently-launched CATALYST project (European VET Excellence Centre for Leading Sustainable Systems and Business Transformation) will strengthen the sustainable competitiveness of professionals, students and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Upskilling and re-skilling are crucial for long-term and sustainable growth, productivity, and innovation and therefore a key factor for the competitiveness of businesses of all sizes, in particular SMEs. The goal of the project is to provide citizens participating in various VET programmes the right skills to work more effectively and take advantage of new technologies. Through its Enable and Inspire component, the project aims to have a positive impact and decrease identified obstacles.

The project was launched in June 2022 and it will run until 2026. 16 partners from North Macedonia, Germany, Austria, Greece and Portugal will run the project on a shared vision to contribute to the meeting the European Green Deal goals. The CSCP will focus on the establishment of one out of the five national CATALYST Centres of Vocational Excellence (CoVEs). The centre (based in Germany) will create an educational offer to tackle personal and organisational development issues and support SMEs to embrace transformation. It will do so by inspiring and enabling them to re-think and re-design their business models as well as by facilitating co-creation and sharing between educational and business organisations.

The desired impact of the CoVEs is to be ‘catalysts’ on national, regional and European levels, enable change, and inspire the transformation of individuals and SMEs toward more sustainable systems and societies.

The project is funded by the Erasmus+ Programme.

For further questions, please contact Imke Schmidt.

The post The CATALYST Project Is Launched: Accelerating Vocational Education and Training for a Circular Economy appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

Sharing Knowledge: Our Train-The-Trainer-Workshop on the Circular Economy

SCP-Centre - 20. Juni 2022 - 11:14

How can such a diverse group as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Germany be reached with a challenge as big as the Circular Economy? There are no off-the-shelf solutions, but through our train-the-trainer workshop within the project Competence Centre eStandards for SMEs we have supported those who regularly build capacity in SMEs.

Building capacity within peers is one of the best ways to increase impact on a larger scale. The idea is simple. Instead of trying to reach the target group directly, others in the same field of work can be reached and taken along through multiplication effects. Train-the-trainer workshops are a central part of the project; the most recent workshop took place in early May 2022.

The 30 participants were all part of more than a dozen other competence centres that are part of the Mittelstand-Digital network funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. Leveraging the network not only made it easy to connect to the trainers but also guarantee that the ambitions of the “trainers” are similar.

The aim of the workshop was both to understand the concept of the Circular Economy and to learn how to apply it directly. This means that the “trainers” not only learn about the circular economy itself, but also received practical applications for their work with SMEs.

One tool to provide this practical experience was the Circular Economy Guide, which was co-developed by the CSCP as part of the Competence Centre eStandards for SMEs. The tool provides a practical and interactive way to look at SME value chains and potential points to promote circular economy practices. The approach aims to be holistic and beyond the value chain. Other approaches such as business models and technologies that can help promote the circular economy in SMEs were explored. Overall, both analytical tools and tools for implementing circular economy measures could be discussed interactively.

“It was great to see the strong interest in the topic of circular economy from the other trainers. It shows that demand from SME’s to find hands-on circular solutions is growing, which is essential to achieve the sustainable transition of the German economy”, says the CSCP Circular Economy Trainer Thomas Wagner.

The CSCP experts from the project team could build on the experience of working with SMEs also from other projects of the CSCP like the Charta for Sustainable Digitalisation, which focuses on Circular Economy in the context of sustainable digitalisation and CSR.digital that offers expertise and SME tools on the intersection of the mega trends of digitalisation and sustainability.

The train-the-trainer workshops will enable more competence centres to support SMEs in implementing circular economy practices in the context of sustainable digitalisation.

For further questions, please contact Thomas Wagner.

 

The post Sharing Knowledge: Our Train-The-Trainer-Workshop on the Circular Economy appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

Climate Neutral Week: A Greek City’s Journey to Becoming Climate Neutral

SCP-Centre - 20. Juni 2022 - 10:27

Cities account for only 4% of the EU’s land area, but they are home to 75% of EU citizens. They are very energy intensive, consuming over 65% of the world’s energy and are responsible for more than 70% of the global CO2 emissions*. Thus, cities can and should play a key role in achieving climate neutrality – one of the main goals of the EU Green Deal. The city of Kozani in Greece, one of the pilot cities in the European project SCALIBUR and a lighthouse in the HOOP project, has been selected among the European Mission 100 cities to become climate neutral and smart by 2030.

The region of Western Macedonia and its capital, Kozani have entered a post-lignite era. To achieve the transition towards climate neutrality by 2030, Kozani will be working on innovative strategies and solutions in four key areas: transport and smart mobility, energy efficiency, circular economy & resource management and digital transformation.

