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How to Prevent a Demographic “Youth Bulge” From Causing Widespread Unemployment

UN Dispatch - 11. April 2019 - 12:07

South Africa is experiencing what demographers call a “youth bulge” which occurs when young people make up a disproportionately large percentage of the population.

One key challenge facing societies experiencing a youth bulge large is what happens when young people become of working age, and there are too few jobs.

In South Africa and in many countries with similar demographics, unemployment rates among young people is orders of magnitudes greater than the overall unemployment rate. As my guest today Nicola Galombik explains, when large numbers of young people are unemployed the knock-on effects for society in general can be extremely negative.

Nicola Galombik has embarked on a strategy to reduce youth unemployment in her native South Africa. She is the co-founder of the Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator, a social enterprise that is not only helping to find young people jobs at scale, but is changing mindsets around employing young people.

Youth unemployment is a key driver of instability in many countries around the world, and as you will see from this conversation the Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator has found a formula to take on what is essentially a demographic challenge.

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The post How to Prevent a Demographic “Youth Bulge” From Causing Widespread Unemployment appeared first on UN Dispatch.

Kategorien: english

Time to give the carbon footprint a higher profile in climate change policy

Simon Maxwell - 11. April 2019 - 9:04

Time to give the carbon footprint a higher profile in climate change policy



This is shocking. Half the UK’s carbon footprint is accounted for by net imports; and, despite a sharp fall in carbon pollution from domestic sources, our overall footprint was exactly the same in 2015 as it was in 1990. In effect, we have made no contribution at all to tackling climate change. No wonder global emissions are still rising. We have a mountain to climb – but one that hardly features in the national debate. Thanks, though, to Caroline Lucas, for highlighting the problem in a debate in the House of Commons (jointly with Layla Moran MP) and in an article in the Guardian.

This note tells the story, and then looks at what might be done, especially (a) working with the countries that supply our imports to reduce their own footprint, and (b) tackling our own over-consumption. I do not do much more than provide a check-list of things to think about, ranging from financial aid for emerging economies to a Green New Deal at home.  I do, however, offer a framework for thinking about policy interventions: Encourage. Incentivise. Enforce.

At the end, I ask why it is that national and international policy pay so little attention to the footprint. Nationally, the UK’s Climate Change Committee has not published a report on the subject since 2013. Should there be a target, as there is for national emissions, even a budget, enshrined in law? And internationally, why does the UNFCCC not mandate that every country should report its footprint, and make commitments in its next round of climate pledges?

To begin with the data . . .

We have become used to hearing how well the UK is doing in reducing emissions, and it is – though obviously deeper and faster cuts are desirable. But look at the graph below from the EORA carbon footprint model, which uses consumption-based accounting (CBA) to calculate the carbon footprint. Emissions of CO2 have indeed been falling quite rapidly, especially since about 2007: by 27% overall since 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed, and by 31% since 1990, the Kyoto reference year. But the UK’s carbon footprint, taking account of imports, rose sharply, is now falling, but overall has not fallen at all: it was 656 Mt in 1990, and 657Mt in the latest year for which data are shown, 2015.

Figure 1


I will return to the numbers shortly, but of course the difference between the two series on the graph is that we are importing a lot of ‘stuff’ - and imports have their own carbon footprint. It looks as though there is a mountain still to climb if overall emissions are to be reduced.

The 'carbon loophole'

Why this matters, and has global policy implications, is that the official reporting, under the terms of the UNFCCC, is of emissions not footprints, and so disguises countries’ overall impact on the climate. This has been described as ‘the carbon loophole’.

Thus, the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, required (mainly developed) countries to reduce their national Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-12. The Doha amendment, adopted in 2012 but not yet formally ratified by a sufficient number of countries, provided for further reductions by 2020. The Paris Agreement in 2015 took a different approach, setting a global temperature target and requiring countries to submit Nationally Determined Contributions towards achieving the target These also focused on national emissions (albeit with some provision for trading between countries). The UK commitment was for a 12.5% reduction in GHG emissions during the first Kyoto commitment period, and, jointly with other EU Member States, for a 20% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020. In Paris, and again jointly with other EU Member States, the UK committed to a 40% reduction by 2030 from 1990 levels.

Now, obviously, the UK is active in trying to meet its commitments in terms of domestic emissions. The commitments are mandated in legislation, thanks to the Climate Change Act of 2008, and implemented through national carbon budgets approved by Parliament. Progress is kept under constant review by the independent Committee on Climate Change, established as a statutory body by the 2008 Act. Most recently, the Government was able to report that GHG emissions fell by 3% in 2018, to a level 44% below the 1990 level, and at the lowest since the 1890s. Claire Perry, minister for energy and clean growth, was reported as saying that ‘We can be proud that we continue to lead the way in reducing emissions while growing our economy’.

Well, yes. But you might think that both the Government and the independent CCC would have the issue of imported emissions high on their agenda. In fact, the CCC did publish a Report on Reducing the UK’s Carbon Footprint, back in 2013. It said that

‘UK greenhouse gas emissions have fallen substantially over the last two decades. However, UK imports of goods and services have risen significantly over the same period and a number of studies, as well as estimates produced for us, have suggested that the emissions embedded in these imports have caused the UK’s overall ‘carbon footprint’ (i.e. emissions measured on a consumption basis) to increase. These studies also indicate that the UK has one of the largest gaps between production and consumption emissions in the world, with our net imports of emissions higher than those of most other countries. This is due to the types of goods and services we trade – we import a large quantity of manufactured goods, and we primarily export services.’

The main conclusion of the Report was that a global deal was required to achieve climate goals.

There seem to have been no CCC reports on this topic since 2013. However, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) published a report in May 2018 on the UK’s Carbon Footprint 1997-2015, based on work by the University of Leeds, and also drawing on the EORA MRIO work cited earlier (see e.g. this paper). This shows (Figure 2) that imported emissions by the UK from all parts of the world rose during the period, most significantly from China. Note that these statistics are described as experimental. They refer to GHGs not just CO2.A new report has just been published, updating the data to 2016. This shows what is described as a 'slight decrease' of 6% in the overall GHG footprint in 2016. 

