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The French response to the Corona Crisis: semi-presidentialism par excellence

GDI Briefing - 19. Januar 2038 - 4:14

This blog post analyses the response of the French government to the Coronavirus pandemic. The piece highlights how the semi-presidential system in France facilitates centralized decisions to manage the crisis. From a political-institutional perspective, it is considered that there were no major challenges to the use of unilateral powers by the Executive to address the health crisis, although the de-confinement phase and socio-economic consequences opens the possibility for more conflictual and opposing reactions. At first, approvals of the president and prime minister raised, but the strict confinement and the reopening measures can be challenging in one of the European countries with the highest number of deaths, where massive street protests, incarnated by the Yellow vests movement, have recently shaken the political scene.

Kategorien: english

How can the G20 support innovative: mechanisms to mobilise financial resources for LDCs in a post-pandemic world?

GDI Briefing - 26. Dezember 2022 - 14:05

Innovative financing for development can contribute to closing the financial gap by mobilising new funds for sustainable development and leveraging existing scarce public concessional resources (ODA). In addition to domestic resources and traditional external financial resources, innovative financing mechanisms can mobilise further financial resources for LDCs. In view of the LDCs’ enormous sustainable investment needs, mobilising private financial resources is both crucial and inescapable. Blended finance represents an important instrument to combine ODA with private finance, thereby leveraging scarce concessional public financial resources. The G20 should consider promoting the adoption and implementation of the OECD Blended Finance Principles in LICs to enhance blended finance in these countries. As many LDCs do not have sufficient institutional capacity. To adopt blended finance instruments the G20 should support LDC in developing institutional capacity to effectively implement blended finance tools and to lower risks associated with blended finance. An additional instrument to enhance external financial resources to LDCs is to allocate the recently approved new SDR allocation to LDCs exceeding LDCs quota. The G20 should take on a leading by example/frontrunner role and donate as well as lend a percentage of their allocations, discuss establishing a special purpose fund (i.e. a green or health fund), support allocating a large amount of SDRs to LDCs exceeding their quota and discuss proposals how to allocate them among LICs and discuss how these financial instruments can be used to ensure a sustainable and inclusive recovery from the covid-19 crisis. As the fragmented architecture of sustainable bond standards represent one main challenge in mobilising financial resources for attaining the SDGs by issuing sustainable bonds the G20 should discuss and promote harmonisation of sustainable bond standards. Moreover, the G20 countries should provide capacity building for LDCs for developing the sustainable bond market in these countries.

Kategorien: english

The World Is Melting Down and the Cause is Corruption- The G20 Needs to Take Action

#C20 18 - vor 7 Stunden 37 Minuten

WASHINGTON DC, Jul 1 2022 (IPS) – The G20 is meeting again next week in Indonesia for the second time this year- at a moment when the world is facing the most difficult economic, political and social challenges for decades.

At their core, these problems are driven by corruption- from the “weaponization” of graft by Russia in Ukraine to the lack of regulation of the enablers of corruption in G20 countries such as the UK. This malfeasance costs lives and livelihoods- and is directly responsible for everything from energy black-outs to food and fuel shortages.

Critical decisions are being made by the G20 about the ways that governments can collectively manage what is now considered a significant transnational threat to peace and prosperity. But despite the earnest anti-corruption commitments made by G20 countries annually, follow-up and delivery on these commitments is a challenge.

” Despite the earnest anti-corruption commitments made by G20 countries annually, follow-up and delivery on these commitments is a challenge “

Civil society has to make its voice heard on these issues now, before it is too late. The Civil-20 (C20)– which we Co-Chair- engages the G20 on behalf of civil society. Over the past several months we have collectively gathered ideas from civil society around the world related to five central corruption challenges on which the G20 must take action immediately: Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and asset recovery; beneficial ownership transparency; countering corruption in the energy transition; open contracting; and the transparency and integrity of corporations.

This is what the C20 members are telling the G20 it needs to do now. First, effective anti-money laundering efforts are key to detecting illicit financial flows from corrupt activities in countries like Russia.