The first Climate Neutral Week in Kozani, which took place between 30 May and 5 June 2022, offered an opportunity to accelerate the transition on a city level through engaging key stakeholders and citizens. During the week, six hybrid multi-stakeholder events attracted local, regional, and national stakeholders offering a space to exchange on barriers and opportunities presented by the transition to climate neutrality. The events touched upon different topics like best practices for waste management, smart mobility, clean energy, digital transformation, sustainable tourism, and waste valorisation from the agricultural sector. One of the events focused entirely on financial aspects, aiming at identifying suitable financial tools and exploring the investment potential for the deployment of innovative valorisation technologies in the region of Western Macedonia.

The Climate Neutral Week also focused on raising awareness among Kozani’s citizens regarding the topic of circular bio-economy and supporting them to get a clearer understanding of how they can directly contribute to making their city more circular. Citizens had the opportunity to talk and engage with ‘local champions’ – active citizens and social start-ups who are promoting the concepts of reuse, recycle and upcycle.

Additionally, several interactive citizen events took place on the weekend, including an informative poster exhibition, games on sorting waste properly, and Do-It-Yourself workshops. Over 1000 children joined the week’s events, including sessions such as how to make beeswax as an alternative to packaging or producing ink from leftover food.

The Climate Neutral Week was organised by The Cluster of Bioeconomy and Environment of Western Macedonia (CluBE) together with the CSCP and in collaboration with DIADYMA, a waste management company and the municipality of Kozani organised a series of events and activities.

For further questions, please contact Dimitra Ioannidou.

*European Commission

The post Climate Neutral Week: A Greek City’s Journey to Becoming Climate Neutral appeared first on CSCP gGmbH.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

Globale Nachhaltigkeit im Blick behalten

GDI Briefing - 20. Juni 2022 - 9:48

Bonn, 20.06.2022. Die Bundesregierung startete Anfang 2022 mit einer ambitionierten Nachhaltigkeitsagenda in ihre G7-Präsidentschaft. Keine zwei Monate später sah sie sich einem russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine gegenüber, der neue Prioritäten erforderlich macht und alte Gewissheiten in Frage stellt. Bundeskanzler Scholz hat deutlich gemacht, dass der russische Angriff eine Zeitenwende markiert. Auf dem G7-Gipfel, der vom 26. bis 28. Juni in Elmau stattfindet, wird die Kunst des Politischen darin liegen, kurzfristige Krisen zu lösen, ohne die langfristigen Herausforderungen aus dem Blick zu verlieren.

Während die Vereinten Nationen in ihrer Reaktion auf den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine gespalten sind und die G20, mit Russland als Mitglied, mehr oder weniger paralysiert ist, präsentiert sich die G7 aktuell als eines der wenigen handlungsfähigen internationalen Foren. Die G7-Staaten haben nicht nur wirtschaftliche Sanktionen gegen Russland auf den Weg gebracht, sondern auch Finanz- und Unterstützungspakete für die Ukraine und deren Nachbarstaaten geschnürt. Die Entwicklungsminister*innen der G7 haben eine Globale Allianz für Ernährungssicherheit gegründet, welche die negativen Folgen des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine abfedern soll.

So wichtig diese unmittelbaren Reaktionen der G7 auf den Krieg in der Ukraine sind, stellt sich vor allem die Frage, welche Antworten der Gipfel in Elmau auf die mittel- bis langfristigen Herausforderungen finden wird. Der Fokus soll im Folgenden auf der nachhaltigen wirtschaftlichen Erholung und der klimapolitischen Transformation liegen.

Für das Erreichen der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele zum Ende der Dekade ist es notwendig, einer „two-track recovery“ entgegen zu wirken, durch die Entwicklungsländer ins Hintertreffen geraten. Infolge der Covid-19-Pandemie waren die fiskalischen Spielräume vieler Entwicklungsländer bereits stark eingeschränkt. Es fällt ihnen daher schwer den sozio-ökonomischen Folgen der Pandemie zu begegnen und ihre Volkswirtschaften langfristig klimaneutral und -resilient umzubauen. Die Zahl der Länder, die vor Verschuldungsnotlagen stehen, hat sich seit 2015 verdoppelt. Die Folgen des Kriegs in der Ukraine und die Zinsanhebungen in den USA und der EU drohen diese Entwicklungen noch zu verschärfen. Zudem werden internationale Investoren die steigenden Klimarisiken in vielen Entwicklungsländern einpreisen, was deren Zugang zu internationalen Finanzmärkten weiter erschwert.

Die G7-Finanzminister*innen haben bisher nur auf das „Gemeinsame Rahmenwerk“ der G20 verwiesen, das helfen soll Schulden umzustrukturieren oder sogar zu erlassen. Eigene Initiativen der G7 zur Entschuldung von Entwicklungsländern sind bisher Mangelwahre. Der Verweis, dass auch China zur Entschuldung beitragen muss, ist richtig, aber nicht zielführend. Vielmehr sollten private Schuldner, die vor allem in den G7-Ländern ansässig sind, stärker in die Pflicht genommen werden. Zudem ist es geboten, Schuldenerlasse stärker an ökologisch-sozialen Transformationsprozessen oder Anpassungsmaßnahmen in vom Klimawandel bedrohten Ländern auszurichten.