Figure 2



A demonic race between decarbonisation and rising demand

So what is going on? Is this just about exporting services and importing manufactures, as the CCC suggested. Partly, but there are two other factors to consider: rising income and growing population.

On income, and on World Bank data, UK GDP per capita rose from $US 28,691 in 1990 to $US 41,537 in 2015, in 2010 constant dollars, an increase of 45%. For population, figures from the Office of National Statistics show that the UK total in 1990 was 57.2m and in 2015 was 65.1m – an increase of nearly 14%. Thus, other things being equal, the footprint would have been expected to rise significantly between 1990 and 2015. In fact, it may be mildly reassuring to learn that the CO2 emissions footprint has fallen over the period, by 50% in the case of emissions per unit of GDP (Figure 3), and by 17% for emissions per capita (Figure 4).

Figure 3


Figure 4


However, this is only mildly reassuring. Both per capita income and population are projected to rise in the future. There is thus a demonic race between rising demand on the one hand, and on the other, the imperative of decarbonisation.

What to make of this?

The data . . .

First, just to reiterate that the figures are not necessarily the last word. The calculations of embedded carbon and of trade are complex – see, for example, the FAQs on the Eora website. The Eora numbers are for CO2 only, not all GHG. There are other estimates available, for example (also for CO2 only) from The Carbon Project. These appear to be broadly consistent.  There is also a separate debate about the treatment of capital stock in emissions, especially for fast growing economies (see here). But the numbers do not need to be super-accurate to make the point.

The UK compared to other countries . . .

Second, the UK may be a bit of an outlier among developed countries, as suggested by the CCC report. In the UK, 37% of the total CO2 footprint was accounted for by imports (though the DEFRA report says 50% for all GHG). Eora has data for 190 countries, and confirms that the percentage is lower in other developed countries: 34% in France, 15% in Japan, 12% in the US, only 5% in Germany.

For developing countries, the picture is mixed. For China, the CO2 footprint is lower than emissions, by 13%, since so much carbon is exported. But in most poor countries, with lower exports but significant imports, the footprint exceeds the national emissions. This is true, for example, in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania.  It looks as though countries may go through a transition as manufactured exports increase, from a situation in which the footprint exceeds emissions to one where emissions exceed the footprint. Interestingly, Thailand and Vietnam are at a point of balance, where carbon exports about balance carbon imports. Of course, both emissions and footprints are much lower for poorer countries than for rich ones. The UK footprint of 10 tonnes per capita in 2015 compares with 2.3 in Vietnam and 0.1 in Ethiopia.

Pay more attention to carbon embodied in imports . . .

Third, though, the figures do emphasise how important it is to see what the countries which provide our imports are doing. For example, the UK’s carbon imports from China are presumably mostly a question of growing volume, offset by falling carbon intensity. We can see from the Eora database that emissions per unit of GDP are falling rapidly in China, by over 80% since 1970.  There is evidence that efficiency improvements have been driving a reduction in the energy intensity of manufacturing, as might be expected (see e.g. here). China has become a leader in climate change diplomacy, and is making major investments in renewable energy and electric vehicles. But is progress sufficient? The Climate Action Tracker rates China’s Nationally Determined Contribution as ‘highly insufficient’ on a fair share basis, mainly because of issues related to coal. Indeed, China’s reliance on coal is a recurrent news item – see e.g. this recent report, raising the alarm about a coal power construction spree.

Figure 5



Deliver change abroad: Encourage. Inncentivise. Enforce.

Fourth, then, and in relation to all exporting countries, it seems reasonable to ask what can be done to realise faster change abroad. There are some options. They can broadly be described as: Encourage. Incentivise. Enforce. Each of these deserves longer treatment, but in brief:

  • Encourage greater ambition in the global climate talks.

2020 is an important year in the UNFCCC process, with countries which submitted pledges to 2025 required to submit their second round of pledges, and those which submitted pledges to 2030 required to update their pledges – all this in preparation for a global stocktake in 2023. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement states specifically that

‘Each Party's successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’

There are also opportunities to build on the Global Climate Action Summit, held in 2018. This brought non-state actors in the public and private sectors firmly into the picture. More than 500 commitments were made, by national and sub-national Governments, mayors, industry leaders and others.

For 2019, the UN Secretary General has convened a Climate Change Summit, to be held in September, and designed to encourage action in a series of ‘action portfolios’, including energy and industry transitions, nature-based solutions, and action by cities.

It is also important to recognise the impact on the public mood, and therefore on the political process, of Greta Thunberg, the School Strike Movement and initiatives like Extinction Rebellion.

  • Incentivise greater ambition by means of financial support and technical cooperation.

Finance has been a key theme of global climate negotiations, with the iconic figure of $US 100 bn per year first mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord agreed by a group of countries at the climate talks in 2009. Climate finance is regarded as a key requirement to bridge the gap between conditional and unconditional Nationally Determined Contributions: for 2030, this difference is estimated at 2-3 Gigatonnes of GtCO2e, a significant additional contribution. Individual countries have made climate finance pledges. For example, the UK has an International Climate Fund worth £5.8bn between 2016 and 2021. There are many (too many) international funds and programmes, including the Climate Investment Funds and  Green Climate Fund. Overviews of progress are available from institutions like ODI and WRI. The UNFCCC provides a biennial review of climate finance, most recently in 2018. The OECD/DAC also tracks climate-related development finance.

Technology has also been a key issue in the climate talks. A Technology Mechanism was established in 2010. A chapter on innovation policy in the 2018 UNEP Emissions Gap Report provides an authoritative overview, emphasising the importance of patient strategic finance, directed (=targeted) investment portfolios, and mission-oriented innovation.

  • Enforce faster action by means of taxes or administrative measures.

The UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 again provides authoritative analysis of this issue, especially of financial measures. It summarises the conclusions as follows:

‘Border carbon adjustments are a specific form of carbon tariff that involve levying taxes on imported goods according to their carbon footprint . . . However, implementing border carbon adjustments requires substantial (and accurate) information on production-side emissions and on the direct or implicit carbon prices in exporting countries. Improved monitoring, reporting and verification systems can therefore help make border carbon adjustments more accurate. . . Focusing on particularly carbon-intensive goods (e.g. cement and steel) and conducting an ex ante evaluation on trade impacts can help overcome . . . downsides and make border carbon adjustments more effective . . . Carbon tariffs are not necessarily compatible with World Trade Organization rules, although they could be covered by Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which stipulates that trade policies can be used for achieving environmental goals if no other policies are feasible that are less distortive to trade.’

No doubt there is a literature on regulation. The case that springs to mind is the US attempt to ban tuna caught with purse seine nets, back in 1991. That was under GATT rules and was rejected, though the ruling was not formally adopted. There are various WTO workstreams on trade and the environment, including regulation, though apparently no work specifically on climate change.

Reduce the footprint: act on lifestyles

Fifth, it is necessary to look much more closely at overall lifestyles. What can be done to reduce the carbon footprint?

It goes without saying that rich people have larger footprints than poor ones, globally and nationally.

Globally, Oxfam have looked at the distribution of emission footprints, suggesting that the average emissions of someone in the richest 10% of the world population is 50 times more than that of someone in the poorest 10%. Footprints are much higher in rich countries than poor ones, as noted.

Nationally, the Open University cite data (from a paper by Gough et al in 2012) showing that in the UK ‘the carbon footprint per person for households with the highest 10% of incomes is about three times that of people living in households with the lowest 10%. This is true for all categories, but especially for consumables (goods), private services and transport.’ Similar findings are reported for the US.

Figure 6


Figure 7


There is an important implication of these findings, which Lutz Sager, the author of the LSE study on EU emissions, describes as the ‘equity-pollution dilemma’, viz that redistributing income from the rich to the poor would most likely increase emissions:

‘The research predicts that if the US had the same household income distribution as Sweden, CO2 emissions from private households would be 1.5% higher, and would increase by 2.3% . . . (Further) despite having a smaller carbon footprint, the consumption of households on lower incomes is more carbon-intensive per dollar because they spend a greater proportion of their income on fossil-fuel-based utilities, for example energy. . .  transferring US$1,000 from a richer household to a poorer household could increase the emissions created by that sum by 5%, or 28.5kg of CO2..’

With that caveat in mind, the issue is what measures can be taken to reduce consumption, contributing to reductions in both imported and national emissions. Again, the earlier model would seem useful as an organising framework: Encourage. Incentivise. Enforce.

There is work on all these, for example at the LSE/Grantham in a work stream on Changing Behaviour, or in a new work programme on lifestyles, being launched at IDDRI in Paris. IDDRI’s earlier work on the European food system is relevant, seeking to balance diet quality and agro-ecological imperatives, inter alia involving fewer imports of animal feed and lower meat consumption. Others focus on housing and mobility: for example, the 1.5 degree Lifestyle Report reviews options like car-free travel, living closer to workplaces and off-grid energy. Green procurement is one of the options examined by the Report on Closing Europe’s Carbon Loophole.

Work on the circular economy is also relevant, for example by Patrick Schroder at IDS in Sussex, linking the circular economy to debates about ‘degrowth’. One way in which this topic has been approached is via an argument for regenerative economics, popularised by Kate Raworth in her book on Doughnut Economics. This links nicely to the case for a New Green Deal, in the UK and now in the US. These initiatives attempt to tackle one of the concerns about degrowth, that it may not create enough jobs, arguing instead that an environmental focus, for example on retrofitting buildings to be more energy efficient, will create many new sources of employment. Maybe. But globally? Africa needs 18 million jobs a year, remember, just to stand still.

Strengthen the reporting and regulatory framework

Finally, an important question remains about how to reflect the issues covered here in national policy and international negotiations.

In terms of national policy, should not the UK Committee on Climate Change, and its counterparts in other countries, pay more attention to footprint issues? The relevant Government Department (DEFRA - Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) reports annually on emissions, and has just published data for 2016. But how about an annual report from the CCC, with recommendations? A long term target, even enshrined in law? A footprint budget, to match the national carbon budget? Of course, a research programme. Parliamentary bodies could also take more interest. In the UK, this could mean the Environmental Audit Committee.

Internationally, a step change is needed in the way in which the UNFCCC handles consumption issues. At the very least the Secretariat should be asked to report regularly on the topic: better data and reporting is a recurrent theme of work on this topic (see e.g. here). More ambitiously, countries should be asked to incorporate consumption targets and commitments into the next round of national pledges.


Kategorien: english

Financing gender-responsive social protection

ODI - 11. April 2019 - 0:00
This webinar explores the main challenges, opportunities and initiatives underway on financing gender-responsive social protection.
Kategorien: english

‘A trusted voice’ for social justice: Guterres celebrates 100 years of the International Labour Organization

UN #SDG News - 10. April 2019 - 22:22
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has been “a trusted voice” to “ensure social justice in every corner of our world”, Secretary-General António Guterres said on Wednesday, at a high-level meeting to commemorate the centenary of what was the first ever United Nations agency.
Kategorien: english

FEEM & SDSN Workshop: Roadmap toward Total Decarbonization in 2050

UN SDSN - 10. April 2019 - 19:17

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and SDSN co-organized the “Roadmap toward Total Decarbonization in 2050” workshop that was held at FEEM’s headquarters in Milan on 2-3 April.

Paolo Carnevale, FEEM Executive Director, Domenico Siniscalco, Morgan Stanley, and Jeffrey Sachs, SDSN Director, opened the workshop which gathered seventy technical experts from all over the world. The workshop aimed to start defining a roadmap toward the decarbonization of the energy systems, with a specific focus on the four most energy-intensive economic sectors: power, buildings, transport and heavy industry.

The main output of the workshop was to kick-start the process toward the definition of a roadmap for the decarbonization of the energy systems worldwide, useful to support decision makers, inform the public, and encourage national governments to take immediate action for confronting our shared future.