The G20 needs to strengthen regulatory authorities across its membership and expand sanctions for violating AML requirements, in particular for large financial institutions and what are called Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) that facilitate illicit financial flows (such as lawyers or accountants).

Similarly, when assets are returned they need to be aligned to GFAR principles, including through the engagement of civil society and community groups to support the transparency of this process.

Second, the G20 has committed to lead by example on beneficial ownership transparency (the real ownership of companies) and has the opportunity to strengthen this commitment by strengthening G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency in line with improved global standards, including those recommended by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

One challenge is integrating data and G20 member countries should also implement the Beneficial Ownership Data Standard to share and analyze data more easily- which would dramatically improve the ability of citizens to understand who owns companies that might be involved in corruption.

Third, there is massive amounts of corruption as the world transitions to clean energy, but corruption risks in the renewables sector are not unique- they follow many of the same patterns we have seen in infrastructure and the extractives industries, for example. As more and more countries transition towards renewable energy, it is important to prioritize resource governance in ways that align with existing agreed-upon high-level principles and best practices.

The G20 must regulate lobbying activities around clean energy- including through lobbying registries; enforce a strong and credible sanctions regime, including public databases of companies banned from tenders; and support independent civil society monitoring of large-scale energy projects through integrity pacts and other similar vehicles that help to ensure transparent procurement.

Fourth, government contracting is rife with collusion, nepotism and graft. The G20 must open up contracting processes and strengthen open data infrastructure by sharing information across the whole cycle of procurement for projects- from planning to contracting to awards and implementation.

Governments must also publish high-quality open data that is readily machine-readable so it can be used across multiple systems. This does not mean starting from scratch- there are standards for this, like the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) and the Open Contracting for Infrastructure Data Standard (OC4IDS). It is a question of commitment.

Finally, not all G20 member countries are party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and private sector bribery is not criminalized in every G20 member country as per the UNCAC provisions. This means companies can legally offer bribes to win contracts, and this has to be outlawed immediately.

The EU Directive for Corporate Responsibility Due Diligence includes requirements that the G20 should adopt immediately- for instance to identify the actual or potential adverse human rights impacts of corruption; to prevent or mitigate the potential impacts of bribery; and improve public communication around due diligence processes.

G20 members should also regulate the “revolving doors” through which government and business people can engage in favoritism; and invest in better partnerships between entities working on these issues such as regulators, law enforcement agencies and civil society.

This might all seem quite technical- but the negative impacts of corruption are not felt in government meeting rooms, but in the everyday lives of citizens. The G20 has for too long made excuses for the lack of action on this topic, and we are now seeing the devastating effects. Unless action is taken now, it will be too late.

These ideas were gathered through a consultative process as part of the C20 Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG), and represent the inputs of many civil society organizations.

Blair Glencorse is Executive Director of Accountability Lab and is Co-Chair of the C20 ACWG.
Sanjeeta Pant is the Global Programs and Learning Manager at the Lab. Follow the Lab on Twitter @accountlab.

Sumber : Ipnews.net

Kategorien: english, Ticker

What COVID-19 taught us about risk in a complex, inter-connected world

UN ECOSOC - vor 16 Stunden 18 Minuten
A new UN report has shed fresh light on the ways that the COVID-19 pandemic unleashed cascading risks, particularly on vulnerable people, worldwide.
Kategorien: english

How sharp will be the global slowdown?

Brookings - 1. Juli 2022 - 23:08

By Justin Damien Guénette

The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine was yet another supply shock to a global economy still reeling from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the June 2022 edition of the Global Economic Prospects report, global growth is projected to slow sharply from 5.7 percent in 2021 to 2.9 percent this year (Figure 1). The effects of the invasion account for most of the 1.2 percentage point downward revision to this year’s global growth forecast. Growth in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) is expected to slow from 6.6 percent in 2021 to 3.4 percent in 2022 due to negative spillovers from the war in Ukraine and a deteriorating global environment. Other than the pandemic-induced recession in 2020, this is the weakest year of EMDE growth since 2009.