Den Markenkern der im Januar vorgestellten Agenda der deutschen G7-Präsidentschaft bildete die klimapolitische Transformation. Auf ihrem Treffen Ende Mai haben die Klima-, Energie- und Umweltminister*innen der G7 sich darauf verständigt, eine überwiegend dekarbonisierte Stromversorgung bis zum Jahr 2035 zu erreichen und aus der Kohleverstromung auszusteigen, ohne sich bei letzterer aber auf ein konkretes Enddatum zu einigen. Von Bedeutung ist auch die Einsicht, dass es nicht ausreicht, die Klimakrise zu lösen, sondern dass im Rahmen eines integrativen Vorgehens auch die globale Biodiversitäts- und Verschmutzungskrise angegangen werden muss.

Im Bereich der internationalen Klimafinanzierung blieben die Finanzminister*innen bisher vage. Im Kommuniqué ihres Treffens im Mai findet sich nur der Satz, dass sie erwarten, das Ziel, jährlich 100 Milliarden US-Dollar zur Verfügung zu stellen, bis 2023 zu erfüllen. Mit Blick auf die zentralen Instrumente der G7 zur Förderung der klimapolitischen Transformation, vor allem eines offenen und kooperativen Klimaclubs und der „Just Energy Transition Partnerships“ mit ausgewählten Ländern, finden sich bisher auch nur Ankündigungen, aber noch wenig Konkretes.

Auf Ebene der Fachminister*innen wurden also wichtige Initiativen auf den Weg gebracht, trotz der notwendigen Reaktionen auf den Krieg in der Ukraine. Der Gipfel der Staats- und Regierungschefs in Elmau muss aber in zentralen Bereichen, wie der Klimapolitik oder mit Blick auf die Verschuldungskrise, konkrete Beschlüsse liefern, damit die G7-Präsidentschaft Deutschlands tatsächlich zur Erreichung der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele bis 2030 beiträgt.

Wichtig ist auch die multilaterale Einbettung der Initiativen der G7. Es ist daher gut, dass mit Indien, Indonesien, Südafrika und Argentinien wichtige G20-Mitglieder nach Elmau eingeladen sind und mit Senegal die aktuelle Präsidentschaft der Afrikanischen Union mit am Tisch sitzt. Mit diesen Ländern gilt es, konkrete Beschlüsse zu fassen, die dann in anderen, inklusiver zusammengesetzten Foren wie der G20 eingebracht werden können. Nur gemeinsam mit internationalen Partnern wird die G7 handlungsfähig sein.  

Kategorien: english

Globale Nachhaltigkeit im Blick behalten

GDI Briefing - 20. Juni 2022 - 9:48

Bonn, 20.06.2022. Die Bundesregierung startete Anfang 2022 mit einer ambitionierten Nachhaltigkeitsagenda in ihre G7-Präsidentschaft. Keine zwei Monate später sah sie sich einem russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine gegenüber, der neue Prioritäten erforderlich macht und alte Gewissheiten in Frage stellt. Bundeskanzler Scholz hat deutlich gemacht, dass der russische Angriff eine Zeitenwende markiert. Auf dem G7-Gipfel, der vom 26. bis 28. Juni in Elmau stattfindet, wird die Kunst des Politischen darin liegen, kurzfristige Krisen zu lösen, ohne die langfristigen Herausforderungen aus dem Blick zu verlieren.

Während die Vereinten Nationen in ihrer Reaktion auf den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine gespalten sind und die G20, mit Russland als Mitglied, mehr oder weniger paralysiert ist, präsentiert sich die G7 aktuell als eines der wenigen handlungsfähigen internationalen Foren. Die G7-Staaten haben nicht nur wirtschaftliche Sanktionen gegen Russland auf den Weg gebracht, sondern auch Finanz- und Unterstützungspakete für die Ukraine und deren Nachbarstaaten geschnürt. Die Entwicklungsminister*innen der G7 haben eine Globale Allianz für Ernährungssicherheit gegründet, welche die negativen Folgen des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine abfedern soll.

So wichtig diese unmittelbaren Reaktionen der G7 auf den Krieg in der Ukraine sind, stellt sich vor allem die Frage, welche Antworten der Gipfel in Elmau auf die mittel- bis langfristigen Herausforderungen finden wird. Der Fokus soll im Folgenden auf der nachhaltigen wirtschaftlichen Erholung und der klimapolitischen Transformation liegen.