For this reason, the workshop fostered a rewarding and well-balanced dialogue with the contribution of academia, scientific institutions and international agencies aimed at defining technical solutions to achieve total decarbonization in 2050.

Some important guidelines and a well-defined framework have been set up in terms of applied technologies and technological breakthrough for the sectors investigated to be pursued within specific contexts, latitudes and sectors toward a sustainable future.

The final comments of Jeffrey Sachs, Paolo Carnevale and Laura Cozzi (IEA) reiterated the commitment to draw up an effective and incisive roadmap under the principles of flexibility, vision and realism to encourage governments around the world to look ahead and take immediate action for global decarbonization.

The final outcome of this process will be the drafting of an official document aimed to support governments and decision makers in the adoption of medium-long-term strategies and plans for energy transition. The document, whose first signatories will be Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and SDSN – will be presented as input paper at the next Global Climate Summit in New York (September 2019) and will be one of the reference texts for COP25 in Chile (December 2019).

For more information or to get involved, please contact Elena Crete at


Kategorien: english

A Unique Approach to Monitoring the Effectiveness of Development Co-operation: Lessons from Mexico

Effective Co-operation - 10. April 2019 - 17:51

Mexico has evolved into an emerging economic power and one that is becoming a champion for South-South Co-operation (SSC) engagements in Latin America. We recognise that innovative partnerships that respond to unique country contexts are key for achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and also acknowledge the increased importance of SSC in eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable development, but also encourage efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of this co-operation modality.

Established in 2011, the Mexican Agency of International Co-operation for Development (AMEXCID) has been tasked with addressing issues related to international development co-operation. Focusing particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, Mexico shares successful experiences, strengthens capacities and exchanges resources with developing countries in the region, while at the same time works with partners to strengthen Mexico’s own institutional capacities. Mexico has taken an active role in SSC, particularly in enhancing the transparency as well as systematisation and analysis of information. One such example is the quantification of Mexico’s international co-operation which is an annual exercise, as part of the National Database of International Development Co-operation (RENCID).

Mexico’s seat in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC)’s 25-member Steering Committee as one of two representatives of recipient and providers of development co-operation also speaks to its key position as a dual characteristic partner. Mexico has also served as one of three Co-Chairs of the GPEDC Steering Committee from 2014 to 2016 and continues to engage and share its lessons and expertise with this global network.

As part of the 2016 monitoring round of the GPEDC, Mexico examined the applicability of Global Partnership monitoring indicators to its context as a dual provider and recipient of development co-operation. Building on this work, Mexico is now leading the effort to develop an approach to monitor the effectiveness of SSC.

The first step in developing an approach to monitor the effectiveness of SSC was to develop a pilot framework. Mexico, with the support of the Government of Germany and UNDP, used the pilot framework to conduct a national data collection exercise during the 2018 Global Partnership monitoring round. This process culminated in a multi-stakeholder workshop to discuss the monitoring results, as well as to reflect on the monitoring process.

The workshop, with Argentina, another dual characteristic country, and El Salvador and Honduras (recipients) along with the participation of civil society, the private sector, local governments, and donor countries pointed to several areas of progress and opportunities:

The main takeaways from Mexico’s monitoring exercises showed that, although advances have been made, there is room for improving our results-oriented approach in co-operation projects, including monitoring and evaluation indicators and targets. Moreover, it is essential to allocate a budget in accordance with the goals and scope expected of the Mexican policy of international co-operation. This has to be accompanied by comprehensive multi-stakeholder training programs on South-South Co-operation with sub-national actors. This is key to promoting multi-stakeholder partnerships to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as to enhance and make more visible the relevance of the gender perspective in Mexican co-operation.

These initial results were presented by the Government of Mexico at a side event during BAPA +40. The event brought together different representatives from other countries participating in this country-led work to develop an approach to assess the effectiveness of SSC and discuss why this is important. The recommendations emanating from this event will be useful for middle-income countries and countries with dual roles in international development co-operation. Given the multi-stakeholder nature of the proposed solutions, civil society organisations, the private sector and donor countries can equally benefit from these ideas.

As we look ahead and plan for the historic GPEDC 2019 Senior-Level Meeting (13-14 July, New York) hosted in the margins of the 2019 High-Level Political Forum, Mexico aims to expand the effectiveness network by adapting effectiveness to respond to such context-specific challenges. Mexico believes that effectiveness is synonymous with the 2030 Agenda and with that in mind, increased effectiveness of SSC can help to strengthen Mexico’s contribution to the achievement of the SDGs in Mexico and beyond.

Kategorien: english

UN Partnership Forum 2019: “Partnerships Driving Inclusive Implementation of the SDGs”

Global Policy Watch - 10. April 2019 - 15:40

By Barbara Adams and Sarah Dayringer

Download UN Monitor #03 (pdf version).

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Partnership Forum will hold its annual session at UN headquarters on 11 April 2019. This year it will focus on partnership efforts supporting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda is the subject of review by the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) annually under ECOSOC and at summit level every four years (including 2019) under the auspices of the UN’s highest political body, the General Assembly.

The HLPF has a multiyear programme clustering the SDGs year by year but SDG 17, essential for the implementation of all SDGs, is reviewed every year. Framed as a goal to “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development”, what was conceived as a global partnership led by States is being re-interpreted to emphasize partnerships with as many actors as possible. However, this shift has not been guided or governed by principles, criteria, and independent assessment and oversight. The 2030 Agenda indicator by which to assess the value of multi-stakeholder partnerships, which was meant to build on “experience and resourcing strategies”, measures only financial resources (17.17.1). This quantity not quality approach favours big business and big NGOs (see Global Policy Watch briefing #24: “The semantics of partnerships”).

The attention to UN engagement in partnerships has the potential to re-position the ECOSOC Partnership Forum from a market place of practices to a policy-shaping body. While it may be a forum to develop the understanding of UN partnerships, it does not deliver the accountability and oversight needed. Its orientation / DNA is to promote partnerships, side-stepping the essential first step of assessing in what circumstances partnerships are a legitimate approach or an effective modality (see remarks of Barbara Adams at the 2018 ECOSOC OAD segment, on “Strengthening partnerships and stakeholder engagement”).