Arrayed against this baseline of sharply diminishing global growth are various overlapping and mutually reinforcing downside risks, including intensifying geopolitical tensions, rising financial instability, and continuing supply strains. Three of these, which are discussed and quantified in the sub-sections below, may already be materializing. If these shocks materialize at the same time, they could lead to a much sharper global slowdown in 2022-23 than projected in the baseline.

Figure 1. Global growth

Source: World Bank.
Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies. Bars show cumulative output losses over 2020-24, which are computed as deviations from trend, expressed as a share of GDP in 2019. Output is measured in U.S. dollars at 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates. Trend is assumed to grow at the regression-estimated trend growth rate of 2010-19. EMDE commodity exporters exclude the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Rising financial stress

Relentless inflationary pressures have led to chaotic repricing of monetary policy expectations across the world. Prior to June, markets were pricing in an increase in the U.S. Federal Funds rate to 2.5 percent by end-2022. Barely a few short weeks later, in response to another inflation surprise—total CPI inflation reached 8.6 percent year over year in May—end-2022 expectations surged above 3 percent (Figure 2). Similar revisions have beset other major central banks, sending stock markets plunging amid sustained equity volatility. In turn, EMDE financial conditions have reached their tightest level since the start of the pandemic. Sovereign spreads have increased steadily across EMDEs, particularly in commodity importers, where debt service may be increasingly strained (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Market-based expectations of Fed policy rates

Sources Bloomberg; World Bank.
Note: Figure shows changes in market-based expectations of monetary policy rates over time. “Dec-21” refers to December 21, 2021. “May-22” refers to May 26, 2022, and “Jun-22” refers to June 28, 2022.

Figure 3. Changes in EMDE sovereign spreads by commodity exporter status

Sources: J.P. Morgan; World Bank.
Note: Figure shows the difference in bond spreads between the latest available data and February 23, 2022 (day prior to the invasion of Ukraine). Last observation is June 24, 2022.

Expectations of faster monetary tightening in the United States could trigger financial stress in EMDEs starting in the third quarter of this year. In this scenario, the Federal Reserve would see no choice but to raise the policy rate to 4 percent by the first quarter of 2023, causing a sharper tightening of EMDE financial conditions. Several major EMDEs would experience large-scale capital outflows and soaring bond spreads, ultimately forcing authorities to accelerate fiscal consolidation efforts. Global growth would be reduced by 0.3 percentage point in 2022 and a further 0.6 percentage point in 2023 compared to current baseline forecasts. EMDEs would be disproportionately affected, with their aggregate growth reduced by 0.5 percentage point in 2022 and 0.9 percentage point in 2023.

Disruptions in energy markets

The war in Ukraine has caused significant supply disruptions and higher price volatility across several commodities, including energy, food, and fertilizers. There are many possible triggers for further upward movements in energy prices. These are all driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and could include an immediate ban by Russia on all energy exports to EU members, additional G-7 sanctions targeting shipping companies, and the possibility of secondary sanctions on third parties purchasing Russian energy supplies.

In a scenario of additional major disruptions to energy markets centered around Europe, the prices of natural gas, oil, and coal could spike in the third quarter of 2022 and remain elevated over the remainder of the scenario horizon, reflecting both precautionary buying and lower global supplies. Growth would slow sharply in advanced economies—particularly in the euro area—while EMDEs would face notable headwinds from higher energy prices and weaker foreign demand. On net, global growth could be reduced by 0.5 percentage point in 2022 and a further 0.7 percentage point in 2023.

Recurring lockdowns in China

Economic activity in China is recovering from the deep disruptions caused by strict lockdowns in response to large-scale outbreaks of COVID-19. But the country could experience renewed pandemic disruptions. This possibility of recurring pandemic lockdowns in China is explored in a third risk scenario for global growth. Large-scale COVID-19 resurgences would trigger intermittent lockdowns all the way through 2023, reducing growth in China by 0.5 percentage point in 2022 and a further 0.3 percentage point in 2023. Global spillovers would be modest, unlike in the first two scenarios, but the risks of prolonged disruptions to global supply chains would increase substantially.