Für das Erreichen der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele zum Ende der Dekade ist es notwendig, einer „two-track recovery“ entgegen zu wirken, durch die Entwicklungsländer ins Hintertreffen geraten. Infolge der Covid-19-Pandemie waren die fiskalischen Spielräume vieler Entwicklungsländer bereits stark eingeschränkt. Es fällt ihnen daher schwer den sozio-ökonomischen Folgen der Pandemie zu begegnen und ihre Volkswirtschaften langfristig klimaneutral und -resilient umzubauen. Die Zahl der Länder, die vor Verschuldungsnotlagen stehen, hat sich seit 2015 verdoppelt. Die Folgen des Kriegs in der Ukraine und die Zinsanhebungen in den USA und der EU drohen diese Entwicklungen noch zu verschärfen. Zudem werden internationale Investoren die steigenden Klimarisiken in vielen Entwicklungsländern einpreisen, was deren Zugang zu internationalen Finanzmärkten weiter erschwert.

Die G7-Finanzminister*innen haben bisher nur auf das „Gemeinsame Rahmenwerk“ der G20 verwiesen, das helfen soll Schulden umzustrukturieren oder sogar zu erlassen. Eigene Initiativen der G7 zur Entschuldung von Entwicklungsländern sind bisher Mangelwahre. Der Verweis, dass auch China zur Entschuldung beitragen muss, ist richtig, aber nicht zielführend. Vielmehr sollten private Schuldner, die vor allem in den G7-Ländern ansässig sind, stärker in die Pflicht genommen werden. Zudem ist es geboten, Schuldenerlasse stärker an ökologisch-sozialen Transformationsprozessen oder Anpassungsmaßnahmen in vom Klimawandel bedrohten Ländern auszurichten.

Den Markenkern der im Januar vorgestellten Agenda der deutschen G7-Präsidentschaft bildete die klimapolitische Transformation. Auf ihrem Treffen Ende Mai haben die Klima-, Energie- und Umweltminister*innen der G7 sich darauf verständigt, eine überwiegend dekarbonisierte Stromversorgung bis zum Jahr 2035 zu erreichen und aus der Kohleverstromung auszusteigen, ohne sich bei letzterer aber auf ein konkretes Enddatum zu einigen. Von Bedeutung ist auch die Einsicht, dass es nicht ausreicht, die Klimakrise zu lösen, sondern dass im Rahmen eines integrativen Vorgehens auch die globale Biodiversitäts- und Verschmutzungskrise angegangen werden muss.

Im Bereich der internationalen Klimafinanzierung blieben die Finanzminister*innen bisher vage. Im Kommuniqué ihres Treffens im Mai findet sich nur der Satz, dass sie erwarten, das Ziel, jährlich 100 Milliarden US-Dollar zur Verfügung zu stellen, bis 2023 zu erfüllen. Mit Blick auf die zentralen Instrumente der G7 zur Förderung der klimapolitischen Transformation, vor allem eines offenen und kooperativen Klimaclubs und der „Just Energy Transition Partnerships“ mit ausgewählten Ländern, finden sich bisher auch nur Ankündigungen, aber noch wenig Konkretes.

Auf Ebene der Fachminister*innen wurden also wichtige Initiativen auf den Weg gebracht, trotz der notwendigen Reaktionen auf den Krieg in der Ukraine. Der Gipfel der Staats- und Regierungschefs in Elmau muss aber in zentralen Bereichen, wie der Klimapolitik oder mit Blick auf die Verschuldungskrise, konkrete Beschlüsse liefern, damit die G7-Präsidentschaft Deutschlands tatsächlich zur Erreichung der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele bis 2030 beiträgt.

Wichtig ist auch die multilaterale Einbettung der Initiativen der G7. Es ist daher gut, dass mit Indien, Indonesien, Südafrika und Argentinien wichtige G20-Mitglieder nach Elmau eingeladen sind und mit Senegal die aktuelle Präsidentschaft der Afrikanischen Union mit am Tisch sitzt. Mit diesen Ländern gilt es, konkrete Beschlüsse zu fassen, die dann in anderen, inklusiver zusammengesetzten Foren wie der G20 eingebracht werden können. Nur gemeinsam mit internationalen Partnern wird die G7 handlungsfähig sein.  

Kategorien: english

Digitalising the African Livestock Sector

SNRD Africa - 19. Juni 2022 - 12:30

New study on the status quo and future trends for sustainable value chain development

The post Digitalising the African Livestock Sector appeared first on SNRD Africa.

Kategorien: english

Audacity Needed in Natural Resource Governance:

Brookings - 17. Juni 2022 - 22:07

By Daniel Kaufmann, Mario Picon

For decades, the field of natural resource governance (NRG) has been focused on addressing governance challenges associated with the resource curse. For much of that time, the approach was centered around transparency reforms. However, over time, it became clear that transparency, while necessary, did not suffice. Subsequently, more emphasis was given to participatory approaches and the pursuit of accountability. This focus on bringing together elements of transparency, accountability, and participation (TAP) gave way to a “TAP troika.”