Its emphasis on promotion implicitly allows a pick and choose approach, without robust indicators of impact and effectiveness apart from the results of resource mobilization.

Since the last Partnerships Forum, UN discourse has demonstrated a shift from an exclusive focus on the private sector to multi-stakeholder partnerships and UN reports have enumerated the constituencies of civil society, academia, foundations as well as the private sector as partners.

The importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships is emphasized in the Partnerships Forum concept note:

The last decade has seen partnerships in the field of sustainable development burgeoning and diversifying at an accelerated rate. Sustainable Development Goal 17 … recognizes the critical importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships for the achievement of the SDGs in all countries.

However, the UN gatekeepers/interlocutors are those with private sector experience and lack substantial engagement with a diverse array of constituencies, especially those with a public interest commitment and non-profit experience. By illustration, this year the Partnership Forum is co-organized by the United Nations Office for Partnerships (UNOP) and the United Nations Global Compact, two such interlocutors, together with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA).

2019 Partnership Forum Agenda

The 2019 Partnership Forum will showcase good practices and lessons learned on the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in driving inclusiveness and impacts under the overall theme of “Partnerships Driving Inclusive Implementation of the SDGs”. The agenda will include:

  • multi-stakeholder partnerships and partnership platforms led by national governments to draw concrete recommendations on ways to address existing gaps in SDG implementation, and to catalyse value-additions and accountability for different stakeholders;
  • ways to enhance the effectiveness of UN-associated partnerships in the context of ongoing UN development system (UNDS) reform; and the role of the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and UN local networks, including the Global Compact Local Networks; and
  • an update on the work of the UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) – formerly known as UN Development Group or UNDG – Strategic Results Group on Partnerships.

Additionally, UN partnerships are one of the six priority areas of the UN development system reform (see Global Policy Watch briefing #15: “The UN development system: Can it catch up to the 2030 Agenda?”).

UN development system reform and partnerships

More recently attention to UN partnerships arrangements has escalated with the Secretary-General’s reform recommendations for the UN development system. His December 2017 report, “Repositioning the United Nations development system (UNDS) to deliver on the 2030 Agenda” (A/72/684), asserted that “partnership efforts remain fragmented and overly focused on ‘projectized’  activities” and that the UN “must do better to manage risks and ensure oversight” (para 131).

The report outlined six partnership-focused work streams and made concrete proposals for improving UN partnership engagements, including measures to ensure increased transparency and accountability (paras 130-143).

  1. UNSDG to agree on a system-wide approach to partnership
  2. Strengthen system-wide integrity, due diligence and risk management, including the 10 Global Compact principles on for private sector engagement
  3. Considerations of Global Compact leadership on ways to improve governance at the global level, its impact, and its oversight of Global Compact Local Networks
  4. Reinvigoration of UNOP as the global gateway for partnership
  5. A system-wide compact with the international financial institutions
  6. Efforts to invigorate UN support for South-South cooperation

In May 2018 Member States responded positively to the Secretary-General’s reform proposals on re-aligning its leadership, capacities and accountability mechanisms to meet the demands in delivering on the 2030 Agenda by adopting resolution A/RES/72/279 “Repositioning of the United Nations development system in the context of the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system”. This resolution included attention to the importance of partnerships but did not endorse any concrete directions regarding the Secretary-General’s proposals for partnership arrangements.

With the adoption of the reform resolution attention has shifted to its implementation and the UNDS will report on progress to Member States on 21-23 May 2019 at the ECOSOC operational activities for development segment.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

A New UN Report Details Food Crises Around the World

UN Dispatch - 10. April 2019 - 15:36

Every year for the last three years, persistent conflict, climate shocks and economic instability have driven more than 100 million people around the world into crisis-levels acute hunger or worse.

Last year, that number was 113 million people in 53 countries, according to the UN’s latest Global Report on Food Crises, published last week. That’s the same magnitude as if all of the UK and Spain were in urgent need of food, nutrition and livelihoods assistance.

Of those in need last year, more than half were in 33 African countries, and two-thirds (or 72 million) were in just eight conflict-ridden countries. In order of severity, they were: Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Syria, Sudan, South Sudan and Nigeria. These countries are expected to remain among the world’s worst food crises in 2019, with large portions of their populations at risk of falling into the “emergency” phase of food insecurity.

According to the classification system used by the international community, “emergency-levels” of food insecurity are more severe than “crisis-levels.” But “catastrophe-levels” are the worst. When at least 20 percent of the population in an area faces catastrophe-levels of hunger, famine is declared. In such cases – as in areas of South Sudan in 2017 – urgent action is required to “prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.”

Last year, UN officials warned that Yemen was on the brink of the “worst famine in 100 years” if the war did not subside. Although famine was not officially declared, the report says that 65,000 people still faced catastrophe-levels of extreme hunger and loss of livelihoods – and that was with humanitarian food assistance. Had that aid not been available, the UN estimates the number would have been about 238,000.

When the UN first began to publish the annual Global Report on Food Crises in 2016, the number of people who faced crisis-levels of acute hunger or worse was 108 million in 48 countries. In 2017, that number jumped up to 124 million in 51 countries, mostly because conflict or insecurity intensified in South Sudan, Yemen, north Nigeria, the DRC and Myanmar. Unrelenting drought also worsened food insecurity in a number of African countries.

Compared to 2017, the number of people facing acute hunger actually decreased slightly in 2018. The report attributes this dip to less severe climate shocks in some areas and better harvests and humanitarian aid in others (like Nigeria). However, the number of people facing at minimum crisis-levels of food insecurity remained the same or grew in 17 countries, with the biggest increases occurring in Afghanistan, the DRC, Sudan and Zambia.

Despite the modest improvement globally from 2017 to 2018, the report says that an additional 143 million people in 2018 were living on the edge of acute hunger. If faced with any shock or stressor, it warned, those 143 million people would be at risk of being pushed into crisis-levels of hunger or worse.