Possibility of a sharp global downturn with three shocks

The simultaneous materialization of all three scenarios presented above could reduce global growth to only 2.1 percent in 2022 and 1.5 percent in 2023—0.8 and 1.5 percentage points slower than in the baseline forecast (Figure 4). This would correspond to a sharp global downturn and effectively push the global economy to the brink of recession. The prospects of a dire global economic outcome, so soon after the pandemic global recession, could have devastating consequences for the world’s poor.

Figure 4. Global growth scenarios

Sources: Oxford Economics; World Bank.
Note: Scenario outcomes produced using the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model. Scenarios are linearly additive.

Policies can help!

Even if several downside risks materialize, policymakers may be able to fend off the worst economic outcomes. At a national level, a forceful policy response would require an urgent reprioritization of spending toward targeted relief for vulnerable households, steadfast commitment to credible monetary frameworks, and a general restraint in the use of distortionary policies such as export restrictions and price controls. Once the global economy has stabilized, reversing the damage inflicted by the dual shocks of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine will require an unwavering commitment to growth-enhancing policies, including large-scale investment in education and digital technologies, and the promotion of labor force participation—especially female participation—through active labor market policies.

      
Kategorien: english

Food insecurity and economic misery in low-income countries

Brookings - 1. Juli 2022 - 22:41

By Carlos Arteta, Sergiy Kasyanenko

The deterioration in the global economic landscape has exacerbated suffering in the world’s poorest countries. Still recovering from the sharp downturn caused by the pandemic, low-income countries (LICs) are being hit hard by soaring inflation at home and rising global interest rates. Dislocations in global commodity markets due to the pandemic, amplified by the war in Ukraine, have led to food and fuel shortages and to surging prices of staple consumer goods. This is eroding real incomes, exacerbating food insecurity, and worsening extreme poverty in LICs. Surging world food prices, which reached their highest levels on record this year, are contributing to the rapid rise in LIC inflation (Figure 1). 

Figure 1. Inflation in low-income countries 

Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO);  Haver Analytics; World Bank.  

Note: “Median” line shows median percentage increase in consumer prices from 12 months earlier for a sample of eight low -income countries. Last observation April 2022. The base period prices of the FAO Food Price Index are the averages for the years 2014-2016. 

Food insecurity is exacerbating misery  

Food consumption accounts for 45 percent of total household expenditure in low-income economies, and diet is heavily based on staple foods including wheat. All LICs are food-deficit countries reliant on imported foods. Imports of wheat from just Russia and Ukraine account for about 14 percent of total caloric intake in a median LIC, compared with just 3 percent in the median emerging market and developing economy. Disruptions to wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine and surging global food prices are slowing LIC growth and increasing extreme poverty, particularly in countries where sizeable segments of the population were already experiencing acute food insecurity (Figure 2). 

Figure 2. Wheat imports and food insecurity in LICs  

Sources: Global Network Against Food Crises; Comtrade (database); World Bank.

Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. Wheat imports shares are averages for 2019-2020; wheat imports data for Sudan is only available for 2018. “People in food crisis” indicates the estimated percentage of population being in phase 3 or above of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for 2022; estimates are not available for Madagascar and Togo.

Subdued growth and stretched public finances have hamstrung the ability of governments to cushion vulnerable populations from soaring food and fuel prices. Even in LICs that do not rely on imports of wheat from Russia and Ukraine, millions of people are struggling to afford enough food to avoid hunger. Worsening hunger and malnutrition will inevitably exert adverse long-term consequences, compounding the pernicious effects of more than two years of pandemic on human capital. 