In 2020, shortly after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, we made the case in the Leveraging Transparency to Reduce Corruption (LTRC) Initiative’s foundational paper for an approach that goes beyond TAP (“TAP-Plus”), as current TAP approaches do not necessarily consider key context dimensions. These contextual factors are shown to be determinants of success or failure but were not complementary to each other nor set up to reinforce each other.

That same year, together with the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) and the Transparency and Accountability Initiative, LTRC organized a dialogue on the key priorities for the future of NRG. For LTRC, this was an opportunity to identify specific areas for the use of TAP-Plus approaches. This effort, along with the need to understand what others in the world are working on in relation to NRG and future priorities, led us to carry out a survey of the field in 2021. Survey respondents included nearly 400 people from varying backgrounds, sectors, and countries.

While this survey took place last year, and much has happened over the last few months, its data and analyses still provide insights across time, space, types of stakeholders, sectors, generations, and genders on short- and medium-term priorities in the field.

As you will notice in the full report, the results challenge preconceived notions of the current status of the NRG field and its future direction and bring into the forefront the perspectives of individuals working outside the NRG space. What follows is a brief account of selected findings.

 

Cautious reticence so far. 

While respondents are clear about priority areas and direction of change, they tend to be circumspect about the likelihood of priority reforms and favor a rather evolutionary and risk-averse approach to pivots in the NRG field. This is the case despite the rise in global awareness on climate change and the post-pandemic realities.

When asked about priorities ahead of 2022 and beyond, respondents emphasized climate change and democratic governance — including rule of law, corruption, and capture. As a result, governance reforms in rule of law, corruption, and state capture emerged as a top priority, closely followed by specific governance reforms to accelerate the energy transition and address climate change and environmental degradation. Yet respondents do not regard such direly needed changes as highly likely to take place, as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1:

This perceived “reform likelihood deficit” cannot be merely characterized as an “implementation gap” challenge, prevalent across reform areas everywhere. This is evident because in contrast with the very large “reform likelihood deficit” in the themes just mentioned, the gap between priority and likelihood is significantly smaller for areas in which the NRG field has already been working in the past. This raises the question as to whether there is still some inertia in the field that is occurring in an environment of cautious expectations, given past experiences, and/or whether participants perceive limited political will to move forward with major reforms and prefer to focus on safer lower-hanging fruits.

When asked specifically which natural resources should be prioritized in the future, respondents did concur that a dedicated focus on renewables was needed, both in the medium and longer term. This was followed by emphasis on water, land, and forestry. There was also consensus on the other side of the issue: Respondents pointed to the need to exit coal sources.

By contrast, there was a more cautious view regarding the oil, gas, and mining sectors, with many respondents taking the view that focus on the sectors should continue, even if gradually declining into the longer term (Figure 2 below). Such caution about exiting oil and gas was particularly marked in some regions, such as in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa and in contrast with the Americas. And generally, there was support for staying committed to mining, aside from coal.

 Figure 2:

The need for audacity. 

As seen above, there was a consensus on the need for broader, tougher governance reforms, despite the pessimism regarding the likelihood of such reforms taking place, even from civil society representatives. There was a cautious approach as well to the notion of a fast transition away from extractives.

The stark global context, dominated by a post-pandemic environment, military conflict, and energy security concerns, as well as the climate emergency, does pose a major challenge to overly cautious, incremental strategies in the NRG field. We propose a major infusion of audacity into a revamped NRG field. Considering a bolder strategy would entail a multi-pronged approach that answers the following questions:

What areas beyond TAP do we need to focus on?  First, it is the time to enter concretely into the realm of tougher governance reform areas, well beyond what we call TAP. TAP has been the traditional focus in the field for a long time. Addressing state capture by the oil industry, as well as their colluding capture with kleptocrats, are major areas requiring further emphasis even if beyond the comfort zone for many. The massive oil rents generated by Big Oil, which, thanks to their capturing influence, continue to benefit from implicit or explicit subsidies and tax avoidance schemes at the expense of the common citizen, conspire against equitable economic progress in industrialized and emerging economies alike. They also generate perverse incentives to maintain the status quo on fossil fuels and delay addressing the climate emergency.

In fact, consistent with the cautious stance of the NRG field so far, the mention of climate emergency (or climate crisis) has often been downplayed or avoided. Addressing climate change continues to be the notion of choice. Similarly, regarding the energy matrix, the “compromise” notion that continues to be used in discussing this enormous challenge is merely “the energy transition,” a concept suggesting caution, gradualism, and evolutionary linearity.