Over the last decade, prolonged conflicts and insecurity as well as more severe and frequent climate shocks have driven up humanitarian assistance and spending needs by about 127 percent. About 40 percent of that, the report says, have been for food and agriculture needs. These drivers of food insecurity will persist in 2019. And if the political and economic crisis in Venezuela doesn’t let up, we can expect the number of displaced people, refugees and migrants from that crisis to add to the burden significantly.

For years now, the UN has said that as crises become more protracted and increasingly political with no clear solution, humanitarian responses are no longer sufficient on their own. The report echoes this and says their findings “clearly underscore” the need for the humanitarian and development sectors to work together for more sustainable long-term answers to food insecurity. In some cases, this may include investing in conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well.

Without such efforts, the root causes of hunger will continue unchecked, the report warns, and hundreds of millions of lives will be on the line.

The post A New UN Report Details Food Crises Around the World appeared first on UN Dispatch.

Kategorien: english

Investment facilitation for development: a new route to global investment governance

GDI Briefing - 10. April 2019 - 14:50
While global investment needs are enormous in order to bolster the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, developing countries are often excluded from global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Beyond economic fundamentals like market size, infra¬structure and labour, the impediments to FDI in developing countries relate to the predictability, transparency and ease of the regulatory environment. In contrast, tax incentives and international investment agreements (IIAs) have been found to be less important (World Bank, 2018). To harness the advantages of FDI, it is critical that governments have policies and regulations in place that help to attract and retain FDI and enhance its contribution to sustainable development. The 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, thus, call for appropriate international frameworks to support investments in developing countries.
In this context, the Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development adopted at the 11th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2017 called for the start of “structured discussions with the aim of developing a multilateral framework on investment facilitation”. Investment facilitation refers to a set of practical measures concerned with improving the transparency and predict¬ability of investment frameworks, streamlining procedures related to foreign investors, and enhancing coordination and cooperation between stakeholders, such as host and home country government, foreign investors and domestic corporations, as well as societal actors.
Despite the deadlock in the WTO’s 17-year-old Doha Round negotiations, the structured discussions on investment facilitation, which have been under way since March 2018, show that the members of the WTO take a strong interest in using the WTO as a platform to negotiate new international rules at the interface of trade and investment. In contrast to previous attempts by developed countries to establish multilateral rules for investment, the structured discussions are mainly driven by emerging and developing countries. Most of them have evolved over the past years into FDI host and home countries reflecting the changing geography of economic power in the world. Their increased role has led to a shift of policy agendas, focusing on practical measures to promote FDI in developing countries while excluding contentious issues such as investment liberali¬sation and protection, and investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS).
This policy brief provides an overview of the emerging policy debate about investment facilitation. We highlight that four key challenges need to be tackled in order to negotiate an investment facilitation framework (IFF) in the WTO that supports sustainable development:
  1. There is a need to properly conceptualise the scope of investment facilitation as a basis for empirical analyses of the potential impact of a multilateral IFF.
  2. Many less- and least-developed countries do not yet participate in the structured discussions. It is necessary to enhance their capacity to participate in the structured discussions and address their specific concerns.
  3. In order to enhance the contribution of FDI to sustainable development it is necessary to support the development of governance mechanisms at the domestic level.
  4. It is key to ensure transparency towards countries not yet participating in the discussions, the business sector and societal actors to support a successful policy process.

Kategorien: english

The violence in Mali is getting bloodier, but religion is not necessarily at its root

The Broker - 10. April 2019 - 14:24

The massacre of Fulani in central Mali on 23 March marks a grave, new turn in the conflict. How did we get here? While the politics of religion are often identified as the main cause, local rights-based issues are a more plausible source of the current conflict. The UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA should establish a more comprehensive and inclusive political strategy in order to achieve a proper truce. 

Kategorien: english

Global Solutions Summit opens with the G20 Japan’s research and policy advice network

T20 - 10. April 2019 - 14:17

The third Global Solutions Summit in Berlin, Germany kicked off with calls for a paradigm change to recouple social, economic and political progress.

Some 1,200 individuals attended the Global Solutions Summit, a Think20 Japan associated event, with 221 speakers from 120 countries giving presentations in 60 sessions. “This research community is connected to communities of business leaders and policymakers worldwide, cognizant that none can achieve their goals independently of the others,” Global Solutions President Dennis J. Snower said.

This is the third summit supporting the T20 process, helping establish the international think-tank network as the intellectual backbone of the G20. The summit program is focused on priorities set by the Japanese G20 Presidency’s 2019 Task Forces: sustainable development, infrastructure finance, financial architecture, trade and investment, climate change, future of work and education, social cohesion and the future of politics, SME policy, and policies for aging populations.

Together, the world’s leading think tanks will guide policy innovations to help G20 leaders address pressing global challenges.

The summit welcomed German Chancellor Angela Merkel, EU Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans and G20 Sherpas from Germany (2017), Argentina (2018) and Saudi Arabia, which holds the T20/G20 Presidency in 2020.

GSI President Snower also presented Chancellor Merkel with this year’s new edition of the Global Solutions Journal. Download the journal here.

On the Horizon

In the months following the Global Solutions Summit, T20 Japan will finalize its work on the Task Force Policy Briefs.

These Policy Briefs will then be presented at the T20 Japan Summit in Tokyo, Japan in May and available on the G20 Insights platform soon.

The post Global Solutions Summit opens with the G20 Japan’s research and policy advice network appeared first on G20 Insights.