War-related disruptions and the sharp deceleration in global growth are amplifying other ongoing challenges faced by LICs, including pervasive poverty, deteriorating security, and policy uncertainty. As a result, growth forecasts for 2022 presented in the World Bank’s latest Global Economic Prospects report have been downgraded in more than 80 percent of LICs (Figure 3). Per capita income growth in LICs is projected to be a feeble 1.3 percent this year—well below that in middle-income countries (2.3 percent) and high-income countries (2.4 percent). 

Figure 3. Forecast revisions to 2022 growth  

Sources: World Bank. 

Note: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; LICs = low-income countries. Sample includes 145 EMDEs and 22 LICs. Forecast revisions show the share of countries where 2022 growth forecasts were downgraded/unchanged/upgraded between January 2022 and June 2022 editions of Global Economic Prospects. Data for 2022 are forecasts. 

In commodity-exporting LICs, elevated commodity prices will only partly mitigate the deleterious effects of higher food and fuel costs. In these countries, surging living costs are tempering gains from increased export earnings. High oil prices are also unlikely to boost growth meaningfully in LIC energy exporters, as aging oil fields as well as pandemic-induced maintenance delays and weak extractive investment limit prospects for increased oil production.  

Agricultural production in most LICs is also expected to remain subdued, further tightening food supply. Several LICs have faced worsening drought conditions and planting delays due to erratic and poor rainfall. In some LICs, higher prices of grains are expected to limit the ability of farmers, especially those dependent on subsistence agriculture, to purchase enough seeds for the new planting season and feed for livestock. The war in Ukraine has also disrupted the global supply of fertilizers. Insufficient access to agricultural inputs could lead to a state of widespread, low-productivity subsistence farming, rendering LIC food systems more vulnerable to shocks.  

More suffering ahead 

These sobering prospects could be even weaker if supply shortages, conflict, and divisions persist. With almost all LICs relying on imports of wheat, a longer-lasting disruption to global trade in cereals would worsen affordability and availability of staple foods. Further price increases of farming inputs—such as seeds, fuels, and fertilizers—could lead to worsening food price pressures. These pressures would be particularly painful in LICs where climate change has already depressed productivity in farming and in those with high incidence of extreme poverty. In this environment of high inflation, a more pronounced deterioration in living standards would exacerbate social unrest, especially in countries suffering from high levels of insecurity and violence. As financial conditions tighten, higher risk aversion would lead to increases in borrowing costs in LICs. High levels of public debt and increased non-concessional borrowing could further stall progress in debt relief. About one-fourth of all LIC external debt has variable interest rates, compared to just 11 percent in 2010.  

Quick and coordinated responses needed 

Already weakened by the adverse shocks during the last two years, LICs are facing stiff headwinds. The scope for domestic fiscal and monetary policy responses is in most cases limited. A concerted global effort is necessary: 

  • A rapid global response to improve access to safe and nutritious food and bolster food security is critical for health and human development in LICs. The international community needs to substantially scale up financing of LICs’ food systems, including measures that target farming, nutrition, social protection, water, and irrigation.  
  • LICs also face formidable debt-related challenges. Even before the invasion of Ukraine, about 60 percent of LICs were in or near debt distress. To mitigate the risks that debt burdens lead to financial crises, globally coordinated debt relief efforts are essential.  
  • The global community also needs to help foster LIC vaccination rates, which continue to lag far behind other EMDEs owing to a combination of insufficient supply, logistical challenges, and vaccine hesitancy. Sustained collective action is required to bolster pandemic preparedness and rapidly expand vaccination campaigns in LICs.  
  • Finally, the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related disasters highlights the escalating costs of climate change, especially among the poorest countries. Green investment projects need to be accompanied by policies to reduce the economic, health, and social costs of climate change, many of which are borne disproportionately by vulnerable populations in poor economies and make these countries more resilient to climate shocks.  

In the poorest countries of the world, a quick return to economic growth and prosperity is the surest antidote to all these problems, including climate change.