If the actual focus and goal were a paradigmatic shift in the energy matrix, we would be focusing on an energy transformation, not merely a transition. The agenda of the NRG field in fighting the climate crisis needs to be much bolder, encompassing full and detailed transparency on fossil fuel investments, the switch to renewables, and climate risks.

All stakeholders in the NRG space will need to work with rigor and audacity in advocating for reforms to move away from fossil fuels, the centerpiece of an energy transformation. In doing so, it will be critical to present the stark choices, short-term tradeoffs, and complementarities from the transformation away from fossil fuels, energy security, and the short- and long-term socio-economic costs and benefits to citizens.

A review of current “energy transition” realities, coupled with the growing geopolitical focus on energy security, would likely conclude that it will be many years before renewables can overtake fossil fuels. The path to addressing the climate crisis would be even more gradual and damaging if glaring governance weaknesses continue to persist. Solely focusing on governance in renewables will not mitigate most of the risks; at least as important is to deepen the work on poor governance in extractives, which is slowing down the urgently needed transformation. Initiatives to reduce dirty energy consumption, including carbon taxes and subsidy elimination, to reign in the undue influence of Big Oil and to revamp national oil companies are needed more than ever.

Who are the key actors, and what is their role?  

A key actor in this space is civil society. The traditional strategies and approaches of “civil society engagement” and “civic space protection” in the NRG field need a major refresh. For decades already, emphasis has been placed on public dialogue and debate, coalition-building around transparency, and raising alarms when an activist is officially harassed. These have been worthy activities in their own right but have not contributed to a very coherent strategy, have often lacked teeth, and, on the whole, have been dwarfed by the often violent crackdowns by increasingly autocratic regimes.

The current approach cannot begin to confront the massive and concrete threat to civil liberties, voice, and democratic accountability, which are particularly pronounced in resource-dependent countries with autocratic regimes. The relationships with civil society, and within these organizations to support each other, need to become much more intentional and tougher, suited to a new future where democratic institutions and human rights are in danger.

It is important to draw lessons over the past two decades from countries like Russia, a case study pointing to hydrocarbon resources as a fuel for kleptocapture and unprovoked wars. This most extreme, violent, and costly expression of the resource curse cannot simply be addressed by the traditional soft civic space or economic toolkit.

Civil society groups in natural resources, including international NGOs, need to partner closely with local organizations in holding governments (national and subnational) accountable and consider aligning themselves with stronger strategies to building democratic institutions. The latter includes collaborating with organizations outside of the NRG field with different approaches to make concrete progress.

Ultimately, it is the people working in civil society and its organizations that make the difference. The survey results were generally sobering, pointing to a measure of complacency, timidity, and risk aversion. Yet specific results from some respondents also offered ways forward. Although a minority, there were some respondents who provided bolder proposals and believed that tougher governance reforms were not merely a priority but were also likely to take place. In general, younger female respondents tended to be more optimistic about tougher reforms ahead than their older and/or male counterparts.

Civil society was not alone in terms of relative conservatism regarding change ahead. Industry is even more reticent, for obvious reasons. International financial institutions and multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) will also need to play a more decisive role in a revamped NRG field, embracing bolder change, as will also need to be the case with bilateral and private donor funders of NRG activities.

How to be audacious in the NRG space? 

The provides some concrete and detailed illustrations of integrated initiatives and reforms that could be considered ahead in the field. As explained in the report, some priority reform areas may need to be tailored to regional and country realities. The approach to be taken in Africa, for instance, will need to differ from that for the industrialized world, or from Latin America and the Middle East. Further, a much bolder approach to partnerships in the field, such as cross-thematic mergers (NRG/renewables/climate) by some NGOs/think tanks could also be considered.

A concrete and ambitious initiative deserves more priority and substantial funding, where developing countries that are new to producing fossil fuels could be compensated to leave those fossil fuels unexploited. Such compensation mechanisms could also be linked to programs supporting improved governance and the transformation of the energy matrix. Audacity also means addressing head on areas generally considered taboo in the past in the NRG field, such as concretely exploring the pros and cons of the role of nuclear power in a faster transformation of the energy matrix (see Figure 2) or considering a more robust version of EITI in the future, with a recast role for industry and a concrete commitment in the initiative to address the climate crisis and kleptocapture.

Conformity is no longer an option. A delay in the revamp of the field of NRG is increasingly untenable. There are immense challenges brought about by the pandemic and its aftermath, the climate crisis, the erosion of democratic institutions in key countries around the world, and the geopolitical shifts associated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These challenges also present an opportunity to move boldly. An audacious revamp of the NRG field does entail costs and risks, but these pale in comparison to those associated with the continued soft evolutionary approach.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

The authors would like to thank Caroline Pitman for copyediting and fact-checking assistance on this piece. A full list of acknowledgments for the report is available here.