Kategorien: english, Ticker

Why you should care about the rise of DFIs

Devex - 10. April 2019 - 11:01
Kategorien: english

Protecting people displaced by disasters

D+C - 10. April 2019 - 10:30
The Platform on Disaster Displacement’s objective is to integrate the protection of refugees in international processes

Its mission is to carry forward the work of the Nansen Initiative established in 2011/12, which developed a Protection Agenda for Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement on the basis of regional consultations. That agenda was endorsed in 2015 by 109 states. The Platform on Disaster Displacement was launched at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit by Germany’s then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (see article by Sabine Balk in D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2017/4, Focus section). The chairmanship went first to Germany, then passed to Bangladesh. The next chair will be France. The Platform’s objective is to integrate the Protection Agenda in international processes. It has significantly helped to get the issue of climate change and disaster-induced displacement recognised in the UN Global Compact on Migration, the Sendai Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris climate-change talks. A resolution was passed in Paris to create a Task Force on Climate Change and Displacement, in which the Platform is involved. At a regional level, the Platform is mainly active in Latin America, East Africa and the South Pacific. It is largely supported by Germany. (wk)

Platform on Disaster Displacement:

Kategorien: english

Poverty and a lack of rights

D+C - 10. April 2019 - 10:03
Lebanon has taken in over a million refugees and is struggling with many problems

The Lebanese greeted the formation of their new government at the end of January with fireworks and celebratory gunfire. Over eight months of political crises had finally been overcome. The people hoped that this step would have a positive effect on the economy. However, Syrians in Lebanon had less reason to celebrate. The new Minister for Refugee Affairs, Saleh Gharib, belongs to the faction in the Lebanese government that is loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Correspondingly, Gharib’s first official act was not, for example, a visit to one of the many informal camps for Syrian refugees, but rather a whirlwind trip to Damascus. While there, he went along with the Syrian government’s official pronouncements that Syria was now safe and that everyone could return. This visit caused concern among refu­gees. They are very worried that they could be forced to repatriate.

Since the beginning of the conflict between the Syrian regime and armed opposition groups in 2011, millions of people have had to flee their homeland. Over 5 million Syrians crossed the border into neighbouring countries, primarily Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Roughly 1 million Syrian refugees have registered with the UN Refugee Agency in Lebanon (947,000 as of January 2019). There is also an unknown number of unregistered Syrians. Therefore approximately 20 % of Lebanon’s population is Syrian. Most of the people who fled the war settled in the border regions in the north and east of the country. These areas are among the poorest regions in Lebanon.

According to Nasser Yassin of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut (AUB), both the Lebanese host society and the Syrian refugees in Lebanon have reached a “state of exhaustion”. Approximately 70 % of Syrians live below the poverty line in deplorable conditions (see my contribution in D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2017/05, focus section). Over half of the Syrian children between the ages of three and 18 do not attend school. The majority of Lebanese who live in areas where Syrians have settled hold the refugees responsible for power and water shortages. It is not rare for Lebanese to protest against Syrian businesses for luring away customers with low prices. 

Many factors are responsible for this situation, Yassin explains. According to him, the number of immigrants is simply too high for Lebanon. The Cedar State is a politically fragile country that has not yet come to terms with its armed conflicts of past decades – not to mention its internal political tensions. Then there is the dilapidated state of its infrastructure. Furthermore, the researcher explains that the relationship between the Lebanese and the Syrian refugees is being strongly influenced by Lebanon’s prior experiences with Palestinian refugees. “A negative attitude towards refugees has become embedded in the collective memory of many Lebanese,” Yassin says. He believes that the withdrawal of international solidarity is also playing a role. In his opinion, the rise of populist, right-wing movements in the countries of the global North have changed these countries’ attitudes towards refugees. There is less willingness now to take in people who are fleeing their homelands.

A lack of political strategy

These issues are being exacerbated by the lack of a clear, well-thought-out strategy on the part of the Lebanese state: “Every group or local power in the country is whittling away on their own policy towards the Syrian refugees according to their own political and populist interests,” the researcher says.

A look back at the treatment of Syrian refugees by Lebanese authorities in past years supports the analysis of Nasser Yassin. Prior to 2015, Syrians could enter Lebanon without a visa. That was part of the close, though not unproblematic relationship between the two countries since each gained independence. The refugees crossed the border legally and were able to freely disperse over the entire country and register with the UN Refugee Agency. There were repeated discussions about and plans to build camps. The idea was to process and care for people at a central location. But these plans were never put into action. In fact, they were unpopular, given Lebanon’s experiences with the camps of the Palestinians, which had turned into permanent establishments. Instead, as a kind of regulation, the Interior Ministry introduced entry restrictions, high fees for extensions of stay and the kafala (in-country sponsor) system for Syrians.

Refugees came nevertheless, but from that point on they crossed illegally over the green border. Most Syrians did not have the financial means to extend their stay. The consequences have been catastrophic: over 70 % of Syrians in the Cedar State do not have a valid residence status. They have to work illegally. Hundreds of thousands of people are the victims of exploitation by domestic employers and of harassment by security agencies.

Khalil Jebara, a former advisor to the Interior Ministry, admits that the illegal status of hundreds of thousands of Syrians is not in Lebanon’s best interest, since the country has lost sight of and control over the people who are residing in its territory. But according to him, the state is incapable of devising a sensible refugee policy because each of the different Lebanese political forces that is also represented in the government has its own reading of the crisis in Syria and, correspondingly, its own approach to dealing with the refugees. The only consensus of all the different factions is “no” to “tawtin”, the permanent settlement of refugees, and “no” to easier access to work.

Non-Syrian refugees

However, if one compares the way the Lebanese state treats Syrian refugees with its policies towards other refugee groups, such as Palestinians, Iraqis or foreign workers from Asian and African countries, then it is possible to detect a pattern. People are forced to the margins of society and stripped of their rights. The result is disenfranchisement and poverty, says Nizar Shaghiyeh, an attorney and editor-in-chief of The Legal Agenda, a publication by an organisation of the same name that examines legal developments in Lebanon. Part of this pattern is also a strong focus on security. All refugees are categorised as potential security threats.

According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 422,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in Lebanon. However, the actual number of Palestinians is much lower: a 2017 census revealed that there are only about 170,000. They are descendants of the people who were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in neighbouring countries during the foundation of the State of Israel and the wars of 1948 and 1967. Many Palestinians live in camps dating from that time, which, over the decades, have developed into city districts and also often into slums.