      
Kategorien: english

Today’s global economy is eerily similar to the 1970s, but governments can still escape a stagflation episode

Brookings - 1. Juli 2022 - 20:52

By Jongrim Ha, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge

The global economy is in the midst of a sudden slowdown accompanied by a steep run-up in global inflation to multidecade highs. These developments raise concerns about stagflation—the coincidence of weak growth and elevated inflation—similar to what the world suffered in the 1970s. That experience should be warning of the damage this could wreak on emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). The stagflation of that era ended with a global recession and a series of financial crises in EMDEs. In light of the lessons of that stagflation episode, these economies need to do a quick rethink of policies to cope with the consequences of rapidly tightening global financing conditions. 

Inflation and growth: moving in opposite directions  

In May 2022, global inflation (8.1 percent) and EMDE inflation (9.4 percent) were at their highest levels since 2008. Inflation in advanced economies reached its highest level recorded during the last four decades. As recent shocks in energy and food prices recede, supply bottlenecks ease, and financial conditions tighten, global inflation is expected to decline to about 3 percent next year. But this would still be about 1 percentage point above its average in 2019, before the pandemic turned the world upside down.  

After collapsing during the 2020 global recession, global growth rebounded to 5.7 percent in 2021, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy accommodation. However, growth is now expected to slow to 2.9 percent in 2022 with little change in 2023-24 because of the war in Ukraine, the fading of pent-up demand, and the withdrawal of policy support amid high inflation. Beyond the near-term, global growth is expected to remain subdued over the 2020s, reflecting a trend weakening of the fundamental drivers of growth.  

The growth slowdown is steeper, inflation increases not quite as bad (yet)

The current juncture resembles the early 1970s in three key respects: 

  • Elevated inflation and weak growth. The global economy has been emerging from the pandemic-related global recession of 2020, just as it did during the stagflationary period after the global recession in 1975. Global inflation during 1973-83 averaged 11.3 percent a year, more than three times as high as the average of 3.6 percent a year during 1962-72. While the inflation run-up since the 2020 global recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has been less steep than after the 1975 recession, the projected growth slowdown is much steeper. Between 2021 and 2024, global growth is projected to slow by 2.7 percentage points, more than twice as much as between 1976 and 1979 (Figure 1). 
  • Supply shocks after prolonged monetary policy accommodation. Supply disruptions driven by the pandemic and the recent supply shock dealt to global energy and food prices by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resemble the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979-80. Increases in energy prices in the 1970s and during the period 2020-22 have constituted the largest changes in prices of the past 50 years. Then and now, monetary policy generally was highly accommodative in the run-up to these shocks, with interest rates negative in real terms for several years. 
  • Significant vulnerabilities in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). In the 1970s and early 1980s, as now, high debt, elevated inflation, and weak fiscal positions made EMDEs vulnerable to tightening financial conditions. The stagflation of the 1970s coincided with the first global wave of debt accumulation in the past half-century. Low global real interest rates and the rapid development of syndicated loan markets encouraged a surge in EMDE debt, especially in Latin America and many low-income countries. The 2010s featured the fourth (and current) wave of global debt accumulation involving the largest, fastest, and most broad-based increase in government debt by EMDEs in the past 50 years. A number of LICs are already either in or near debt distress. The sheer magnitude and speed of the debt buildup heightens the associated risks. 
Figure 1. Developments in the 1970s and 2020s: Similarities  A. Slowdown in growth after global recessions 

B. CPI inflation

C. Real interest rates  

D. Change in food and energy prices 

Sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data; Haver Analytics; World Bank.  

Notes: CPI = consumer price index; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies. A. Figure shows changes in global growth (in percentage points) between 2021-24 and 1976-79; covers three years following a rebound from a global recession; B. Annual averages of headline and core CPI inflation in the United States and global (average across 66 countries). 2022 is based on the averages of January to May 2022; C. Figure shows nominal and real (CPI-adjusted) short-term interest rates (Treasury bill rates or money market rates, with the maturity of three months or less). Global interest rates are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. Sample includes 113 countries, though the sample size varies by year; D. Percent change in monthly energy and food price indices over a 24-month period. Because of data limitations, prior to 1979, the energy price change is proxied using the oil price change.