      
Kategorien: english

Did transatlantic slavery and colonial borders wreck West African women’s movements?

Brookings - 17. Juni 2022 - 19:44

By Alice Evans

Africa’s parliaments are increasingly gender equal, but there is a curious heterogeneity (Figures 1 and 2). Southern and Eastern African legislatures have near parity, while West Africans are ruled by men. Nigeria’s parliament is 94 percent male. Common explanations—tradition, colonizers’ male bias, contemporary sexism, and civil war—all fail to explain why West Africa is such an outlier. Women’s movements face insurmountable obstacles in West Africa owing to ethno–religious fragmentation, which was exacerbated by the transatlantic slave trade.  

Figure 1. Percentage of seats held by women in and lower and upper houses of the national legislature, as of January 1, 2021

Source: Women’s Power Index, Council on Foreign Relations.  

Does West Africa have more patriarchal traditions?  

No! West Africans used to revere women’s spiritual power and moral authority. They were respected as creator gods and goddesses, priestesses, oracles, deities, and queen mothers. Cosmology upheld gender complementarity.  

The Asante, Igbo, and Yoruba also had dual sex systems of governance. Women had independent networks and separate spheres of influence. Markets were controlled by women, who set the rules and punished wrongdoers. Banding together, women reprimanded abusive men and traversed great distances as traders. Independently wealthy women marshalled their networks, commercial acumen, and linguistic skills to thrive in coastal exports. Back in the 16th century, Hausa Queen Amina was a successful military strategist who led armies and conquered new territories. 

Why were women historically important to religion, politics, and commerce in the Gulf of Guinea? Tropical rainforests incubated parasites and pathogens such as leprosy, dengue, and tuberculosis. Many children died. High infant mortality combined with land abundance sustained perpetual demand for labor. Although societies in the Gulf of Guinea were often patrilineal, this specifically concerned control over the children (not inheritance). By paying bride wealth, grooms gained control over the children. This reverence for fertility may help explain why a girl’s first period was followed by initiation rituals celebrating female powers of fertility. So too in cosmology, women were revered as creators

The Gulf of Guinea’s tropical forests were also plagued by the tsetse fly. This parasite causes deaths in cattle. Elsewhere in Africa, nomadic pastoralism spread through male-biased migration. Pastoralists killed indigenous men, reproduced with women and institutionalized male dominance. Islam, which spread south of the Sahara via trade routes, especially among pastoralists, did not reach the regions with the cattle-killing tsetse fly.

In the Gulf of Guinea, therefore, women continued to move freely and maintain autonomy through solidarity. Igbo and Bakweri women harassed men for mistreating their wives, violating market rules or harming their crops. In 19th century Congo-Brazzaville, a husband would not take even “an egg from her chicken coop” without permission from his wife. In the early 20th century, women in southern Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire marshalled their independent networks to mobilize en masse against imperialism (see photo below).  

But if the Gulf of Guinea was traditionally relatively gender equal, what explains male dominance today?  

Colonizers’ male bias? 

Feminists fault colonizers for favoring men in agricultural extension and wage labor and promoting female domesticity, while imposing male-biased legislation, language, and warrant chiefs.  

All true. But how large and long-standing were those effects? Colonialism could have only heightened gender inequalities if most African men prospered. But colonial bureaucracies were tiny, state penetration weak, agricultural support meager, and labor markets miniscule. The vast majority of African men did not benefit from colonialism.  

Colonizers also disregarded women’s village networks. But did that prohibit urban African women from organizing today? Perhaps not. In Southern and Eastern Africa, a few men did gain advantage as warrant chiefs, but this has not precluded feminist activism and gender quotas. Uganda now has more female legislators than the U.K.  

Colonizers did neglect women, but that does not explain the West Africa outlier. 

Exceptional sexism?  

Women in the Gulf of Guinea do not suffer exceptional discrimination relative to the rest of the continent. Early marriage has fallen rapidly. Female employment and entrepreneurship are high. In Ghana and Nigeria, women comprise over a third of senior managers. The gender gap in property ownership in southern Nigeria is relatively small. A third of Ghana’s supreme court justices are female. Women comprise 20 percent of mayors in West Africa’s capitals. From Côte d’Ivoire to Cameroon, independently wealthy “mama benz” own fleets of chauffeur-driven Mercedes. In narrating their life histories, Ghanaian businesswomen focus on their own independent businesses and commercial acumen. 

Nationally representative social surveys by Afrobarometer suggest that preference for male leaders is no greater in West Africa than Southern or Eastern Africa (though it is exceptionally high in Niger and Nigeria). 

Post-conflict transition? 

Civil wars and especially post-conflict nation building have provided opportunities for women’s movements to press for gender quotas. Eager for donor funding, authoritarians have often used quotas to strengthen international legitimacy.   