Even though these Palestinians have lived in Lebanon for generations, the state denies them many rights. There are many jobs that they are not allowed to perform, particularly those that require higher qualifications. They are barred from acquiring property outside the camps. They are largely excluded from the state’s social and health insurance scheme. Palestinian children are not allowed to attend Lebanese state schools (see my contribution in the focus section of D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2017/01). They are treated like foreigners at the state university and are subject to a quota. For decades, the Lebanese government has used these policies to block the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon (“tawtin”).

The results of this discrimination are social decline and poverty. A 2012 study by the International Labour Organization (ILO) showed that half of Palestinians in Lebanon do not earn more than $ 333 a month. According to UNICEF, 96 % of six- to eleven-year-old Palestinian girls and boys go to school. Between the ages of 12 and 14, that number drops to 63 % and then to 40 % for 15- to 17-year-olds. Many young people work. The only opportunity Palestinians have to live a better life is to emigrate to other countries. Therefore it is no wonder that their numbers in Lebanon continue to decline. Returning to Palestine is nothing but a dream.

The situation is different for Syrians. Their homeland is accessible, but the conditions for a voluntary, safe and dignified return are lacking, even though war is no longer raging in many parts of the country. Whether and when these conditions will be fulfilled depends on the political process in Syria. Meanwhile, the next generation of young Syrians is growing up in Lebanon.

Nasser Yassin from the AUB is reminding rich countries of the global North of their duty. He is calling on them to take in more refugees in order to make Lebanon’s burden lighter and to give people hope for a better future.

Mona Naggar is a journalist and media trainer. She lives in Beirut, Lebanon.

Kategorien: english

Agriculture at risk

D+C - 10. April 2019 - 9:38
FAO sees food security at risk because of biodiversity loss

The FAO’s first report on the State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture explains why biodiversity is essential to food and agriculture. It also spells out what needs to be done to protect it.

Wildlife plays a part in food production, the FAO points out. That is the case, for example, when birds feed on pests. More­over, three-quarters of crops depend on pollinators. The FAO warns that bees are becoming rare and that other insect populations are dwindling too. Moreover, some species of bats and birds also serve as pollinators, but are at risk of extinction. 

Scientists know that, as a general principle, biodiversity makes food systems resilient to shocks. Biodiversity is not only threatened by climate change. Invasive species, urbanisation, pollution, resource depletion, destructive consumption habits and unsustainable agriculture practices matter too. These include overharvesting, soil degradation and intensive farming in general. Farms rely on ever fewer species of plants and animals. Industrial scale breeding, moreover, means that the genetic base of varieties concerned is small and keeps shrinking.

Government policies often either harm or ignore biodiversity. For instance, infrastructure development may be destructive – such as, when new roads, dams or mines destroy wildlife habitats. Such projects have “caused the degradation and fragmentation of ecosystems, destroying habitats and creating barriers to species’ migrations”. According to the authors, even development considered “low impact” and “environmentally friendly” often threatens ecosystems with high levels of biodiversity.

Scientists still do not fully understand many important issues. More research is needed, for instance concerning pollinators, wild foods and invertebrates. The FAO warns that it is difficult to tell exactly what an ecosystem is worth. The value should be considered, but is mostly not taken into account. The authors suggest that a standard method for measuring what an ecosystem contributes to the economy – for instance in terms of productivity – would be useful. Such a method would help to convince policymakers, for example, and educate the public. The FAO calls for more research on the matter.

In political debate, agriculture and nature conservation are often considered to be opposites. The FAO warns that this assumption is wrong. It calls for more and closer collaboration amongst producers, consumers, marketers, policymakers, state agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Such cooperation, moreover, is needed internationally. The authors call for effective policies and stringent implementation, which depends on financial, technical and human resources. In their view, policies and implementation so far have proved too weak.

The report praises the Mexican approach to international and interdisciplinary cooperation. The Mexican biodiversity commission CONABIO (Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad) coordinates action to preserve traditional farming methods in cooperation with partners in other Central American countries. CONABIO organises funding from the public and private sector and provides money and seedlings to farmers, encouraging them to rehabilitate their land, prevent harmful slash-and-burn practice and comply with sustainable practices.

Mexicans can access CONABIO information on food security, conservation and soil and water use. Additionally, CONABIO promotes certification for sustainable coffee production which increases incentives for farmers as market value increases. This could be a model for other countries in regard to other products, the FAO report suggests.

Ninety-one countries submitted country reports to the FAO for the biodiversity study. The bad news is that biodiversity is in decline and the levels of protection are not yet sufficient. The good news is that biodiversity-friendly efforts are increasing. Ever more actors are realising that biodiversity really does matter.

FAO 2019: The State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture.

Kategorien: english

‘Once-in-a-generation opportunity’ will be squandered, warns Guterres, unless social, economic, environmental challenges are met

UN #SDG News - 10. April 2019 - 3:13
Unless the world faces its “social, economic and environmental challenges head-on”, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said on Tuesday, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), will not be met.
Kategorien: english

Localising emergency preparedness and response through partnerships

ODI - 10. April 2019 - 0:00
Lessons from Islamic Relief's exercise in localisation of aid, partnerships and capacity strengthening.
Kategorien: english

Five priorities for the new World Bank president

ODI - 10. April 2019 - 0:00
Improve accountability; target an end to extreme poverty; help MICs transition away from aid; prioritise labour migration; engage more in fragile areas.
Kategorien: english

IMF cuts global growth outlook, but predicts pick up later in 2019

UN ECOSOC - 9. April 2019 - 21:47
The outlook for global growth is at its lowest since the financial crisis, but expected to pick up in the second half of 2019, the International Monetary Fund reported on Tuesday, so long as “policy missteps that could harm economic activity” are avoided.
Kategorien: english

Triangular, the shape of things to come?

OECD - 9. April 2019 - 16:18
By Mario Pezzini, Alicia Barcena, Stefano Manservisi  This blog is part of an ongoing series evaluating various facets of Development in Transition As the global community gathers in Argentina to mark the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, we have an additional opportunity to discuss, debate, and design a reinvigorated … Continue reading Triangular, the shape of things to come?
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