Critical differences from the 1970s 

While the similarities outlined above are worrying, there are important cyclical and structural differences between the 1970s and the current situation. These mean that the global economy could yet escape a repeat of that stagflation episode.  

  • Smaller shocks. At least thus far, the magnitude of commodity price jumps has been smaller than in the 1970s. For now, global inflation in 2022 is still less broad-based than it was in the 1970s, and core inflation has remained moderate in many countries, even if it has recently picked up. 
  • More credible monetary policy frameworks. Monetary policy frameworks have become increasingly focused on price stability over time. In the 1970s, central banks often faced competing objectives—aiming for both high output and employment, as well as for price stability. In contrast, central banks in advanced economies and many EMDEs now have clear mandates for price stability, typically expressed as an explicit inflation target (Figure 2). As a result of improvements in policy frameworks and better anchored inflation expectations, inflation—in particular core inflation—has become much less sensitive to inflation surprises. 
  • More flexible economies. The 1970s were a time of considerable structural economic rigidities, many of which have since evolved. Today’s greater economic flexibility, with less centralized wage setting and less financial repression, allows a faster supply and demand response in sectors where prices are rising particularly rapidly and reduces the likelihood of price-wage spirals becoming entrenched. In addition, the energy intensity of GDP has fallen considerably since the 1970s, making economies more resilient to shocks in energy prices (World Bank 2022a).  
  • Less fiscal accommodation. The 1960s and 1970s were marked by expansionary fiscal policy. In contrast, fiscal policy tightening is expected in coming years as governments withdraw the unprecedented fiscal support provided during the pandemic. 
Figure 2. Developments in the 1970s and 2020s: Differences  A. Number of countries with inflation targeting  

B. Labor market flexibility 

C. US inflation expectations 

D. Global energy intensity 

 

Notes: TOE=Tonnes of oil equivalent. A. Based on the clarification of IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and country-specific sources; B. Collective bargaining rates indicate percent of employees with bargaining powers. Trade union density rates indicate the number of union members as a percent of total employees. Aggregation is based on median across a balanced set of 25 economies; C. U.S. consumer inflation expectations based on April 2022 University of Michigan survey; D. Energy includes coal, natural gas, and oil. TOE stands for tonnes (metric tons) of oil equivalent. Aggregates calculated using GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.

A sluggish response to serious risks  

Concerns about persistently above-target inflation have already prompted central banks in most advanced economies and many EMDEs to tighten monetary policy amid a sharp growth slowdown. Despite this tightening, as of May 2022, real policy rates (adjusted by actual inflation) remain deeply negative in the average advanced economy (-5.2 percent) and in the average EMDE (-3.2 percent). 

If inflation expectations de-anchor, as they did in the 1970s, because of persistently elevated inflation and repeated inflationary shocks, the interest rate increases required to bring inflation back to target in advanced economies will be greater than those currently anticipated by financial markets. This raises the specter of the steep increases in interest rates that brought inflation under control but also triggered a global recession in 1982. That global recession also coincided with a string of financial crises and marked the beginning of a protracted period of weak growth in many EMDEs. 

If current stagflationary pressures intensify, EMDEs would likely face economic danger again because of their less weakly-anchored inflation expectations, elevated financial vulnerabilities, and dwindling growth prospects. This makes it urgent for their governments to shore up their fiscal and external buffers to stave off potential contagion, strengthen their monetary policy frameworks to reduce policy uncertainty, and implement structural policies to reinvigorate growth.  

      
Kategorien: english

UN Ocean Conference ends with call for greater ambition and global commitment to address dire state of the Ocean

UN #SDG News - 1. Juli 2022 - 19:04
Following a week of discussions and events in Lisbon, Portugal, the UN Ocean Conference concluded on Friday, with governments and heads of state agreeing on a new political declaration to Save Our Ocean.
Kategorien: english

UN Ocean Conference ends with call for greater ambition and global commitment to address dire state of the Ocean

UN ECOSOC - 1. Juli 2022 - 19:04
Following a week of discussions and events in Lisbon, Portugal, the UN Ocean Conference concluded on Friday, with governments and heads of state agreeing on a new political declaration to Save Our Ocean.
Kategorien: english

LIVE · Devex World 2022 - Fichandler stage

Devex - 1. Juli 2022 - 16:36
Kategorien: english

LIVE · Devex World 2022 - Kogod stage

Devex - 1. Juli 2022 - 16:29
Kategorien: english

Civil society is struggling with ever worsening framework conditions – all over the world. What do we do about it?