Civil wars are neither necessary nor sufficient for female representation. Liberia, Nigeria and the Republic of Congo have all been torn apart by conflicts and yet their parliaments remain 90 percent male. Meanwhile, Tanzania, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe have enforced gender quotas, even though they have not recently undergone civil wars. Although many political scientists have attributed Africa’s high female leadership to civil wars and authoritarianism, I suggest this is because they are identifying the effects of one variable rather than looking at the whole continent and trying to explain heterogeneity. They are studying the effects of X rather than the causes of Y. 

The transatlantic slave trade and colonial borders 

In West Africa, ethno-religious fragmentation has been an obstacle to the formation of mass women’s movements. Activists must overcome ethnic and religious divisions in order to advance their interests politically and cannot rely on an otherwise homogeneous gender-based identity. Women who primarily identify with their ethnicity may have little appetite for such campaigns, preferring to be governed by co-ethnics. An Igbo woman may prefer to be led by an Igbo man than a Hausa woman. Even if women privately support gender quotas, distrust may dampen willingness to invest in sustained mobilization. Activism becomes sporadic. 

All of this has been exacerbated by the historical legacies of the slave trade, colonialism, as well as the arrival of Islam and Christianity. 

In the transatlantic slave trade, 12 million enslaved people were taken from Africa to the Americas. A further 6 million were exported in other trades. In the struggle to survive (to buy European weapons to protect themselves from slave-raiding), people kidnapped their neighbors, family, and friends

Intensive raiding and insecurity have long-run cultural effects, as demonstrated by Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon. Africans who distrusted others were more likely to evade capture and then socialize their children to be distrustful. Today, distrust of relatives, neighbors, and local government remains higher in places that suffered intensive raiding.  

West Africa suffered most severely from the transatlantic slave trade and is now marred by acute ethnic divisions, stratification, and distrust. Colonial borders compounded these effects by grouping multiple ethnicities into large states, imposing nationhood where there was none

The politicization of ethnicity also affects presidential responsiveness. Ghana’s leaders have always prioritized regional balance. Hence women are less likely to be appointed to African cabinets where ethnicity is heavily politicized. 

Figure 3. Ethnic stratification is especially high in West Africa 

Source: Hodler et al. 2020. 

West Africa is also marred by religious divisions. Muslims comprise 43 percent of the population in Nigeria, 43 percent in Côte d’Ivoire, and 30 percent in Togo. Sectarian violence has greatly increased over the past 20 years. Two-thirds of Ghanaian and Cameroonian Christians perceive Muslims as “violent.” This impedes nationwide feminist activism. 

Muslim-majority countries also tend to express less support for gender equality. Within Africa, a country’s level of development (as measured by capita GDP, human development, the size of the non-agricultural labor force, urbanization, and mass communication) has no such influence on gender ideologies. Religion really matters.  

Gender segregation persists in northern Nigeria. Muslim clerics have vehemently opposed women’s rights legislation. In Nigerian states with Sharia law, women are far less likely to undertake paid work in the public sphere and there is strong opposition to female leaders. State governance is overwhelmingly male. Northern Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Chad have persistently high rates of child marriage

Unlike Northern Nigeria, Senegal was never subject to a Fulla Jihad. Before colonialism, clerics were merely advisors (not rulers). Senegal is also majority-Sufi, believing in a direct, personal connection with God. Religious tolerance has been iteratively institutionalized by post-colonial leaders and communities. Catholics and Muslims rebuild each other’s mosques and churches. In this more tolerant environment, a strong women’s movement relentlessly lobbied for a gender quota. “Let’s strengthen democracy with gender parity,” they chorused. Like other African leaders that have amplified female leadership, President Wade’s party was electorally dominant. This enabled Wade to allocate more seats to women without forfeiting vital patronage. Senegal’s parliament is now 43 percent female, but within West Africa, it is very much the exception. 

West African women once exercised authority, such as through dual –sex systems of religious and political governance. Women maintained influence through their own independent networks. Yet they have suffered a reversal of fortunes. Although women are individually entrepreneurial, national governance is overwhelmingly male.  

Plausible hypotheses, such as patriarchal traditions, colonizers’ male bias, contemporary sexism, and civil wars, fail to explain the West African outlier. West Africa has exceptionally high ethno-religious divisions and distrust that were exacerbated by transatlantic slavery. And while feminists typically fault colonizers’ male bias, colonialism’s greatest impact on patriarchy may be the imposition of arbitrary borders, imposing nationhood where there was none. 

History is not destiny, of course. Democratization and women’s legislative representation improve gender parity in cabinet portfolios. Urbanization promotes ethnic homogeneity. Ethno-religious divisions can also deteriorate, with drought-induced competition for pasture and sub-national competition for oil rents. But without the transatlantic slave trade and colonial borders, West Africa would have stronger feminist coalitions and more gender-equal governance.  

      
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