CSO Partnership - 1. Juli 2022 - 3:26

 For civil society to work unchallenged, the international community must demand that governments and companies adhere to the effective development cooperation principles of democratic ownership of development priorities, and transparency and accountability.

Under pressure

Around the world, representatives of civil society have less and less room for manoeuvre. They are subjected to legal proceedings, surveillance, and defamation, or funds are withheld. These attacks by state or state-approved forces on independent development actors, human rights, and democracy, aim to limit the social and political participation of civil society and suppress criticism of systems that favour a few but neglect the majority.

For civil society to work unchallenged, the international community must demand that governments and companies adhere to the effective development cooperation principles of democratic ownership of development priorities, and transparency and accountability.

Civil society must be involved in the design and implementation of development policies and projects. It is the task of civil society to stand united against restrictions – through awareness raising, legal action, and mobilising the general public.

Our platform monitors whether governments are fulfilling their obligation to create an enabling environment for civil society. We also raise awareness, call on national authorities to address gaps in the implementation of the above development principles, and advocate for an end to attacks on human rights defenders through the Belgrade Call to Action.#

The post Civil society is struggling with ever worsening framework conditions – all over the world. What do we do about it? appeared first on CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

US Supreme Court ruling on environmental protection ‘a setback in our fight against climate change’

UN ECOSOC - 30. Juni 2022 - 23:53
The ruling by the United States Supreme Court against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on Thursday, is “a setback in our fight against climate change” said the UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric.
Kategorien: english

Amazon's tax challenge

Tax Justice Network - 30. Juni 2022 - 19:56

Annual shareholder’s meetings used to be pretty staid and boring affairs. But, as inequality has boomed along with corporate profits, AGMs are becoming sites of protest. In this episode Naomi Fowler speaks to Katie Hepworth of PIRC and Jason Ward of CICTAR about the recent challenge to Amazon on tax transparency from shareholders. How did the challenge unfold and what was the result? What does it tell us about progress on principles that as societies are increasingly important to us?

A transcript available here (some is automated) https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/The-Taxcast-transcript_June_22-1.pdf 

Our website with more podcasts is here: https://www.thetaxcast.com/ 

Further reading:

https://www.statista.com/statistics/272258/percentage-of-shareholders-in-the-total-population-of-selected-countries/

https://www.businessinsider.com/no-the-average-stock-holding-period-is-not-11-seconds-2010-10?r=US&IR=T

The Taxcast in 2014 covering Google's annual shareholder meeting tax transparency challenge: https://youtu.be/lFSfWvdedt4?t=1226 

Amazon’s Tribulations And The Future Of Tax Transparency, Nana Ama Sarfo https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxnotes/2022/05/31/amazons-tribulations-and-the-future-of-tax-transparency/ 

 

 

Kategorien: english

Save lives, support development, and ‘steer our world to safer roads ahead’: Guterres 

UN #SDG News - 30. Juni 2022 - 19:48
Road traffic accidents claim nearly 1.3 million lives each year, cost some countries up to three per cent of their annual GDP, and are the biggest killer of five to 29-year olds globally, the UN General Assembly President told a High-level Meeting on Improving Global Road Safety on Thursday.
Kategorien: english

CONFINTEA - Closing Speeches

UIL UNESCO Hamburg - 30. Juni 2022 - 16:09
Kategorien: english, Hamburg

Panel 6: ALE for climate action

UIL UNESCO Hamburg - 30. Juni 2022 - 16:09
Kategorien: english, Hamburg

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